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This study presents a framework for the detailed examination of Soviet Middle
Eastern policy from 1967 to the present. The volatility of the current Middle Eastern
situation and the inherent risk of superpower involvement lends a sense of urgency to
the task of correctly interpreting Soviet interests, objectives and commitments in the
Middle East. This paper uses past Soviet policy behavior to construct a model for the
understanding of current and future Soviet activity by measuring the impact of internal
and external inputs to the decisionmaking process. The field of study was limited to
two countries, Egypt and Syria, chosen for their leading roles in the development of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The American decision to launch a retaliatory raid on Libya in April 1986, and a
situation on the Israeli-Syrian border recently described as one in which "a
miscalculation by either side could ignite an armed conflict." 1 lends new urgency to the
task of correctly assessing Soviet interests, objectives and commitments in the Middle
East. Given the region's inherent political instability, the high superpower stakes, and
the growing superpower force levels in the Middle East, there is a persistent risk that
any local conflict could escalate uncontrollably into a full scale superpower
confrontation. It is therefore essential to determine the depth of Soviet obligations to
its Middle Eastern clients and the importance of these states to Moscow's global
policies.
Attempting to comprehend, much less predict, Soviet foreign policy decisions is
never easy. Soviet policymaking has been subjected to varied interpretation and
speculation by countless Western observers and analysts. This paper represents an
effort to construct a framework of analysis that will interpret past Soviet policies with
an eye towards using these interpretations to explain current and predict future Soviet
decisions. More specifically, this paper will seek to explain the "outputs" of Soviet
foreign policy in the Middle East, which at times appears contradictory and self-
defeating, by measuring the relative impact of certain critical "inputs" to the
decisionmaking process.
These inputs will take two forms-internal and external. Internal debate as a
determinant of Soviet foreign policymaking is a subject of much speculation and
controversy. Frequently, Soviet decisionmaking, particularly in foreign policy, is
depicted as monolithic' on the assumption that there is a rigid concurrence within the
Kremlin on all Soviet foreign policy goals, and that policy making can be adequately
explained in terms of the 'rational actor model.' 2
'"Israel and Syria Believed to Face Risk of Conflict", New York Times, 19 May
1986, p. 1.
See Graham Allison. The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban \[issile
Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971). In his book Allison defines the rational
actor model as one in which "the nation or government, conceived as a rational,
unitarv decisionmaker is the agent. The aeent has one set of unified eoals, one set of
perceived options, and a single estimate of consequences." p. 32. Authors who have
adopted the "totalitarian" method of explaining Soviet foreien policv decisions might be
saidto be advocates of the rational actor approach. Among the foremost works in this
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With regard to "internal inputs" this paper will attempt to measure the level of
concurrence which exists within the Soviet governmental hierarchy to determine
whether high-level debates on foreign policy issues have forced policy modifications.
Of special interest will be any evidence of disagreements between the political
apparatus (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the military- leadership on
matters pertaining to the Soviet presence in the Middle East, the causes of those
debates, and their outcomes. It is anticipated that such debates, when they can be
observed, will revolve around different interpretations of the importance of Middle
Eastern clients to the overall security of the Soviet Union, and the level of risk
acceptable to support those clients.
"External" inputs refer specifically to the pressure a client state can exert on
Soviet policy. Even in those instances where there is seemingly complete agreement
within the Kremlin, Moscow must still consider the needs and demands of the client
state. The problems that client relationships can present to the superpowers was
explained by Stanley Hoffman:
Both the Lnited States and the Soviet Union, out of reciprocal fear and opposed
interests, trv to court neutrals, to win friends and keep them, to detach the
friends of rivals. This need for support from lesser powers (whether for strateeic,
diplomatic, or svmbolic reasons) tends to make the Americans and the Russians
dependent on their clients: the latter want to safeguard their independence,and
exploit even,' possible asset in their positions, and this subverts the hierarchv.
The competition between the superpowers results in smaller states sometimes wielding
influence disproportionate to their apparent power, at least within some range of
activities. The Soviet willingness to adapt and adjust policies to accomodate client
requirements is an important, but poorly understood, phenomenon. Further, the
ability of the Kremlin to direct the foreign and domestic policies of its clients is often
grossly overestimated.
To measure the impact of internal debate and client pressure on Soviet foreign
policymaking, this paper will present a focused comparison of Soviet relations with two
field are. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt-Brace,
1951). Carl Friedrich. Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19^4),
and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brezezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
3 Stanlev Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy
(New York: "McGraw Hill. 1968). pp. 19-20.
of its foremost Middle Eastern client states, Egypt and Syria. Egypt had much to offer
as a case study.
• There is an abundance of information on Soviet-Egyptian relations. Besides the
numerous interpretations of the relationship, there have been detailed studies
done on the debates within the Soviet hierarchv on the proper approach to
Soviet-Egvptian relations. Additionally several excellent Eevptian sources are
available. "most notablv journalist Mohamed Heikal and President Anwar Sadat,
who provide invaluable insights into Soviet policvmaking from the clients
perspective.
• The link, with Egvpt was crucial to Soviet policies in the Middle East and the
rest of the Third world. For manv vears, Egvpt was an acknowledged leader of
the Arab world and the "non-alighe'd" movement. From 1955- 1973 Eevnt was
the showcase of Soviet efforts in the Third World. Anv break or"flaw in
relations promised repercussions far bevond Egypt's borders and further
sensitized Vloscow to the demands of its client.
• Finallv. Eevpt provides a "closed case." It is possible to track the relationship
from beginning to end, and draw important conclusions about the potential
underlvine Haws in Soviet policies, the limits of Soviet ability to control a client
state, 'ana
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the difficulties Moscow might encounter in subsequent client
relationships.
A comparable investigation of the relations between the Soviet Union and the
Republic of Syria presents a far more difficult task. In contrast to the Egyptian case
there is a marked lack of information on internal debates within the Kremlin, or
detailed presentations of the relationship from a Syrian perspective. Despite these
drawbacks, Syria was selected for this study for several reasons.
• The Republic of Svria has replaced Eevpt as the "linchpin" of Soviet relations
with the Arab world. This factor wilf'make Moscow more sensitive to Svrian
demands and needs.
• Svria is the foremost of the "rejectionist" or "confrontation" states dedicated to
the destruction of Israel. If a major Arab-Israeli war is to break out it most
likely will occur on the Syrian- Israeli border.
• Given Svria's active support of Palestinian terrorists, its activities in Lebanon,
and its violent opposition to America's client state of Israel, no Middle Eastern
state, with the possible exception of Libya, presents a more formidable problem
to American policymakers.
The underlying premise of this paper is one which is common to most historical
writings; that the foreign policy problems any country faces today are not entirely
unlike those it faced in the past. An accurate interpretation of Soviet responses to past
Middle East opportunities and crises should provide a means of filling the lacunae in
our present knowledge. A framework of analysis which accurately explains the
objectives of Soviet policy towards Egypt may help predict Soviet policies towards
Svria and much of the rest of the Arab world.
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II. METHODOLOGY
Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East is, and always has been, a balancing act.
The challenges confronted by Soviet decisionmakers are not uncommon in modern
statecraft; the dynamics of balancing gains and risks, credibility and confrontation.
However, these problems seem particularly acute when reviewing Soviet relations with
their Middle Eastern clients during the timeframe in question (1967-1985). The
Kremlin was repeatedly forced to assess the relative importance of maintaining
credibility in the eyes of the "progressive" Arab states as opposed to pursuing the
tangible benefits of detente with the West. As a result, Soviet policy adopted a
dualistic nature, often attempting to endorse Arab aspirations while at the same time
subtly seeking to restrain Arab policy.
A. HYPOTHESES
In building a framework that will bring meaning and consistency to the
interpretation and analysis of Soviet decisionmaking, it is first necessary to develop a
series of hypotheses. This paper will begin with a purposely general hypothesis
designed to serve as a focus for this study of Soviet policy in the Middle East:
• The Soviet objective in the Middle East is to maintain a viable presence in the
region while avoiding military intervention.
This hypothesis is presented as a "straw man" of an optimum Soviet policy for
the Middle East. There are several reasons why Soviet decisionmakers might be
expected to adopt such a policy. Soviet political leaders are anxious to reap the
economic benefits of expanded trade with Middle Eastern clients, while Soviet
penetration of the politico-economic structure of Arab clients would allow Moscow to
influence regional affairs. From a military viewpoint, the positioning of Soviet forces
in Arab client states, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean (Egypt, Syria), would
serve as a counter to Western forces in the region, such as the U.S. Sixth fleet. At the
same time, however, Moscow will seek to avoid active involvement in regional
hostilities, specifically the Arab- Israeli conflict, because it recognizes that any form of
active involvement or intervention might provoke a superpower confrontation. While
this policy involves the Soviet Union in the constant pursuit of suitable Arab clients, it
also forces the Soviets to carefully limit their obligations to their client states and
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establish effective means to prevent their Arab clients from escalating a regional
conflict to a point at which Soviet intervention becomes unavoidable.
The hypothesis will be tested by applying it to several specific events that
occurred in Soviet relations with Egypt (1967-1976) and Syria (1980-1985). In each
case, it will be determined whether the Soviets adhered to a policy that maximized their
presence, yet minimized their risks. Internal and external inputs to the Soviet
decisionmaking process will be measured to determine whether there was any effort to
force Soviet policymakers to abandon this conservative stance and adopt a more active
stand in support of their clients. It is anticipated that pressure to modify Soviet policy
would be applied either by the Soviet military or by the respective Arab client itself.
These measurements should provide an understanding of the level of concurrence
within the higher levels of Soviet decisionmaking and the ability of the Soviet Union to
control the actions of its client states.
B. INTERNAL INPUTS
No foreign policy functions in a vacuum. One must consider both the
international context and the domestic considerations involved in any foreign policy
decision. There is evidence of disagreements within the Kremlin over the proper
conduct of Soviet policy. Internal debates, when they occur, should revolve largely
around the level of acceptable risks in the pursuit of Soviet policy objectives in the
Middle East. This paper will focus upon disagreements that arise between the Party
and the military leadership. 4
"Party" is a very broad term when applied to the Soviet government. All major
Soviet decisionmakers, including those in the military, are party members. For the
purposes of this paper, the term party will refer to the Secretary General and his
supporters within the party apparatus. The party position will be determined largely
through a review of Pravda, the daily newspaper that serves as the chief organ of the
Two recent studies examine the debate between the partv and the militarv. In
Soviet Involvement in [he Middle East: Policy Formulation W66-I973 (Boulder CO:
YVestview Press t 1978), liana Kass focused on disagreements that developed between
political and militarv interest groups over the formulation of Soviet policv towards
Egvpt and other Middle Eastern countries following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Dina
Rome Spechler. in Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policv (Washington DC:
Lniversitv Press of America. 1978). examined the conflicting" attitudes of Soviet
political, 'ideological and militarv elites over prospective Soviet responses to the 1973
October War. ""Both of these studies entailed an exhaustive review of Soviet press
reporting and proved invaluable in the development of this paper. The military's
ability to influence Soviet foreign policv decision making is also discussed bv Malcom
Mackintosh in "The Soviet Militarv:' Influence on Foreign Policv." Problems in
Communism 22 (Sept-Oct 1973) and' Vernon Aspaturian in. "The Soviet Military-
Industrial Complex - Does it Exist?" Journal of International Affairs 26, (1972).
Party Central Committee. Pravda articles can be expected to reflect the policies
supported by the party leaders at any given time. For example, in the late 1960s and
early 1970s the party, led by then Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, was the primary
proponent of Soviet detente policy with the United States. The views expressed by
Pravda during this period stress the necessity of finding a peaceful solution to the
Arab- Israeli conflict and the avoidance of a detente-shattering superpower
confrontation. When relations with the United States worsened after 1975, Pravda
deemphasized the need for peaceful accomodations and adopted a harder line.
The military plays a special role in the Soviet Union. It is a mainstay of the
regime; it is primarily through military strength that the Soviet Union retains its
superpower position. As a result, it may be expected that the military will have
considerable influence over foreign policy decisions that concern Soviet national
security and overseas strategies. Any "dissenting" military views would be observed in
Krasnaya Zvezda the daily newspaper published by the Defense Ministry. The Soviet
military might be expected to disagree with the party on the relative importance of
detente to Soviet national security and question any apparent willingness to sacrifice
the interests of the progressive Arab states to improve Soviet-American relations,
especially in countries such as Egypt and Syria in which the Soviet military benefited
from an established presence. The relationship between the party and the military on
Soviet foreign policy might be hypothesized as follows:
• The military's interest in, and ability to influence, the course of relations with any
Soviet client will vary in direct proportion with the tangible benefits {bases,
presence, etc) the military derives from the relationship.
To determine the validity of this hypothesis, the following questions will be
considered when reviewing each event in the Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Syrian
relationships.
• Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct ofrelations?
• Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship?
The use of Soviet open source material to determine party and military attitudes
towards Middle East policy necessitates the consideration of a variety of caveats. One
must always consider its controlled nature and propaganda intent. Several authors
have openly questioned the assumption that any Soviet press organ might be allowed
to adopt dissenting viewpoints. The Scotts, in their popular volume on the Soviet
Armed Forces remarked:
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The belief held bv some Western analvsts - that there is a semi-independent
military press in which generals and admirals mav express their own particular
views - does not correspond with the actuality of the tieht Party-militarv control
that is exercised over all military publications.
Soviet analyst Karen Dawisha also warns of the dangers inherent in drawing
inferences about the positions of top Soviet leaders from the editorial columns of
selected newspapers. In a recent work she commented:
Although great differences have sometimes been gleaned bv the comparison of
individual articles or a studv of the overall trend of editorials over time, the
assumption that unsigned editorials in any newspaper represent the previously
unknown views of a specific leader or faction is questionable. ... all newspapers
are published bv the partv committee within the ministrv or public bodv
concerned. Krashaya Zvezda, for example, is formally the newspaper of the partv
committee within trie Ministry of Defense, not a paper in which the military can
express independent views.
Dawisha, the Scotts, and others emphasize the ability of the party apparatus to
control all aspects of internal Soviet decisionmaking and believe the Soviet
policymaking process can be explained in 'rational actor' terms. There is, however, a
body of authors who would argue that the complexity of Soviet society would defy any
such attempt at complete control. For example, Roman Kolkowicz, doubts that Soviet
society can avoid the development of interest groups:
The emergence of articulated interest groups, then, is concomitant of a society
which is becoming internallv complex a"hd which is pledged, at home and abroad,
to a grand political design which depends on an efficient technological,
economical and managerial substructure.'
In her work on the influence of domestic constraints on Soviet foreign policy,
Dina Rome Spechler has adopted a similar line of reasoning to defend her use of Soviet
open source material as a basis for an investigation into elite opinions. Spechler
observed:
-Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (3 ed),
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 28S.
6 Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1984), p. 7.
Roman Kolkowicz. "The Military'' in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklvn Griffiths.




It is no longer possible to assume that Soviet foreign affairs are operated bv a
sinsle mind/ operating in isolation from and without regard for the opinions' of
others in hish positions. There is too much evidence that policymaking in the
LSSR involves conflict and compromise for such models o[ Soviet
decisionmaking to have much plausibilitv. ... In a hiehlv bureaucratized societv
like the Sovief Union, it would be most surprising if individual decisionmaker's
did not often act as defenders of organizational Interests and views. . . .the
abundant evidence of the influence of elite groups on the making of Soviet
internal policv gives us reason to suspeci that such groups also have a" substantial
impact on the snaping of foreign policv.
Finally. Edward Warner in The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An
Institutional View questions the actual impact of the party on military literature and
suggests a more balanced view that also considers the background of military authors.
Warner acknowledges that the Main Political Administration (MPA) controls the
content and ideological direction of all literature produced by the Military Publishing
House and that the editor of Krasnaya Zvezda is a member of the executive bureau of
the MPA. However, he notes, careful examination reveals that while the MPA was
originally a network of "political commissars." there has been a significant shift in its
function:
While the MPA remains true to its original task of preventing the militarv's
blatant disregard of Partv directives, it appears at the same time to have come
largelv to embrace the ' values and preferences of the professional military
establishment, the verv group it is supposed to control. As a matter of fact, the
academic researchers ana" inaoctrinational specialists of the MPA are among the
leading articulators and most visible proponents of the institutional ideologv of
the Soviet militarv establishment.
Warner finds the source of this change in the recruitment of political officers
from promising regular officers. As such they are part of the military establishment.
sharing its traditions, prestige and responsibilities. Consequently, despite the
institutional provision of party control over military writing, it can certainly be argued
that military authors writing for a military newspaper would profess a military-
perspective and that such an emphasis would be unavoidable, so completely have
political officers been assimilated into the military establishment.
8 Dina Rome Spechler. Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington.
DC: University Press of Amenca. 1978). p. 6.
9Edward L. Warner III. The Militarv in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An
Institutional View (New York: Praeger. 19"")." pp. 73-74.
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The review of Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda will be supplemented by information
gleaned from other Soviet sources, such as Tass pronouncements and items from
Izvestia and International Affairs. In all cases an effort has been made to filter out the
most obvious propaganda. Additional insights will also be found from client sources,
such as Heikal 10 or President Sadat, who were indirectly aware of Kremlin debates on
policy matters related to their countries.
C. EXTERNAL INPUTS
The building of a foreign policy ultimately will be guided by a state's perception
of its national interests. This holds as true for clients as it does for superpowers. It is
often forgotten that a client in a relationship can wield influence disproportionate to its
power. The term client itself is misleading (though it will be used throughout this
paper for matters of convenience) because it implies a dependancy relationship that
may not exist. On the contrary, many Arab leaders have taken pains to assert their
independence from Soviet control and to prove, as Egyptian President Nasser
remarked, "There is a big difference between cooperation and subservience." 11 The
Soviets discovered early in their Middle Eastern experience that Arab leaders had no
intention of exchanging Soviet for Western domination. At times the interests of
clients will dovetail with those of the Soviet Union. At other times Moscow will
receive some unpleasant surprises. Most importantly, clients retain the option to alter
or depart from a relationship if the Soviets fail to meet their expectations.
In turn, the Soviet Union will always place the Middle East in the context of its
own national security concerns. The Soviet leadership has always believed that
Western domination would threaten their national security by placing potentially
hostile forces directly on Russia's southern border. For this reason, beginning in 1955,
the Soviets have attempted to woo the Arab states by presenting themselves as a
disinterested friend of the Arabs, an alternative to Western imperialism, and a source of
economic aid. In return, the Soviets sought political influence and economic benefits
Mohamed. Heikal was the editor of the leading Egvptian newspaper Al Ahram
and a close confidant of Nasser, serving for a time as' his Information Minister.
Heikal's access to Nasser makes him a particularlv useful source for gaining an
Eevptian perspective on the Soviet-Eevptian relatio'nship. Heikal was vehementlv
"Egvpt-first" in his political orientation and holds the distinction of having been
savaeelv criticized bv Pravda for questioning Soviet motives in Egypt and imprisoned
bv Sadat for his outspoken criticism of the Egvptian President's alignment with the
West.
11 From a speech before the Arab Socialist Union in 1968. See Alvin Z.
Rubinstein. Red Star on the .Xile: The Soviet - Egvptian Relationship since the June War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 64.
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in the "progressive" Arab states. Later, Moscow would attempt to gain military
privileges, in the form of naval and air facilities, that would allow them to monitor US
forces in the Mediterranean, secure their Southern borders, and if necessary, disrupt
Western economic and military lifelines.
The Soviet Union would undoubtedly prefer to deploy its forces to the Middle
East while avoiding involvement in regional conflicts. This has proven impossible and
the Soviets are now deeply involved in the disputes and controversies of the area. The
Soviets have maintained their foothold in the Middle East by backing the Arabs in the
Arab-Israeli dispute. The ongoing nature of this dispute presents the Soviets with a
constant danger that they may be required to honor commitments made to their Arab
clients. This might, in extreme circumstances, entail a direct Soviet military
intervention in the Middle East with its consequent potential for a superpower
confrontation, an eventuality that Moscow is certainly anxious to avoid. 1 "
The challenge for Soviet leaders is to ensure its Arab clients possess the military
power to successfully oppose the Israelis, while at the same time preventing the
uncontrolled escalation of an Arab-Israeli conflict, and avoiding commitments which
might obligate them to intervene in a Middle East conflict at a time and place not of
their own choosing. Since the Soviets have elected to substitute modern weapons for
direct action in the Middle East, great care must be taken to regulate the arms How.
One mechanism used to achieve this has been imposition of a "ceiling of
sophistication." 13 The Soviets have limited the warmaking capabilitiesof their Arab
clients by withholding or restricting the use of, weapons that might allow their clients
to pursue a military objective beyond that which Moscow is prepared to support, such
as the destruction of Israel. This would include such weapons as long range bombers
or fighter-bombers and surface-to-surface missiles. Further, the Soviets will try to
avoid giving any one client the capability to attack Israel alone, without an alliance
with at least one other Arab state. This increases Soviet opportunities to control the
situation. The Soviet mechanism to restrain the Arab states can be stated as:
12 Francis Fukuvama has written two Rand Corp. reports dealing withpast and
potential Soviet mihtarv intervention in the Middle East. The first, Soviet Threats to
Intervene in the Middle' East 1956-19/3 Rand Note N-1577-FF (Santa Monica, CA:
Rand. 1980). discusses Soviet threats to intervene in the Middle East in 19:>6 1957
1968. 1967. 1970 and 1973. In Escalation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Rand
Paper: P-7021, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1981), Fukuvama presents scenarios in
which the Soviets intervene with military units in a Syrian- Israeli conflict.
13This useful term is used bv Amnon Sella in his book Soviet Military and
Political Conduct in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 120.
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• The Soviet Union will impose a "ceiling of sophistication" on arms imports to Arab
client states that will exclude offensive weapons that might give those clients the
ability to initiate or escalate a regional conflict unilaterally.
The Arab states have interests and priorities that are not always compatible with
those of the Soviet Union. For example, the Arabs were adamant in their demands to
regain the territory lost to Israel in the 1967 war and advocated military action to
achieve this end. This ran counter to the Soviet interest in preventing the escalation of
regional tensions and created a fundamental paradox for Soviet policymakers. As one
Egyptian observed, "No doubt they wanted a solution to the Middle East problem,
but they did not want a war." 14
Soviet efforts to manage the release of arms in a way designed to limit Egyptian
warmaking capabilities was a constant source of tension between the two countries.
Anwar Sadat's bitter remarks decrying Soviet arms policy might have been attributed
to a number of Arab leaders:
The Soviet Union had planned to provide us with just enough to meet our most
immediate needs and at the same time maintain its role as our guardian and
ensure its presence in the region - a more important goal from the Soviet point
of view.
Even the most frustrated client state, however, is likely to maintain its own
political agenda and remain impervious to Soviet pressures to abandon policies
considered vital to its national interests. Nasser refused to yield in his determination to
regain the Sinai, while Syria's President Assad has ignored Soviet admonishments not
to pursue his personal aspirations in Lebanon. It will be seen that the cooperativeness
of a client often fluctuates with the immediacy of the threat and the availability of
alternative sources of weapons. More significantly, client state leaders are often quick
to recognize the pressures that they can bring to bear on their superpower sponsor to
force them to to accede to their needs and demands. Every client can collect a set of
"bargaining chips'" for use in dealing with the superpowers. These chips are derived
primarily from the clients strategic location, but also can develop from a Soviet desire
to preserve their military presence or protect their investments in a client. A
hypothesis for the ability of a client state to pressure the Soviet Union might be as
14Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p.
164.
15Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p.
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follows:
• The greater the perceived strategic importance of a state the greater bargaining
strength.
To determine the validity of the hypotheses regarding Soviet relations with Egypt
and Syria the following questions will be asked.
Was there a conflict between the foreign policv objectives of the Soviet Union
and the client state?
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
(specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed?
Did the client attempt to brine pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modifv arms policies? What mechanism was used? Were thev
successful?
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision?
In summary, the hypotheses to be investigated in this paper are:
The Soviet objective in the Middle East is to maintain a viable presence in the
region while avoiding military intervention.
The military's interest in, and ability to influence the course of, relations with any
Soviet client will vary in direct proportion with the tangible benefits {bases,
presence, etc) the military from the relationship.
Soviet Union will impose a "ceiling of sophistication" on arms imports to Arab
client states that will exclude offensive weapons that might give those clients the
ability to initiate or escalate a regional conflict unilaterally.
The greater the perceived strategic importance of a client, the greater its
bargaining strength.
D. CASES
This study will determine the impact of internal and external inputs on ten
specific events, six involving Soviet-Egyptian relations and four involving Soviet-Syrian
relations. Each event signifies a juncture at which Soviet policymakers had to make
fundmental decisions regarding the course of future arms transfer policies and the
management of Soviet-client relations. For Egypt the events will be:
The Soviet decision to re-arm and train the Egyptian armed forces after the
disastrous 1967 Arab- Israeli war.
The Soviet decision to deplov combat troops to Egypt in 1970 to supplement
Egyptian air defense during the "War of Attrition."
The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship, signed in March
The expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in 1972.
Soviet decisionmaking during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The final breakdown and termination of Soviet-Egyption relations in 1976.
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Key events for Soviet-Syrian relations:
• The Soviet-Svrian Treatv of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1980, and
the series of crises that immediately followed the signing of the Treaty.
• Soviet support for Syria during the 1982 War in Lebanon.
• The Soviet decision to resupply Syria with modern weapons in 1982/83.
• The current state of Soviet-Syrian relations.
The case studies begin after the Arab defeat in the six day war of June 1967.
However, an understanding of the foundations of Soviet-Arab ties is crucial to an
accurate evaluation of the depth of the Soviet commitment to the Arab cause, and the
degree of ideological affinity that exists between Soviet Marxists and Arab
progressives. To discover the source of the Soviet-Arab connection this study will
begin with the first substantial contacts in 1955.
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III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY:
1955-1967
A. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Lnion cannot remain indifferent to the situation arising in the region
of the Near and Middle East, since the formation of these blocs and the
establishment of foreign militarv bases on the territories of the countries of the
Near and Middle East nave direct bearing on the security of the USSR. 10
This statement, issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 April
1955. ushered in a new era in Soviet Middle Eastern policy. Prompted by a desire to
counter the Baghdad Pact 17 and prevent other Middle Eastern groupings with links to
NATO members, Moscow initiated a broad offensive in the political, economic and
military spheres designed to attract Arab clients and deny the West a dominant
position in the region. The stunning initial success of this Soviet policy can best be
attributed to what one author termed "a singularly happy concatenation of events" 18 in
which emerging Soviet interests in the region coincided with revolutionary trends in the
Arab states.
This chapter will cover the period from 1955, when the first Soviet-Egyptian arms
agreement signalled the beginning of Moscow's political and military involvement in
the Middle East, to 1967, when the catastrophic defeat of the Egyptian Army at the
hands of the Israelis radically altered the Soviet-Egyptian relationship and forced
Moscow to take on commitments previously unheard of in a non-communist country.
To understand the importance of 1967 as a watershed in Soviet Middle Eastern policy,
one must first discuss the transformation of Soviet policies over the course o[ the
previous twelve years.
16Cited in Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 4.
17The Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955 bv Turkev, Pakistan. Iran. Iraq, and
Great Britain. While the United States chose not to sign the treatv. American civil and
militarv representatives were active on the various committees of the organization,
making the United States a member in fact, if not in name, of the Baghdad Alliance.
See Georee Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N\: Cornell
UniversityTress, 1980), p. 796.
18Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: Praeger,
1959), p. 161.
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Three major factors combined to make 1955 a critical year for Soviet policy in
the Middle East. First, the collapse of the European empires after the Second World
War brought about circumstances favorable for the Soviet penetration of the Middle
East. Colonial administrations were succeeded by "progressive-nationalist" states.
These regimes came to power demanding an end to Western domination and exhibited,
as Walter Laqueur observed "an overwhelming desire to defy the West." 19 Additionally,
the governments of the radical Arab states espoused economic and political values and
methods compatible with those of the Soviet Union, such as state controlled
industrialization, state imposed central planning and single party government. This
commonality of beliefs and goals made countries such as Egypt or Syria susceptible to
Soviet ideas and potential allies of the Soviet Union.20
Second, the Soviets benefitted from the inability of Western policymakers to
formulate a common Middle Eastern policy. The serious divisions between the British,
French and Americans over the correct approach to the Middle East problem would
culminate in the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. In the early 1950s the West was unable to
adjust to Arab nationalism, and its fixation on alliance systems, such as the Baghdad
Pact, served only to polarize regional rivalries. Few Arabs accepted Western
protestations that there was a fundamental difference between the freedom of the West
and the tyranny of the Soviet Union. Having experienced Western imperialism, Arab
skepticism in this regard was certainly understandable. As one Arab writer observed at
the time:
The majority of Arabs, opposed as they were to Communist doctrine, were
nevertheless Tar more concerned with their own unhappv experiences at the hands
of the West. For it was the West that was exercising tvrannv over Arab fortunes
and inllictine grave injustice in Palestine. If the west traditionally stood for
libertv and justice, in its dealings with the Arabs it had betraved these' very ideals.
The East-West conflict appeared to be more of a duel -between power bfocs and
national interests than a contest between good and evil.- 1
Even the United States, unable to dissociate itself from its NATO allies who were
former imperial powers, remained estranged from the new Arab states despite a
1 Laqueur, p. 214.
20Georee Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 1.
21 Fayez A. Sayegh, "Arab Nationalism Today," Current History 33 (November
1 7J / )'. ±Oj.
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substantial reserve of pro-American feeling in many Arab countries, including Egypt. 22
One reason was that American foreign policy in the early 1950s was dominated by
what has been described as "International McCarthyism" 23 which automatically
condemned as communist inspired any effort to alter the international status-quo.
Finally, Western support for Israel was universally condemned throughout the Arab
world.
The third major factor was the relaxation of self-imposed restraints on Soviet
foreign policy. Freed from Stalin's confining "two camp" doctrine, Soviet policy
initiatives were brilliantly timed to take full advantage of the breakdown in relations
between the Arab states and the West. In direct contrast with the West, the Soviet
Union presented itself as sympathetic to Arab nationalism, in favor of Arab unity, and
solidly anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. However before Moscow could fully benefit
from the dissolution of the status-quo in the Middle East, there had to be a
fundamental reinterpretation of Marxist- Leninist ideology as it applied to the
developing world.
B. REINTERPRETING COMMUNIST DOCTRINE
1. Soviet Policies under Lenin and Stalin
Early Soviet policy towards the Middle East must be viewed in the wider
context of Soviet policy toward the Third World. Lenin viewed the underdeveloped
colonial countries as "the weakest link" in the imperialist-colonialist system and
credited them with substantial revolutionary' potential. Liberation movements were
seen as natural allies of the socialist revolution, even those led by bourgeois-nationalist
elements. In 1920 the Second Comintern Congress urged all communist parties to
support struggles for self-determination. However, when the Soviet state came under
pressure from nationalist movements inside its own borders (Caucasus, Central Asia)
these movements were brutally crushed and Moscow's interest in promoting self-
determination declined accordingly. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Soviet objectives in
the Third World were pursued by such tools of Soviet influence as the Comintern and
lesser front organizations. Even this limited involvement was curtailed in the late
1930s when Stalin's desire for a "collective security" alliance system with the Western
22 Ivar Spector, "Soviet Foreign Policy in the Arab World," Current History 36
(January 1959): 17.
23 Laqueur, p. 319.
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powers to combat Hitler forced an abandonment of efforts to ferment trouble for the
Western colonial powers. 24
Despite the rapid disintegration of the colonial empires after the Second
World War, the Soviet Union remained disinterested in the affairs of the developing
world. Involvement was limited to support for subversive Communist organizations in
such places as China, Indochina, and Malaya. A cautious attitude was adopted
towards the Middle East as Stalin waited to see whether the Arab League would adopt
a "reactionary" or "progressive" course of action. Stalin's eventual decision that the
Arab League was a British agency and "an instrument in the struggle against the
national liberation movement in the Middle East"25 was indicative of his division of the
post-war world into two "camps", one socialist and the other imperialist, while denying
the existence of a neutral camp between the two. According to this theory, the
governments of the newly formed nations, since they were generally nationalist and not
truly socialist, were members of the imperialist camp. Stalin refused to believe that
political emancipation could be achieved under the leadership of bourgeoisie
nationalists. As one prominent Soviet Third World specialist pointed out, "Stalin's
theory of colonial revolution proceeds from the fact that the solution of the colonial
problem ... is impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of
imperialism."26
Stalin's failure to exploit the differences between the Third World nationalists
and the imperial powers delayed efforts to extend Soviet influence into the developing
countries for several years. In fact, this policy was in many ways dangerously
counterproductive. Stalin's dogmatic sectarian approach generated a reaction in the
West that increased the power of anti-communist politicians and spurred the
development of the chain of anti-Soviet alliances around the periphery of the Soviet
Union.27 Stalin's rigid policies were not to change during his lifetime. Only after his
death in 1953 were Soviet decisionmakers free to formulate policies necessary to exploit
the anti-Western sentiments and Socialist sympathies of the developing world.
An excellent summation of Soviet policies towards the Third World can be
found in Alexander R. Alexiev. The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World, Rand Note




Prof. Ivan Potekhin, cited in Alexiev, p. 5.
Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and the War in the
Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 178. The Baghdad
Pact was one in this chain of alliances.
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2. Changes under Khrushchev
Soviet policies and attitudes towards the Third World changed dramatically in
the mid-1950's under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev liberated the
Soviet Union from its self-imposed post-war isolationism and Russia emerged as an
actor on the international scene. In order to promote a more active global strategy
many of the more rigid doctrinal principles of the Stalin era were either dropped or
radically modified to provide an ideological foundation for Khrushchev's new course.
Specifically. Soviet policymakers produced a formula that justified Soviet relations with
bourgeoisie nationalist governments in pre-capitalist societies.
The most important fundamental change adopted by the new Soviet leadership
was the abandonment of the Stalinist precept of the inevitability of war between the
two opposing social systems. In its place Khrushchev proclaimed the possibility, or
perhaps necessity, of "peaceful coexistence". This theory of peaceful coexistence had
two corolaries of particular relevance to Soviet relations in the developing world. The
first affirmed that a peaceful road to socialism was possible, thus repudiating the
Stalinist belief that socialism could only be achieved by rigidly following the Soviet
model of a "proletarian revolution." The second corolary rejected the "two camp"
theory and allowed Soviet policymakers to view the Third World as an independent
factor, and more importantly, as a potential ally.
Khrushchev's recognition of the growing importance of the Third World, and
his desire to harness its anti-Western sentiments to the Soviet cause, were evident in his
report to the Central Committee during the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956. The
First Secretary declared that the "disintegration of the imperialist colonial system has
become the most significant trend of our era." He later announced that, "the new
period in world history, predicted by Lenin, when the peoples of the East play an
active part in deciding the destinies of the whole world ... has arrived."28 Khrushchev
sought to attract this new element to the Socialist camp with his "zone of peace"
theory. According to this formula, the Soviet Union and the "peace zone" of the
developing world had common interests and goals and must inevitably unite in a
common front against imperialist aggression. 29
28Cited in Alexiev, p. 6.
29Alexiev p. 6.
The Soviet doctrinal shift aided Moscow's acceptance of the course of events
in the developing world. Since it was accepted that independence from colonial rule
could be achieved without a Soviet-style proletarian revolution, the establishment of a
national-democratic state could be viewed as a positive first step towards socialism,
even if it was initially based on capitalist principles. The break with imperialism
achieved by the bourgeoisie nationalists was seen as a necessary prerequisite to the
eventual transition to complete independence and socialism. Most significantly, this
alteration of ideology defined the national bourgeoisie as a progressive force that was
worthy of Soviet support. Since these "revolutionary" democrats were making a
"constructive effort to build a new society,"30 Kremlin policymakers could justify
turning a blind eye to their non-Marxist politics. This policy also diminished the role
of the proletariat and limited the importance of local Communist parties. Relations
were frequently carried out at a state-to-state rather than a party-to-party level,
particularly in the Arab states.
The modification of Soviet ideology was a purely political initiative. In the
Middle East, for example, the change was not generated by Soviet Middle East experts
or a dramatic reappraisal of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Instead, as Walter Laqueur
observed:
The Middle East experts modified their approach after, not before, the politicians
did. . . . If there had been a Leninist reappraisal of the Middle Eastern situation,
it was carried out bv the diplomats and the Presidium rather than bv the experts
who followed a lead' given from above.
The downgrading of the importance of indigenous Communist parties, the promotion
of state-to-state relations, and the ex post facto alteration of Marxist-Leninist doctrine
reveals the opportunism behind Khrushchev's policies. To enlist the Third World
states in the Socialist cause, Khrushchev rationalized the more unfortunate aspects of
their national governments.
The Soviet push to increase their involvement in the Third World, and their
willingness to equivocate on longstanding Marxist-Leninist principles, was based on a
conviction that the developing nations, if given encouragement and support, would
voluntarily accept the Soviet model of development. Since many of these states were
30 Soviet theorist Rostislav Llyanovski, cited in Alexiev, p. 7.
31 Laqueur, p. 156.
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at a pre-industrial, pre-capitalist stage of development when they attained
independence, the Soviets further adapted Communist ideology to allow certain
countries to bypass the capitalist state of development and progress directly to
socialism, assuming they received the active guidance of the socialist community.
Substantial economic assistance was provided to help pre-capitalist countries build an
industrial base and hasten the transition to socialism. 32 Between 1955 and 1965, five
billion dollars in economic credits and grants were extended to Third World nations in
addition to four billion dollars in military assistance provided to 16 developing nations
during the same period. 33 At all times the Soviet Union presented itself as a selfless
defender of the developing world against imperialist aggression, as well as a source of
desperately needed financial and political support.
Moscow had good reason to be optimistic over the prospects for world
socialism during the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Western imperial systems forced a
major restructuring of the international balance of power that would certainly benefit
the Soviet Union. Although few of these independence movements could be classified
as true "proletarian revolutions," they generally advocated certain elements of
socialism, such as centrally planned economies and single party systems, and were also
fundamentally anti-Western. The forces of imperialism seemed exhausted, leading
Khrushchev to observe that the victory of socialism was "just over the horizon." 34
However, when the Soviets applied their new theories to individual Arab states, they
learned that what worked well in theory could be exceedingly difficult to apply in
practice. Although these states were generally anti-Western, they were also profoundly
anti-communist and their leaders had no intention of substituting Soviet domination
for Western imperialism. The difficulty of bringing a Soviet style system to an Arab
country was made abundantly clear to the Soviet Union from the very beginning of its
relations with Egypt.
Ivar Spector. "Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism," Current History 37
(November 19o9).: 278. In this article Professor Spector argued that the Soviet goal
behind buildine industrv in Arab states was to create an Arab 'proletariat. This
theorv is repeated by Mbhamed Heikal in comments found in the final chapter of The
Sphinx and the Commissar.
33 The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Partv Policy,
Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives,
Washington. DC, May 8. 1977. p. 25. Cited in Alexiev, p. 8.




The transformation of Soviet Third World policy was apparent in the change
in the Soviet attitude towards Egypt between 1952 to 1955. In 1952 the Egyptian
revolutionary regime, headed by General Xaguib and Colonel Nasser, was described in
the Soviet Encyclopedia as a 'regime of reactionary officers linked with the USA - ' which
had "attempted savage repression of the workers." 35 By 1955 the Soviet perception of
the Egyptian Republic had undergone a sweeping reappraisal and Egypt soon became
Moscow's pioneering adventure in political and military relations with a non-
communist state.
As noted earlier, the opening of Soviet relations with the Third World did not
wait for the modification of Soviet ideology. Discussions with the Egyptians were
taking place as Soviet doctrine was being rethought; Soviet ideas on neutralism,
peaceful co-existance and revolutionary democracy evolved to a considerable extent
from their Egyptian experience. 36 The attraction between the Soviet Union and Egypt
was based on a convergence of the emerging Soviet policy towards the Third World
and the foreign and domestic policies adopted by Egypt's new President, Gamal
Nasser, who was by 1955 the dominant personality in Egypt's revolutionary
government. Soviet and Egyptian decisionmakers found common ground on several
key issues, providing the Soviet Union with an opportunity to gain a foothold in the
Middle East.
2. Converging Interests
In many ways Nasser's aims paralleled those of Moscow. The first major
point of agreement was neutralism. Nasser was one of the Third World's foremost
advocates of the non-aligned movement and had played a prominent role at the
Bandung Conference in April 1955. 37 Nasser's neutralism dovetailed neatly with the
Soviet decision to divide the world into three camps and to accept the concept of
neutralism in the "peace zone"' of the Third World. It was also an important element
Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York: Harper and
Row, 1978), p. 53.
36Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 75.
3
'The Bandung Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia 18-24 April 1955.The
conference was an Indonesian initiative and was co-sponsored bv Burma, Cevlon.
India, and Pakistan. Primarv topics of discussion included the reluctance of the West
to negotiate on Asian matters, increased U.S. -Chinese tensions, and opposition to
colonialism. Twenty-four Asian and African nations sent delegations to the
conference.
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behind Nasser's vehement opposition to the Baghdad Pact because he viewed the
alliance as a "foreign" pact that drew the Arabs into an alliance with Western
"imperialists" and endangered Arab solidarity. Any criticism of the Baghdad Pact was
welcomed by the Soviets who had already attacked the alliance as part of an effort to
place a 'cordon sanitaire' around the Soviet Union.
A second factor was anti-colonialism. Nasser rapidly became a recognized
figure in the Third World's struggle for liberation. Soviet association with Nasser
opened the door to liberation movements throughout Africa, the Middle East and
elsewhere because Nasser provided assistance, either directly or indirectly, to nationalist
revolutionaries in Algeria, Angola, Somalia, and the Congo. In all these instances
there was a convergence of Soviet and Egyptian policies with Western imperialism
serving as a common target for hostility. The high point of Nasser's anti-colonialism
was the nationalization of the Suez Canal, an effort undertaken with the Soviet
Union's full approval.
Third. Egypt's revolutionary government pursued a policy of socialist
economic development. Although Arab socialism differed in several important aspects
from Soviet communism, a common reliance on central planning, and the state
management and ownership of the most significant elements of the economy, provided
a link between the economic principles of Egypt and Russia. Egypt provided an
excellent example of the "non-capitalist path of development" then receiving
recognition in Soviet political theory. For its part the USSR was extremely generous
in its economic aid to Egypt.
Finally, it is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of arms transfers to
the development of the Soviet - Egyptian relationship. Moscow's willingness to sell
arms to Cairo in 1955 laid the ground work for the entire Soviet - Egyptian
rapprochement. Nasser's search for an arms source began after an Israeli army raid on
an Egyptian army headquarters in the Gaza Strip38 and was further prompted by
rumors of major French arms deliveries to Israel. 39 Nasser had first turned to the
United States for weapons, an indication of the goodwill Egypt still felt towards
America. While the request was not rejected outright, the Americans did stipulate that
38 Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 78. Lenczowski provides a
summation of the issues that provided the groundwork for Soviet-Egyptian ties.
39Glassman. p. 10. French shipments to Israel were cloaked in secrecy and
shipments were received at sea, rather then in port. Owing to a lack of information on
the precise nature of the deliveries to Israel, the Egyptians were inclined to err on the
side of caution.
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an American military mission be admitted to supervise their use.40 Nasser rejected the
US offer and turned to the Soviet Union.
Moscow was more than willing to help Egypt, and negotiated an agreement
without hesitation and with no strings attached once the Kremlin recognized how
attractive such offers were to the Arabs and how much status the Soviet Union could
gain in the Middle East at a relatively low price. 41 The Kremlin obviously decided that
the political gains outweighed the risk that Nasser might misuse the arms. The initial
arms deal was generous; possibly as high as S200 million. After a second arms
shipment in 1956 (total cost of the two shipments was S336 million), the Egyptian
Armed Forces possessed at least 100 tanks, 80 MiG-15 fighters, 30 IL-38 light
bombers, plus a substantial quantity of armored vehicles and artillery. The arms were
purchased under a twelve-year barter arrangement that exchanged Soviet weapons for
Egyptian cotton and rice and allowed Egypt to purchase equipment whose value far
exceeded Cairo's foreign exchange holdings. 42 These would be the first of many arms
transfer arrangements between the Soviet Union and Egypt; by 1967 arms deliveries to
Egypt would total S1.5 billion.43
3. Nasser's Objectives
Any examination of Soviet-client relations must also consider the national
interests of the client state. An investigation of client objectives is particularly
important in the Egyptian case, given the dynamic foreign and domestic aspirations of
President Nasser. Even though Nasser was almost entirely dependent on the Soviet
Union for military equipment, as well as the bulk of his economic aid,44 he consistently
40
Ali M. Yahva. "Egypt and the Soviet Union, 1955-1972: A Studv in the Power
of the Small State ( Ph.u dissertation. Indiana University, 1981). p. 85. Nasser had
turned to the United States for weapons in 1953 and was told he could have all the
weapons he wanted, free of charge, but "a number of American experts would have to
come with the weapons and the weapons must never be used against a US allv." Since
Nasser wanted the weapons for defense against Israel, the offer was rejected. See
Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) p. 127.
41 The Soviets did. however, effect this transfer through the use of Czech
intermediaries. Glassman attributes the Soviet desire to disguise their involvement in
the deal to "fundamental Soviet temeritv and the desire to avoid directlv challenging
the West during this period." See Glassman p. 14.
42Glassman, p. 10.
4
- Glassman, p. 55.
44From 1945-1965, aid to Egvpt from the communist states, primarily the Soviet
Union, exceeded aid from the US by about 50% (S 1.441 million to S943.1 million). See
Lenczowski. Soviet Advances in the Middle East. p. 93. Soviet resources were often
committed to high profile, high priority projects such as the High Aswan Dam, the
Helwan Steel plant and the development of Egyptian oil resources.
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viewed Soviet-Egyptian relations in terms of furthering his own aspirations. While it
was true that on several key political, economic and military issues there was a
convergence of Soviet and Egyptian interests, Nasser's anti-communism, radical Pan-
Arabism and stubborn independence led to several bitter clashes between Moscow and
Cairo.
Above all Nasser aspired to, and to a substantial degree achieved, a leadership
role in the Arab world; Egyptian foreign and domestic policies were formulated
accordingly. For example, it has been argued that Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad
Pact was inspired at least as much by his concern about the alliance's potential impact
on his leadership role in the region as it was by his concern for Arab solidarity.45
Nasser's extreme sensitivity towards any possible interference with his foreign policy
can be explained by his direct linkage of foreign and domestic affairs. He saw the
solution to Egypt's economic woes in the pursuit of an active foreign policy.
Nasser believed that internal weakness was the primary reason that foreign
powers had been able to dominate Egypt's history and considered a modernized,
smoothly functioning economy as a necessary precondition for safeguarding Egyptian
independence.46 The first task of the revolutionary government was to correct Egypt's
economic deficiencies. However, it soon became apparent that Egypt lacked the
financial resources necessary for the regeneration of the Egyptian economy without
extensive outside assistance. Nasser's foreign policy was therefore designed to project
Egypt to a position of prominence in regional and international affairs and use this
position to obtain foreign backing for his ambitious economic plans. Nasser explained
his plan to convert international political influence into economic prosperity:
Without our foreign policv we would not be able to build our internal structure. .
. . On the volume or our 'work in the international field depends our influence in
international affairs. . . . Without external contacts, and without our external
activities, we could not implement the development plan.
45
Specificallv, Nasser feared that Iraq, a siener of the Baghdad Pact, would be in
a position to challenge Egypt as the leader of the"Arab world. Yahya, p. 39.
46Yahya, p. 39.
47Gamal Abdel Nasser. Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Opening
Meeting of the Second Session of the National Assembly, November 12. 1964 (Cairo:
National "Publication House, n.d.). cited in Yahva, p. 35. \ahya provides a brief
explanation on the connections between Nasser's national and international policies.
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Furthermore, an active foreign policy might distract the people from Egypt's ongoing
financial crisis, either by focusing their attention on larger regional issues or by
providing convenient non-Egyptian scapegoats for the country's economic turmoil.
After involving Egypt in international affairs, Nasser was able to exploit the
competitive interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Nasser became
adept at maintaining his bargaining position between the two superpowers and
collected economic aid from both Moscow and Washington. In the period 1957-1961
Nasser secured S772.5 million in aid from Western sources and S482.9 million from
Eastern sources (not including military credits).48 Nasser's carefully constructed policy
of "positive neutrality" allowed him to secure his position between the two
superpowers.49 He successfully limited outside interference in his domestic policy by
shifting his aid requests between Washington and Moscow and skillfully playing off the
rivalry between the two superpowers. In 1958 he justified Egypt's policy:
As we insisted on liberating our countrv from Western influence, we also insist
that there should be no
sn
foreign influence, whether Communist or non-
Communist in our country.
While Moscow could accept Nasser's "positive neutrality" and his occasional
flirtations with the West, a more serious source of friction between Moscow and Cairo
was Nasser's anti-communism. Nasser refused to give Egypt's indigenous Communist
parties a role in his 'progressive' revolution. Instead he periodically persecuted and
imprisoned party members." 1 His dislike of Communism was made clear in an article
on the Egyptian Revolution he submitted to Foreign Affairs in 1955:
The areatest internal enemies of the people are the Communists who serve
foreign rulers, the Moslem Brotherhood which still seeks to rule by assassination
in an era that has outlived such,practices, and the old time politicians who would
like to reestablish exploitation.
48Yahya, p. 75.
49Spector, "Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism," p. 272. In a Life interview
Nasser warned Americans that his criticism of the Soviet Union did not mean that he
was aligning his country with the United States. Life, 20 July 1959, p. 97.
Gamal Abdel Nasser. President Gamal Abdel Nasser on Non-Alignment (Cairo:
Information Department, n.d.), cited in Yahya, p. 78.
It should be noted, however, that the Eevptian Communist Partv was small,
fragmented, dominated bv foreigners and without an audience, there being' virtually no
"proletariat" in Egypt at the time. Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 39.
52Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign Affairs 33 (January-
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Nasser had never concealed his feelings towards Communism from the Russians and
had always been careful to maintain Soviet-Egyptian relations on a strictly state-to-
state level. This policy was doctrinally acceptable to Moscow, given the
reinterpretation of Communist ideology and the resultant diminishment of the role of
local Communist parties. According to Heikal, Nasser was told that "the Soviet Union
had nothing to do with local Communists; what Nasser did with his Communists was a
purely domestic Egypt affair." 53 If Moscow had hoped that a mixture of diplomacy and
financial generosity would eventually persuade Nasser to end his persecution of
Egyptian Communists, these hopes were to prove unfounded. Nasser ignored Soviet
suggestions that he temporize his anti-communism, instead increasing his harassment
and extending it to Syria after Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab
Republic (U.A.R) in February 1958. Despite Khrushchev's concern about the impact
of Nasser's anti-Communist campaign on the very active Syrian Communist Party, the
Soviet Union chose to sacrifice ideology to preserve its most promising connection in
the Arab states. This was probably done out of fear that excessive pressure on Nasser
to modify his anti-Communist stance risked pushing him to the West.
Khrushchev proved less willing to tolerate Nasser's reaction to the Iraqi
revolution in 1958, and a short, but bitter exchange followed between Moscow and
Cairo. Nasser, who backed the nationalist faction of the coalition that had toppled the
pro-Western Iraqi government, became alarmed at the increasing power of the Iraqi
Communist Party.- 4 He expressed his concerns in a message delivered to Khrushchev
through the Russian Ambassador to Cairo. Nasser took a very strong stand on Iraq:
We consider that the fate of Iraq affects us and we are not going to leave it
under the Communists at anv price. . . .You must decide whether^ou want to
deal with the Arab people or with a few isolated Communist parties.
1955): 209.
53Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 60. This message was delivered by
Dmitry Shepilov, editor of Pravda, who was sent to Cairo in 195^ to make an
assessment of Nasser for the Kremlin.
54For a description of events in Iraq see Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the
Middle East, pp. 126-128.
55Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents (New York: Doubleday and Co.,
1973), p. 140.
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The Egyptian President was seeking to force Moscow to choose once again between
supporting its ideological comrades or pursuing regional ambitions. This time the
Soviets refused to appease their Arab partner. Instead, Khrushchev openly criticized
Nasser in a March 1959 speech in which he dismissed the President of Egypt as a
"passionate and hot-headed young man'' who had taken on himself "more than his
stature permitted."" 6 These comments intensified Nasser's defiance. In response to
Khrushchev's remarks he denounced the subservience of local Communist parties to
Moscow:
Todav . . . having fought the battle with imperialism and its collaborators, we are
now faced bv a new battle aeainst subservience and Communism. . . . We shall
defeat Communism. . . . No power in the world will ever again place us in a
sphere of influence. . . . We accept neither subservience-iior imperialism. We are
determined that our policy shall be an independent one.
In April 1959 Khrushchev countered Nasser's outbursts with a long letter that
clearly expressed his displeasure. First, the Soviet Premier explained Soviet arms
transfer policies, 58 expressed "surprise" at Nasser's belittling of Soviet efforts during the
Suez Crisis and criticized Nasser for his interference in the affairs of other Arab states.
Khrushchev then reminded the Egyptian President of his dependence on Soviet aid and
made a veiled threat to suspend economic assistance:
We are told, Mr. President, that at the meetings now held in the United Arab
Republic shouts of "No rubles, no dollars can be heard, not without
encouragement on the part of the local authorities, and some politicians even
express openlv their doubts as to the unselfishness of Soviet aid. ... It is well
known that the Soviet Union has never imposed and does not impose its aid
upon anvbodv. but renders it onlv if asked to do so. . . . If you are of the
opinion that the aid which we agreed to give, at your request, to the United Arab
Republic is a burden to vou, if vou want to set rid of rubles which we have given
under existing aereemenfs, vou are free to do so. You mav rest assured that this
will in no way offend us arid we shall willingly meet vour'wish. . . . We do not
wish to be obtrusive in giving aid to countries' which do not need it and vilify us
instead of beine grateful. . . . And does not the present situation, when a
campaign is going on in the United Arab Republic against the Soviet Union, and
consequents against the Soviet people, eive rise to complications for discharging
our obligati6ns""under the agreement for^he construction of the Aswan Dam?~. . .
Sb Middle East Affairs, 10 (May 1959), p. 205. Cited in Yahya, p. 116.
57 Royal Institute, Documents, pp. 299-302. Cited in Yahya, p. 117.
58 Khrushchev told Nasser that he had denied Egvptian requests for "intermediate
range rockets" on the grounds that "in the state of excitement largely caused bv the
prevailing situation vou might have undertaken some undesirable action leading to
war." See Heikal, Th'e Cairo"Documents, p. 142.
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^ our countrv also mav vet need, and not onlv once, the Soviet Union's help and
its friendly and equal cooperation. Here I should like to refer to a well-known
Russian proverb: "Don't spit into the well - vou mav need its water to drink. 09
Nasser's behavior was not greatly affected by such admonishments because
Soviet anger was rarely translated into action. At the height of Nasser's persecution of
local Communists the Soviets fulfilled their long-term contractual obligations, and even
signed new deals of considerable importance to Egypt's economy. Millions of rubles
were committed to the Aswan Dam, railroad development, and industrial and
agricultural projects. 60 Several major arms deals were also negotiated between the
Soviet Union and Egypt during the time leading up to the 1967 war. These deals, with
major equipment purchased, were:
1957 - S150 million (170 MiG 17)
1959 - S120 million (120 MiG 19)
1961 - SI 70 million (ground equipment)
1963 - S220-500 million (MiG 21, TU-16. T-54, SA-2)
1965 - S3 10 million (no new weapons). 61
This was approximately two thirds of the amount the Soviet Union spent on military
grants to all developing nations outside the Communist bloc between 1955 and 1966. 62
Soviet-Egyptian relations improved considerably during the early 1960's. This
new atmosphere can be partially attributed to Soviet approval of Egyptian land reform
and the nationalization of Egyptian industry. An increasingly important factor in
Moscow's patience with its often stubborn Arab client, however, was the Soviet
Union's desperate need for military facilities in Egypt, due to the introduction of the
American Polaris missile to the Eastern Mediterranean. Good relations with Egypt
became vitally important to Soviet national security and provided a new incentive for
Soviet aid to Cairo.
59The edited text of the letter appears in Heikal, The Cairo Documents, pp.
141-147.
60Yahya, p. 137.
61 Glassman, pp. 24-28. In 1961 enough material was supplied to equip six
Eevptian mfantrv and armored divisions, and the Egyptian armed forces were
reorganized to imitate the Soviet model.
62Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Trade
Registers (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T Press, 1975), pp. 154-15^.
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D. SYRIA
Before discussing the military dimension of the Soviet Egyptian relationship, it is
necessary to consider briefly the concurrent development of Soviet-Syrian ties. The
turmoil that swept the Middle East in the 1950s also provided Moscow with an
opportunity to become involved in Syria. While Egypt would remain the focus of
Soviet regional attentions, Moscow's support for the "progressive" revolutionary regime
in Damascus initiated a relationship which continues to the present day.
As in Egypt, Soviet success in Syria can be largely attributed to the rise of Arab
nationalism throughout the Middle East in the mid-1950's and the subsequent wave of
anti-Western sentiment. In 1955 an unstable alliance of nationalist and radical
elements seized control of Syria. 63 The new rulers were anxious to emulate their
Egyptian counterparts by defying the West and asserting national sovereignty.
Following the Egyptian lead, the Syrians negotiated an arms agreement with the Soviet
Union in January 1956, in which Syria received a number of outdated T-34 tanks in a
barter arrangement for cotton. 64 The supply of arms led to further cooperation with
Soviet and bloc governments, including naval goodwill visits, commencing in October
1957, and financial assistance for several Syrian development projects.
Several Soviet or Communist bloc aid programs were initiated in 1957. In March
an agreement was reached with Czechoslovakia to build a refinery in Horns. In August
Moscow promised a loan of S140 million to Syria for economic and military aid. This
was followed in October 1957 by a more specific economic agreement, calling for 19
development projects at a total cost of S579 million. 6 Syria's gross national product
doubled in the post war period and between 1950 and 1956 increased at an annual rate
of eight percent.
There was also a degree of ideological affinity between Syria and the Soviet
Union not found in Moscow's relations with any other Middle Eastern state. Syria
had moved towards the Soviet Union voluntarily and there was substantial popular
support for Soviet-Syrian ties. There was a strong and active Communist Party in
63An explanation of Svrian internal politics during this period may be found in
Lenczowski, Soviet Advances'in the Middle East, pp. 102-106.
64Vivian Turnbull, "Soviet Arms Transfers and Strategic Access in the Third
World" (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1984), p. 39.
65Turnbull, p. 105.
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Syria, something of a novelty for the Middle East and a source of attraction for
Moscow. Further, Syrian leaders were firmly in favor of solidarity with Moscow. In
1956 President Kuwatlv stated:
Our armv will stand bv the side of the Soviet armv in defense against aggression
whenever two armies a're required to defend peace "and freedom in the world. . . .
The Soviet Lnion is Svria's best friend. 00
The intensity of Syrian efforts to encourage ties with the Soviet Union actually
proved to be something of a drawback. The substantial Soviet assistance agreements
signed in 1957 had strengthened Soviet connections in Syria and increased the power of
the Syrian Communist Party, but it had also alarmed the Baath (nationalist) party. To
avert a feared Communist takeover, the nationalists turned to President Nasser with a
proposal to unite Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (U.A.R). This union
was proclaimed in February 1958. One of Nasser's primary conditions before agreeing
to the union was the dismantling of the Syrian party system which he viewed as an
impediment to Arab unity. This entailed the dissolution of the Syrian Communist
Party, a move which was opposed both by Communists in Syria and by Moscow. As
noted earlier. Nasser's anti-Communist measures in Syria were a cause of considerable
irritation to Khrushchev, though no tangible steps were taken to force Nasser to
change his policies. Despite an active anti-Communist campaign in Syria, the Soviet
Union actually increased its aid agreements with Syria.
In 1961, Syria abruptly withdrew from the U.A.R. The change in government
brought about some short term benefits for the Soviet Union. However, the instability
that characterized Syrian domestic politics throughout the 1960s limited Soviet
involvement in Syria. The pro-Soviet regime of 1961 was replaced in 1963 by an anti-
Communist nationalist government which ruled until a left-wing takeover in 1966.
This last government improved the political relationship with Moscow, yet differed
sharply with the Soviet desire for a peaceful resolution to the Arab- Israeli conflict in
the wake of the 1967 War. Finally, in 1970, power was seized by Hafez Assad, who
remains as President to this day.
Several parallels may be drawn between Soviet relations with Egypt and Syria.
Both were founded on Moscow's ability to manipulate anti-Western sentiments and
willingness to support Arab nationalism. In each case an arms agreement opened the
°°Cited in Laquer, p. 253.
37
door to further Soviet involvement, including a massive infusion of Soviet
developmental aid. Relations with both countries survived incidents of open anti-
communism and defiance of Soviet desires. This last item is the most intriguing, for
Moscow maintained, and often increased, its level of economic and military support to
these countries, while turning a blind eye to the persecution of local Communists and
ignoring anti-Soviet rhetoric. Since neither country had progressed significantly down
the road towards socialism, or expressed any interest in modeling itself on the Soviet
Union, it would be reasonable to ask why Moscow chose to continue its considerable
support to its two clients. The answer is that despite setbacks in the political
relationships, Moscow also recognized the military necessity of close ties with Egypt
and Syria.
E. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
The Russians have had an interest in the Middle East for centuries. This interest
has taken on a variety of forms, including trade, religious expansionism, and national
security. Above all, Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs was justified on
grounds of proximity, specifically a concern for the security of Russia's southern
borders. An Egyptian observer once characterized Soviet Middle Eastern policy in this
way:
From the point of view of Russia as a state the first consideration must be that
of geography - of proximitv. Whenever Brezhnev or anv of the other Soviet
leaders'" talks' about the 'legitimate interests' of the Soviet' Union in the Middle
East he ahvavs begins bv mentioning the word proximity.
Moscow has always feared Western domination of the Middle East and this fear was
particularly acute in 1955. Where the Soviet Union had a buffer composed of the
Eastern European states to guard its western boundaries, and a friendship treaty with
China to guard its Asian flank, it bordered directly on the Middle East, specifically on
Turkey and Iran, both signers of the Baghdad Pact. This is why the Baghdad Pact,
which placed potentially hostile states directly on Russia's borders, caused such great
concern in Moscow and led to the 1955 Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement which
spoke of events in the Middle East having a "direct bearing on the security of the
USSR."68
Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 35.
68Cited in Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 4.
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A constant consideration for Soviet policymakers was the potential impact of
Middle East disturbances on their own national security. This concern would provide
a consistant theme in Soviet policy statements during crisis situations in the Middle
East. Several examples appeared in 1967 during the weeks of tension that preceded the
June War. Israel was warned that it was "playing with fire ... in an area near the
borders of the Soviet Union"69 and later an attempt was made to control events by
expressing Moscow's interest in "The maintenance of peace and security in the area
directly adjacent to the Soviet borders touches upon the vital interest of the Soviet
peoples."' As sensitive as Moscow was to Middle Eastern affairs, there was very little
the Kremlin could do militarily to alter regional events. This fact became painfully
obvious to the Soviets soon after Soviet - Egyptian relations commenced in 1955.
When Great Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt during the 1956 Suez
Crisis, the Soviet Union was unable to render military assistance. Mohamed Heikal, in
his book The Sphinx and the Commissar, describes a conversation that took place
between Syrian President Kuwatly, Khrushchev and Marshall Zhukov. Kuwatly, who
was in Moscow at the time of the crisis, went to the Soviet leader to insist that the
Soviets rescue Egypt. Zhukov's response reflected Moscow's frustration:
Zhukov produced a map of the Middle East and spread it on the table. Then,
turnine to Kuwatlv, he said "How can we so to the aid of Eevpt? Tell me! Are
we supposed to send our armies throueh Turkev. Iran and then into Svria and
Iraq and on into Israel and so eventually attack the British and French fo'rces?"' 1
The Suez Crisis demonstrated that the Soviet Union, as a traditional land power,
lacked the power projection capability to provide military support to an overseas client.
Despite Moscow's declarations of full support in the weeks preceding the Suez Crisis,
the Soviets were forced to exercise extreme caution during the most critical days of the
conflict. Ironically, it was the intervention of the United States that saved Soviet
prestige. Khrushchev's threats of military intervention came well after the crisis had
reached its peak and the potential need for direct Soviet action had passed.72
69Oral statement of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 1967, cited in
Glassman, p. 38.
:oCited in Yahya, p. 171.
;1
Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 71.
72 Francis Fukuvama, Soviet Threats to Intervene in the Middle East: 1956-1973,
Rand Note 1577-FF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1980), p. 6.
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The Soviet embarrassment in 1956 calls attention to the fact that, despite
Moscow's political and economic inroads into Egypt, no military agreements had been
negotiated and the Soviet Union had derived no practical military benefits from its
relationship with the Egyptians. Somewhat surprisingly, the Soviets initially showed
little or no interest in maintaining a military presence in Egypt; although Moscow had
provided virtually all of Egypt's military' hardware, the USSR had received no naval
facilities or airfield rights in return. By the early 1960's, however, a series of events
would force a major change in emphasis in Soviet policy as Kremlin decisionmakers
became increasingly interested in the military advantages that might be gained from
closer relations with Egypt.
In the 1950s Soviet national security interests could be served through political
means: by giving Nasser the ability to resist Western influences; by supporting his
desire for "non-alignment" and thereby outflanking the Baghdad Pact; and by using
Egypt as a showcase to display to other Third World nations the potential benefits of
improved relations with the Soviet Union. In the 1960's, the pursuit of military
privileges would take precedence as the prime motivating factor of Soviet policy
towards Egypt. In the interest of national security, the ideological dispute between
Khrushchev and Nasser was toned down and the Soviets became increasingly
responsive to Egyptian requests for economic and military aid.
The specific threat that troubled Soviet military planners was the U.S. Sixth
Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean. There had always been concern about Russia's
vulnerability to the fleet's attack carriers, which could launch aircraft capable of
striking key Soviet targets. In the early 1960's the United States was preparing to
introduce the Polaris ballistic missile submarine. The Polaris submarine greatly
expanded American nuclear strike capabilities and posed a particularly ugly threat to
the Soviet Union. The first units to be commissioned carried either the Polaris A-l or
A-2 missiles with ranges of 1370 and 1500 miles respectively, (later upgraded to the A-3
model with a 2500 mile range). 73 Operating from stations in the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Polaris could easily target critical industrial areas deep inside
Russian territory.
11Jone's Fighting Ships: 1985-1986, (London: Jane's Publishing Co. t 1986). p.
763. The Polaris proeram was initiated in 1958 and the first unit was commissioned in
1963. Onlv t\ve submarines were equipped with the A-l missile. These were upgraded
to the A-3'vanent in the mid 1960's.
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The Soviet navy was completely unprepared to meet this new sub-surface threat.
The breakdown of Soviet-Albanian relations had deprived the Soviets of their only
naval facility on the Mediterranean, at Vlone, in May 1961. This meant that, although
the Soviets recognized the need for a sizeable naval presence in the Mediterranean to
act as a deterrent to the Sixth Fleet and guard the Soviet Union's southern borders,
they were completely without the shore facilities needed for supply and replenishment,
refueling and repairs. The Soviet navy further suffered from a severe shortage of
auxiliary ships and floating drydocks. Finally, there was a requirement for airfields
which could provide reconnaissance support and air cover for the fleet. 74 The Soviet
military acted vigorously to offset these disadvantages. The acquisition of naval and
air facilities on the Mediterranean, and specifically in Egypt, became an imperative of
Soviet foreign policy.
Khrushchev, and after 1964 his successors Brezhnev and Kosygin, launched an
effort to promote closer ties with Egypt. Economic aid was increased, there were more
frequent visits by high ranking officials, and several major arms agreements were
signed.- The quantity and quality of equipment sent to Egypt also improved
significantly. Whereas in earlier deals the Soviets had delivered surplus tanks to Nasser
(T-34) they began sending tanks currently in use with Soviet frontline units (T-54). 76
On the eve of the 1967 War the Egyptians possessed the following major weapons
systems:
350 T-34 and 500 T-54 tanks.
30 TU-16 medium bombers.
40 IL-28 light bombers.
120-160 MiG-21 intercepters.
100-150 MiG15/17 fighter-bombers.
80 MiG-19 fighter bombers.
15-55 SU-7 fighter-bombers.
Several SA-2 missile batteries.77
74Amnon Sella, Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 44.




As Moscow expanded its military and economic assistance to Egypt, an attempt
was made to persuade Nasser to grant the Soviet navy "full and automatic access to
Egyptian ports and permanent naval facilities."78 This request was apparently timed to
coincide with the deployment of a permanent Soviet Mediterranean Naval Squadron in
1964 and the delivery of TU-16 bombers and other sophisticated weapons to the
Egyptians. 79 All available evidence suggests that Nasser refused the Soviet request.
The Soviet navy would remain without facilities on the Mediterranean until 1967 when,
following the Egyptian military disaster in the June War, Nasser was in no position to
deny the Soviets the military privileges they desired.
F. SUMMATION
Soviet involvement in the Middle East in the mid-1950's was made possible by
the Soviet ability to take advantage of a change in the regional political environment.
A fortunate series of circumstances, including the relaxation of Stalinist restraints on
Soviet foreign policy, the anti-Western sentiment of the Arab nationalists, and the
compatible socio-economic goals of Arab progressivism and Soviet communism,
greatly facilitated Soviet penetration of the Middle East. However, the Soviets never
viewed their ties with the Arab nationalists as anything more than a tactical alliance
within a broader strategy. Soviet policymakers rationalized their support for the
bourgeois - nationalists on the grounds that the Arab "progressives" were a necessary-
transitional stage on the road to socialism. In an effort to retain the loyalty of their
Arab clients, Moscow tacitly accepted the persecution of local Communists and, in
many cases, dedicated increasing amounts of economic and military assistance, in a
belief that the victory of socialism was "just over the horizon."
The Egyptian case provides an excellent example of the difficulties Soviet
policymakers faced when they tried to put their new theories into practice. Despite the
best efforts of Soviet diplomacy, it proved impossible to overcome Nasser's desire for
independent foreign and domestic policies and his vehement anti-communism. The
Egyptian President was unwilling to sacrifice his objectives for Soviet friendship.
Kremlin decisionmakers could not have been happy with the "road to socialism"
chosen by Nasser, as their Egyptian client seemed determined to undermine Soviet
policy objectives even as he accepted Soviet military and economic assistance.
78
Rubinstein, Red Star on the Xile, p. 7.
79Glassman, p. 33.
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The policymakers in Moscow must have quickly lost any illusions they had about
an easy victory for socialism in Egypt. Nevertheless, they continued to pour billions of
rubles into the Egyptian economy and armed forces. The reason for this seemingly
contradictory foreign policy was national security. Initial Soviet approaches to the
Arab World were prompted by a desire to outflank the Baghdad Pact and secure
Russia's southern boundaries by preventing Western domination of the Middle East.
The Soviets first hoped to accomplish this objective politically, by developing client
states, and eventually remolding the Middle East in the Soviet image. After this
objective proved a failure their interest in the area remained, driven by the military
necessity of countering the threat of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean
and specifically the newly deployed Polaris ballistic missile submarines. As the 1960's
continued, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship became more oriented towards mutual
military needs and lost its pretense of ideological affinities.
By shifting the relationship from the political to the military sphere, Moscow
could not avoid becoming the guarantor of Nasser's government. Soviet military and
political prestige on a global scale became entangled in the success or failure of the
Egyptian armed forces. Although the Soviets were unable to achieve this objective, by
gaining footholds in Egypt and Syria they had successfully outflanked the Baghdad
Pact and thwarted Western domination of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
When the Americans introduced Polaris ballistic missile submarines to the Eastern
Mediterranean in the early 1960s, Soviet-Egyptian relations took on a slightly different
character. Soviet objectives in Egypt were driven by very precise national security
requirements, specifically the need for access to Egyptian naval facilities. In 1967 the
Soviets were to gain the naval bases they coveted, but at the cost of becoming deeply
involved in the conflicts of the Middle East. Military support for the Arab side in the
ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute would become the Soviet mechanism for maintaining their
foothold in the Middle East and would weigh heavily in all future policy decisions.
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IV. THE EGYPTIAN CASE
A. 1967: REARMING EGYPT
1. Introduction
The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 was an unmitigated disaster for Egypt. All
the equipment and training provided by the Soviet Union proved no match for the
Israelis on the battlefield. Poor planning and coordination, particularly in air defense,
hastened the Egyptian defeat. In less than a week the Israelis captured the Sinai
Peninsula and had advanced as far as the East Bank of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian
Army was disorganized and demoralized. Material losses alone amounted to over two
billion dollars. 80
The Soviets were faced with some hard policy choices in the aftermath of the
war. The stunning defeat of the Arab forces, largely equipped and trained by the
Soviet Union, severely damaged Soviet military and political prestige and jeopardized
the Soviet position throughout the Middle East. This led to speculation that Moscow
might elect to withdraw from the Middle East entirely. 81 The Soviet choice was
disengagement, at a substantial financial and political loss and the near certain collapse
of the Nasser government, or increased military outlays to stabilize the Nasser regime
and re-establish Soviet prestige. The Soviets chose the latter course and embarked on
a massive program of military and economic assistance for Egypt. A Central
Committee plenum was called to endorse the Soviet policy and to answer charges
(mostly from the Chinese) that inadequate support had been provided to the Arabs. 82
Soviet resolve was demonstrated by the replacement of 80% of all Egyptian combat
losses within six months. 83 By the end of 1968, the Soviets had committed over three
billion dollars and 3000 advisors to the task of rebuilding the Egyptian military. 84
See Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 29. For a full accounting of Egvptian
material losses see Glassman, p. 46. The Egvptian Air Force took exceptionally 'heavy
losses, mostly on the ground, in the first hours of the war.
8 Rubinstein reports that several State Department analysts were surprised when
the Soviets decided not to disengage from the Middle East in 1967. See Red Star on
the Nile, p. 13 fn.
82Glassman, p. 59.




The intensification of Soviet involvement in Egypt, particularly the expansion
of their military commitment, actively engaged the Soviets in the region's ongoing
conflicts and disputes. The regional role of the Soviet Union, the best method of
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the appropriate level of support for Egyptian
policy all became topics of discussion and debate within the ruling hierarchy of the
Soviet Union.
2. Internal Inputs
Was [here evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations!
A careful review of the Soviet press indicates that as the Soviet involvement in
Egypt increased, so did the level of discussion over the best foreign policy to pursue in
the Middle East. While no blatantly open arguments or criticisms appeared in the
pages of Pravda or Krasnaya Zvezda, there was a discernible difference in the emphasis
given to desires for a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict, and the level of
risk acceptable to ensure the continued goodwill of the Egyptians.
Soviet party leaders, as represented on the pages of Pravda, supported a very
moderate, low risk policy towards the Middle East. In particular, they advocated a
political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and presented ideas for its
accomplishment. During the first two years after the war the views of the party leaders
centered on three primary themes. The first was support for the Arab cause. This was
designed to reassure the Arabs, and warn the rest of the world, that the Soviet Union
had not abandoned the Arab cause. Several articles expressing this theme were printed
in Pravda shortly after the war.
• On Julv 21, Pravda warned that the Israelis were "making a serious mistake in
their evaluation of the determination of the. Arab states and their friends to
•defend the cause of peace in the Near East.
• One month later Pravda was more specific in describing exactly who the
"friends" of the Arab states were: "In their common struggle against the
criminal aeeression of Israel, the Arabs have the full understanding and resolute
support of the Soviet Union^and the other Socialist countries, and~the sympathy
of all peace loving peoples.
While party leaders were intent upon clarifying their position in support of the
Arabs, this support was tempered by a desire to moderate the more radical elements in
the Arab states. There was reluctance to be too closely identified with the more
85
'Pravda, 21 July 1967; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 21 August 1967.
86Pravda, 31 August 1967; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 20 September
1967.
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militant Arab demands. As a result, the second theme adopted in Pravda articles was a
surprisingly evenhanded approach towards distributing the blame for the Arab-Israeli
conflict. While there were constant attacks on Israeli "aggression," the more belligerent
Arabs came in for their share of criticism.
• On 29 July 1967 Pravda blamed the continuing Middle East turmoil on
"extremists' on both sid^s, but specifically accused the Arabs of "seriously
aggravating" the situation.
• Near the end of the year. Pravda criticized the inability of some Arabs to
moderate their demands, "one cannot fail to note that in some, Arab capitals
hotheads can be found and press organs issue hasty utterances."
Finally, party leaders sought to promote a peaceful resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The vehicle they envisioned for securing a settlement was the United
Nations enforcement of Resolution 242 (adopted on 22 November 1967) and the
complete withdrawal of Israel forces. This was the third theme of the Pravda articles
and it remained a constant element of party commentaries until 1969. The articles in
Pravda stressed the urgency of finding a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict
which would allow the Soviets to maintain their presence in the region while avoiding
the uncertainty of renewed hostilities. Some examples of Pravda articles discussing
peaceful means to a settlement include:
• On 27 October 1967. Pravda suggested that the UN take active measures to
brine peace to the Middle East: There is an objective possibility for restoring
peace to the Near East. The Security Council could contribute to the
realization of this possibility . . . the decisive condition for liquidating the Near
East crisis RCis the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab
territories." UN Security Council Resolution 242 was praised as a "first step"
towards a settlement of the situation in an article published just after its UN
adoption on 22 November 1967.
• On 23 March 1968, a Pravda article justified Soviet support for the Arabs bv
placing it in the context of performine their obligations as a UN member, "the
USSR . . . will aid the victims of aggression, oecause in so doing they are
fulfilling their duty in accordance with me UN charter.
• Pravda articles also took care to mention the readiness of the Arab states to
achieve a settlement of the crisis in accordance with UN decisions "the Arab
states are in a most positive wav declarine their readiness and indention to seek
a settlement on the basis of the decisions of the Security council."
8 '
' Pravda, 29 July 1967; in: Kass, p. 50.
^Pravda, 27 November 1967; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 20
December 1967.
89 Pravda, 27 October 1967; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 15 November
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90 Pravda, 27 November 1967; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 20
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46
• Finally numerous Pravda articles, particularly when the Arab-Israeli crisis wore
on with no settlement in sight, reflected fears of a new outburst of regional
violence. On 7 November 1968 a Pravda article observed that it was "the dutv
of all peace loving states to prevent a dangerous, new explosion in this area." 9
Fears of a new explosion would be seen"again in an article <nublished on 25
January 1969 which mentioned the "threat ofa new explosion.
Where Pravda made frequent references to the requirement for a peaceful
settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict and the Soviet willingness to work towards a
political solution, Krasnaya Zvezda made very few. In fact, quantitative analysis by
liana Kass revealed that Pravda discussed a political solution to the crisis four times as
often during this time period.95 In contrast to Pravda, one Krasnaya Zvezda article
published in early 1968 went so far as to specifically warn against pinning excessive
hopes on any peace efforts because "the very idea of a political settlement is anathema
to the Israeli leaders."96
Rather than discussing diplomacy the articles in Krasnaya Zvezda focused on
improvements in the capabilities of the Egyptian military. Throughout 1969 Krasnaya
Zvezda made frequent references to "great increases" in the military capabilities of the
Arab states and expressed confidence that "a new war will not end with an Israeli
victory." Military writers also warned of the steady growth in Israeli military might,
noting that "the Israeli extemists do not limit themselves to talking about the
possibility of a new war . . . they are making every effort to increase their military
potential."98 Part of this disparity might be explained by the simple fact that as military
officers, the writers were more interested in military matters. A second possibility, and
one which would lend added credence to the suggestion of a disagreement in the Soviet
hierarchy, is that the Soviet military was anxious to use Krasnaya Zvezda as a means to
emphasize the close ties between the Soviets and the Egyptians as a means of
consolidating Soviet military privileges in Egypt. These privileges, including long
coveted naval facilities, were not inconsiderable.
1968.
93 Pravda, 7 November 1968; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 27 November
1968.
94 Pravda, 25 January 1969; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 12 February
1969.
95 Kass. p. 77.
96Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 April 1969; in: Kass, p. 78.
91Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 February 1969: in, Kass, p. 79.
9S Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 January 1969; in, Kass, p. 79.
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Was the military successful in changing the pattern of the relationship!
Despite the military's apparent dissension with the "party line," particularly
their skepticism of diplomatic solutions and focus on the importance of maintaining
Egyptian goodwill, the policy advocated in Pravda maintained the upper hand in the
formulation of Soviet foreign policy. liana Kass found that "available evidence
indicates that the policy advocated by Krasnaya Zvezda was not heeded by the
decisionmakers. Official statements made public during this period followed Pravda's
mildness."99 However, as hopes dimmed for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli
crisis, Pravda began to adopt a line that was more openly pro-Egyptian and critical of
Israel. This change was observable in both press items and the public comments of
government officials.
By mid- 1969, articles appearing in several party-supported press organs took
on a more "military" tone, dropping their insistence on a political solution in favor of
more open support of the Egyptian cause. On the 15th of June, Pravda printed an
article intended to explain the outcome of a trip to Cairo by Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko. The item defended Egyptian efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East and
made a strong statement of support for Egypt.
The U.A.R . . . announced their readiness to carry out all the provisions of the
November resolution. . . . The USSR has reaffirmed its full support for the just
struggle of the U.A.R. ancLihe other Arab states for the liquidation of the
consequences of aggression.
On 2 October 1969 this position was reasserted in a Pravda article which stated that
the Soviet Union would "do everything necessary to achieve the liquidation of the
consequences of Israeli action."
Party press organs also began to establish a justification for expanded support
to Egypt. Commentary in the 27 August 1969 issue of Pravda praised the "profound
social and economic transformation in the U.A.R.," the elimination of the "military
bourgeoisie," and the widening of the "social base of transformations in the
country." 102 Later, the November issue of Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the
99 Kass, p. 50.
100 Pravda, 15 June 1969; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 9 July 1969.
101 Pravda, 2 October 1969; in: Glassman, p. 77.
102 Pravda, 27 August 1969; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 24 September
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CPSU. observed that expanding Soviet-Egyptian contacts had allowed the beginnings
of a true revolutionary- outlook in Egypt, thus offering proof Egypt had undergone
major social reform under Soviet guidance. Historian Alvin Rubinstein considers this
article to have been the result of a major policy debate in the Kremlin regarding
increased Soviet aid to Egypt and believes it was designed to provide justification for a
major shift in policy towards the active commitment of personnel. 103
If Rubinstein is correct in his assessment that there was a major Kremlin
policy debate in late 1969. the decision to pursue a policy of more active support for
Egypt would indicate a victory for the military position. Increased military assistance,
or better yet combat personnel, would be a strong sign of Soviet-Egyptian solidarity
and would help consolidate Russia's military presence in Egypt. While the inability to
reach an Arab-Israeli settlement certainly contibuted to the Soviet policy change, the
final decision to upgrade Soviet backing for Egypt may well have been influenced by
strong military desires.
3. External Inputs
IVas there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state?
In the period of time immediately following the June War, Nasser was in no
position to contravene the wishes of Soviet policymakers. He undoubtedly recognized
both the immediacy of the threat and the acuteness of Egypt's needs. Nasser lacked an
alternative arms supplier, and even had one been available the immediacy of the Israeli
threat left him in no position to introduce new weapons systems into the Egyptian
military. For this reason Nasser first backed the idea of a peaceful compromise
solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis. It was noted above that on several occasions Pravda
commented on the willingness of the Egyptians (and the other Arabs) to accept a UN
sponsored peace initiative.
Nasser's outward compliance with Soviet policy desires probably disguised
concern over the reliability of Soviet support. The Egyptian President reportedly was
deeply disappointed by the support Egypt received from the Soviet Union, commenting
at one point that the Russians had been "frozen into immobility by their fear of a
confrontation with America." 104
103 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, pp. 103-105.
104Glassman, p. 52. The Soviets were alleeedlv frightened bv the Sixth Fleet.
Nasser had hoped to receive aircraft from the USSR, because the ground destruction of
the Egyptian Air Force left many pilots available.
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More importantly, it appears that Nasser viewed the pursuit of a political
solution as a purely temporary expedient. Mohamed Heikal reports that soon after the
1967 war Nasser began to plan his future strategy. He saw this strategy falling into
three main stages.
To beein with. Eeypt and the other frontline countries would have to remain on
the defensive; then thev could move^n to active deterence; and finally would
come the liberation of lost territories. 1U ^
During the first, "defensive" stage, Nasser would prove a very agreeable client,
and would lean heavily on Soviet support, at one point asking the Soviets to handle
Egypt's air defense. 106 Nasser realized that he needed a lull in the conflict to allow the
Soviets to rebuild the Egyptian armed forces and he was willing to accept Soviet
guidance at this time. By November 1967 Marshall Zakharov, head of the Russian
military assistance effort, declared that, "Egypt can now stand up to anything Israel
can deliver. 1 have no fears for the Egyptian front. The defenses are perfectly all
right." 107 At this point, Nasser began to consider more active measures to regain the
Egyptian territory lost to the Israelis.
The focus for disagreements between Soviet and Egyptian policymakers was
the recovery of the occupied territories. The recovery of these lands was the overriding
imperative of Egyptian foreign policy. Nasser was adamant on this fact, as was made
clear in a speech he delivered on May 1, 1969:
Unless Israel withdraws we will fight ... to the last man. Israel must withdraw
from the occupied territories, or else war will continue. There is nq^olitics on
this subject. We cannot resort to political maneuvers on this subject.
Nasser soon recognized that Soviet diplomacy would not return the Sinai, which was
his primary objective. With this in mind, Nasser felt it necessary to shift his policy
from a "passive defense" to an "active deterrence." He set out to apply increasing
military pressure on the Israelis in the hope that significant Israeli losses would result
Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 191.
106 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Xile, p. 17.
107
Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 50-51.
108Cited in Yahya, p. 187.
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in an Israeli withdrawal. The result was the "War of Attrition." a phase of the Arab-
Israeli conflict that Nasser entered despite serious Soviet misgivings.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
(specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed?.
There appears to have been very little attempt on the part of the Soviet Union
to place restrictions on the quality or quantity of weapons sent to Egypt immediately
after the war. It must be noted that the Soviets were most generous in their supply of
air defense aircraft (intercepters) and ground based anti-aircraft weapons, but slow to
replace the TU-16 and IL-28 bombers destroyed during the war. 109 There is no
evidence that Nasser was disappointed in these arms transfer arrangements or that he
requested weapons that the Soviets did not deliver. All evidence indicates that Nasser
was pleased with the support Egypt was receiving from Moscow. The Egyptian
President remarked in 1969:
The Soviet Union is supplying us with the arms we need without exerting
pressure on our current financial resources. . . . We have not vet paid a sinele
pennv. We have benefited a great deal in recent months from the Soviet experts
and advisors who are with our units. . . . The Soviet Union has neither dictated
anv political restriction nor made a single condition. It has not made anv request
that could affect our national prestige.
™
Nasser was obviously well aware of the importance of Soviet equipment and advisors
to the survival of his government. It is unlikely that at this critical time he would have
considered any move that might jeopardize his relations with Moscow.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies1. Were they successful!
There is no evidence that Nasser attempted to pressure the Soviets into
altering their arms transfer policy. This may be attributed both to Nasser's reluctance
to upset Moscow and to his general satisfaction with the pace of Soviet arms deliveries.
Nasser explained to Politburo member Alexander Shelepin that the Egyptians were
very grateful for Soviet assistance and commented, "You may be exasperating people
to deal with, but in the end you do deliver." 111
109 The Military Balance, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies),
1966-67 to 1969-70.
110Cited in Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 81.
ul Heikal. The Road to Ramadan, p. 66.
51
It must also be observed that Nasser's strategy involved much more than the
acquisition of arms. He also wanted to involve the Soviets in the Arab-Israeli dispute
as a means of lifting the conflict from the regional to the international level. 112 While
he hoped to avoid the Soviet domination of Egypt, he also made it clear that he
welcomed Soviet assistance in his fight against Israel. In promoting increased Soviet
involvement, Nasser insured that Moscow, in the interest of international prestige,
would prevent the destruction of his government. By making the Russians see the
Egyptian defeat as their defeat, Nasser guaranteed Soviet support. When Nasser gave
the Soviets a stake in Egypt, he created a situation in which he could demand ever
greater amounts of Soviet military equipment. Additionally, Nasser knew that the
increasing Soviet presence in Egypt and the Middle East was a source of great anxiety
to the United States. It was possible that the United States would pressure Israel into
accepting a peaceful settlement before the Russians became too firmly entrenched.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision1.
The major reason that the Soviets were anxious to establish a presence in
Egypt was the strategic importance of that country to the Soviet Union. As was
described in the previous chapter the Soviets were very concerned about the
vulnerability of their country to the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, particularly
the Polaris submarine, and were desperate for bases on the Mediterranean. It is
significant that when Soviet President Podgorny visited Egypt in late June 1967, he
asked for Soviet naval facilities in Alexandria. At this juncture Nasser refused, but
arrangements would soon be made to grant the Soviet navy the facilities they
coveted. 113 The agreement for port facilities was worked out in January of 1968. The
Soviets were granted jurisdictional control over repair shops and warehouses in Port
Said and Alexandria. In April of that year the first Soviet TU-16s deployed to Egypt
for reconnaissance missions over the Eastern Mediterranean. 114
112Heikal, p. 165.
113
Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 47-48. Podgorny probablv pressed Nasser
for too much. While the subject of naval facilities was under discussion, he requested
permission to raise the Red Flag over the facilities. At this Nasser exploded, "This is
just imperialism."
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Rubinstein. Red Star on the Nile, p. 46. Officially the Soviets acquired
"facilities" not "bases." This meant that there was no "surrender of Egvptian
sovereignty and hence no "imperialism."
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••
The Soviets had sought these military privileges since at least 1964 and Soviet
generosity in resupplying Egypt can perhaps best be explained as an effort to
consolidate these gains, as can the emphasis the Soviet military seemed to place on
confirming the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. This interest in Egypt's strategic position
may have blinded the Soviets to a potential trap. The retention of this strategic
position, as well as the maintenance of Soviet international and regional prestige now
required the survival of the Nasser government. Secure in this knowledge, Nasser felt
free to launch his "War of Attrition."
4. Summation
• The Soviet policymakers, both partv and militarv. seemed verv interested in
developing the Soviet presence in Egypt, both bv maintaining Soviet bases and
bv taking" an active role in the diplomatic process seeking a solution to the
A'rab-Israeli conflict. The emphasis on a political solution to the crisis,
particularly evident on the pages of Pravda, points to a desire to prevent an
escalation 'of the conflict and potential Soviet military intervention.
There was a strong militarv interest in Soviet-Eevptian affairs that is traceable
to a desire to retain the tangible benefits the militarv derived from the
relationship (naval facilities, air Bases). There is also evidence that the militarv
mav have oeen able to influence the decision to erant more active support to
Egypt after hopes for a peaceful settlement dimmed in 1969.
It is difficult to prove that the Soviets attempted to impose a "ceiling of
sophistication" on arms transfers to Egypt. There is no evidence of Egyptian
complaints over the types and quantities of arms transferred. It is important,
however, that the Soviets did not return the Egyptian bomber force to pre-war
levels, perhaps a reflection of some effort towards restraint.
Egypt was of tremendous strategic importance to the USSR given its location
on" the Mediterranean and as a gateway to Africa ana Asia. Nasser
undoubtedly recognized his country's strategic location and used this to
strengthen his bargaining position in his dealing with the Soviets.
B. 1970: THE AIR DEFENSE COMMITMENT
1. Introduction
Soviet military and economic assistance proved unable to persuade Nasser to
accept Soviet guidance and prevent his return to active belligerency in 1969 and Nasser
launched his "War of Attrition" over Soviet protests. The "War of Attrition" was
based on an assumption that Egypt could force an Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories by inflicting "significant" losses on the Israeli military. This was
expected to demoralize the Israeli forces and pressure the Israeli government into
accepting a compromise settlement. The plan seriously underestimated the retaliatory
capability of the Israeli Defense Force.
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Nasser's "War of Attrition" led to a serious escalation in the fighting on the
Egyptian-Israeli front, and by January 1970 the Egyptian situation was desperate. The
Israeli Air Force was striking targets close to the center of Cairo and Egyptian
MiG-21s and SA-2s were unable to prevent these attacks. 115 The Egyptian Air Force
had lost 150 pilots and serious questions were beginning to arise over the quality of
Soviet training and equipment. 116 There was a real possibility that the Nasser
government would collapse, taking with it the entire Soviet infrastructure in the Middle
East. As a result, when Nasser journeyed to Moscow in January 1970, his demands for
modern weapons to offset Israeli air superiority carried a sense of urgency the Soviet
leaders could not ignore. The Soviet decision to deploy air defense personnel to Egypt
exemplified how important Nasser's survival was to the Kremlin. The risks involved in
this deployment apparently stirred substantial controversy in the Soviet hierarchy.
2. Internal Inputs
Was [here evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations'!
The rapidity with which the Soviet leadership reached its initial decision to
commit combat forces to Egypt suggests that such a contingency had already been
considered. The party leadership was apparently shifting towards a more active policy
in support of their Arab client. This policy shift culminated in a speech delivered by
Kosygin on 10 December 1969 in honor of a visit by Nasser's personal emissary Anwar
Sadat. In his remarks, Kosygin pledged all-round Soviet support for the "just struggle"
of the Arab peoples and strongly hinted that this support might entail something more
than political backing:
As for the Soviet Union, it will continue to support the rightful cause of the Arab
countries . . . and will maintain the struggle, inside the United Nations and
outside it, for a political settlement in the Near East. We will combine this
strussle . . . with active measures, to strengthen the defense capability of the
U.ATR and the other Arab states. 11
1 The MiG-21 and the SA-2 both have serious limitations operating at low
altitudes. The Israelis exploited this fact by penetrating at low altitudes.
116 Kass, p. 155.
[[1 Pravda, 11 December 1969; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 13 Januarv
1970.
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This strong statement of support was followed two days later by a Pravda
article that promised "urgent and constructive steps aimed at eliminating the
consequences of Israeli aggression." Clearly, Soviet policymakers were ready to initiate
more active measures to defend Egypt, though the actual extent of these measures may
not yet have been worked out. 118
Soon after Nasser's emergency visit to Moscow in January' 1970,
commentaries appeared in Pravda which must have pleased even the most belligerent in
the military. An article published on 27 January 1970 indicated that the Soviet
leadership was adopting a new line towards the Middle East. Specifically it noted that
a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict might be expedited by eliminating
Israel's military advantages. The commentary also observed that it was "necessary to
rule out territorial concessions to the aggressor," a statement certain to find favor in
Cairo. 119
In mid-February, an Israeli attack on a metallurgical plant near Cairo was
seized by the Soviets as an opportunity to justify their heightened involvement in the
Egyptian air defense. A Tass statement strongly condemned the attack and warned
that "the Soviet Union will extend the necessary support to the Arab states in
strengthening their ability to defend their security and their rightful interests." 1 In
this and subsequent articles describing Israeli air operations there was no mention of
the ongoing, and Egyptian initiated, "War of Attrition." Rather Israeli raids were
commonly referred to as "provocative attacks."
Up to this point there was an apparent concurrence between the Soviet party
and military elites over the objectives and methods of Soviet policy. However, an
internal debate probably began about the time the first Soviet troops arrived in Egypt
in March 1970. This debate concerned the proper role of the Soviet troops in Egypt;
that is where they should be stationed and whether Soviet pilots should fly combat
missions.
118 Pravda, 13 December 1969; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 13 Januarv
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The military asserted its position first in an article publish 14 March 1970 in
Krasnaya Zvezda. This piece implied that the Soviet Union had a duty to become
actively involved in Egyptian defense:
In order to be worthv of the loftv title of internationalist . . . practical steps are
necessarv alone with active
2
participation in the struggle of other nations for
freedom'and independence.
The next day Krasnaya Zvezda, focused directly on the Egyptian situation with
an article that described Egyptian airspace as unprotected and Egyptian civilians as
exposed to "barbarous attacks." It also mentioned the insufficient number of Egyptian
pilots and claimed that the Israeli Air Force was relying heavily on Western (primarily
American) mercenaries. 123 In these two articles the Soviet military seemed to be
building a justification for increased Soviet participation in Egyptian air defense, and
specifically the use of Soviet combat pilots.
Soviet reporting on a speech delivered by Anwar Sadat on 20 March 1970
offers a valuable opportunity to compare and contrast the growing difference between
the party and the military on the USSR's "internationalist duty." Krasnaya Zvezda's
commentary, printed the next day, highlighted Sadat's contention that a real and
immediate danger to Soviet-Egyptian interests existed in the form of a US; Israeli plot
to seize Egyptian air bases to replace American bases recently lost in Libya. There was
also special attention given to Sadat's passage on "the noble stand of the Soviet Union
and the many sided aid it grants Egypt in the struggle against imperialism and
aggression." In contrast, Pravda downplayed the immediacy of the threat to Egypt.
The author of the Pravda article reminded his readers that imperialist plots were a
permanent thing and that in any event "it is up to the Egyptian armed forced to defend
their motherland." Pravda also made no reference to Sadat's praise for the "noble
stand" of the Soviet Union. It appears that those responsible for Pravda articles
were far from anxious to rationalize heightened Soviet involvement in Egypt.
159.
112 Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 March 1970; in: Kass, p. 157.
123 Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 March 1970; in: Kass, p. 157.
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On 24 March 1970, Krasnaya Zvezda printed a commentary that explicitly
linked Soviet interests with events in the Middle East. The article first observed that
"The Middle East has become an arena in which the forces of socialism and progress
confront the forces of imperialism and reaction." The article then repeated a common
theme frequently used to justify Soviet interest in the Middle East "the Middle East
borders immediately on the southern boundaries of the Socialist Commonwealth." 125
In her study, liana Kass suggests this commentary "may have been an attempt to exert
pressure on the decisionmakers in order to secure increased commitment to the region
in which the direct confrontation with the chief enemy threatening the Soviet periphery
was taking place." 1 - 6 At the very least, the statement is a reflection of the military's
concern for the impact of Middle Eastern affairs on Soviet national security and
suggests an attempt on the part of the military to remind Kremlin decisionmakers of
this fact.
One final clash between the party and the military arose in mid-April. In a
speech delivered in Kharkov, Brezhnev ignored the issue of Israeli raids and spoke of
the need for a "political settlement "that will bring peace and security to all nations of
the region." 12, A Krasnaya Zvezda commentary published the next day countered this
conciliatory stance by warning that "the Mediterranean has been prepared (by NATO)
as a springboard against the socialist states and the Arab East." Once again, the
military leaders seemed committed to asserting the importance of the Middle East and
the Mediterranean area to Russian security. Soviet influence in both areas depended
upon the maintenance of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and Soviet naval facilities on
Egyptian soil.
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
The military was apparently successful in its push for more active Soviet
involvement in Egyptian air defense. On 29 April 1970, Israel reported that Soviet
pilots were flying operational missions for Egypt.
128 Soviet pilots eventually would fly
combat missions along the Suez Canal. During May and June Soviet-manned SA-3
missile batteries were added to the air defenses along the Suez Canal, a significant
125 Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 March 1970; in: Kass, p. 160.
126Kass, p. 160.
127From a speech given by Brezhnev on 15 April 1970; in: Kass, p. 162.
128 American sources confirmed these reports the next day. Sew York Times, 30
April 1970.
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departure from the original Soviet intention to restrict the use of Soviet personnel to
the defense of high-value targets in the Egyptian interior. Moscow apparently decided
that the risks entailed in the forward deployment of Soviet troops were worth the
opportunity of significantly curtailing the Israeli air operation. Overall, the Soviet
decision to follow the military's advice and participate actively in Egyptian air defense
ended Israel's deep penetration attacks and substantially reduced Israeli Air Force
effectiveness along the Suez Canal. 129
3. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state!
The "War of Attrition" itself was a source of conflict between the Soviet
Union and the Egyptians. The Soviets disapproved of active fighting along the Arab-
Israeli front because of the dangers of escalation. Once the Egyptians were deeply
involved in this policy of "active deterrence," the Soviets were remarkably forthcoming
with their support, including the deployment of combat personnel. This was a clear
indication of how seriously the Soviets took their overseas credibility and the
importance they attached to maintaining their position in Egypt and the Middle East.
It is also clear that even as Nasser was using Soviet aid to pursue his policy of
"active deterrence" he was also planning to pursue an independent foreign policy.
Egyptian thinking was outlined in a "thinking aloud memorandum" prepared for
Nasser by a group of senior Egyptian officials before his trip to Moscow in June 1970.
This memorandum shows that the Egyptians were considering policy options that
would increase their leverage with Moscow by making approaches to Washington.
Major points in the memorandum included:
•. The Soviet presence in the U.A.R. the real prospect of its increase and the
consequent increase of Soviet influence in the Middle East, has become a fresh
source of anxiety in the West and faces the Americans with a situation that
may oblige them'to initiate a direct dialogue with us.
•. The increasing Soviet presence gives us a favorable bargaining position via-a-vis
the U.S., which could lead to some pressure being exerted bv the U.S. on Israel,
with the aim of securing a settlement before the Soviet presence has reached
irreversible proportions.
•. In this case the effect of Soviet aid to Egvpt would have been solely to act as a
means of exerting pressure on the U.S.
•. What would then be the situation should a settlement be reached? The U.S.
would emerge as the power which, bv its pressure on Israel, had achieved a
settlement. This it would have done without spending a dollar, while the other
superpower, which had initiated the process, and in doing so spent its treasure
129Glassman, pp. 77-79.
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and even its blood, would be left on the sidelines. 130
Nasser apparently believed he could use contacts with the Americans to gain
leverage over the Soviets and ensure their support for future policy initiatives lest they
be "left on the sidelines." This support would be of great importance if the Egyptians
were to receive the weapons necessary to go beyond "active deterrence" and pursue a
"war of liberation."
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
(specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed!
The only weapon specifically requested by the Egyptians to deal with air
defense crisis was the SA-3. This was perhaps the most sophisticated surface-to-air
missile in the Soviet arsenal and was designed to intercept low altitude targets. The
SA-3 had not yet been delivered outside the Warsaw Pact, when the Soviets agreed to
deliver the missile as a result of Nasser's request of January 1970. SA-3 batteries, with
crews, began arriving in Egypt by March 1970. 131
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies! Were they successful!
When Nasser arrived in Moscow on 22 January 1970, his primary7 intention
was to secure delivery of the SA-3 missile. His meeting with Brezhnev was blunt,
straightforward, and clearly demonstrated Nasser's ability to influence Soviet
decisionmaking. Nasser's confidant. Mohamed Heikal. was in Moscow for the
discussions and has provided a very detailed account of the proceedings. 132
Nasser opened the discussions with the observation that the SA-2s in Egypt
provided inadequate defense against low-flying aircraft. After some debate. Brezhnev
agreed the SA-3 would fulfill Egyptian needs, commenting "our friend Nasser always
gets what he wants." Although the Soviets were willing to deliver the system, Egypt
lacked sufficient crews to man the necessary batteries. To avoid a prolonged gap in air
defense coverage while the Egyptian crews got their required training, Nasser suggested
that the Soviets provide interim crews to man the batteries. Brezhnev saw the problem
as greater than just sending crews and argued that aircraft were also needed. Nasser's
response was, "All right, send the planes, too."
130
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At this point the Russian leader began to express concern about the possible
international implications of Soviet intervention and the potential for a crisis with the
U.S. Brezhnev explained his fears to Nasser:
We are not scared of anybodv. We are the strongest power on earth. But you
must understand that this will involve a considerable risk. We must weigh up
our position.
In response to this Soviet delaying tactic, Nasser delivered the following
ultimatum:
If we do not get what I am asking for evervone will assume the onlv solution is
in the hands of the Americans. We have never seen the Americans backward in
helping the Israelis ... if Eevpt falls to American- Israeli force the whole Arab
world will fall. ... I shall gd"back to Eevpt and tell the people the truth. I shall
tell them that the time has come to step aown and hand over to a pro-American
President. . . . This is my final word.
Nasser's threat stunned Brezhnev. He asked for time to call a Politburo
meeting, but Nasser said he required an immediate answer. The Soviets quickly
rounded up all available Politburo members, together with twelve military marshalls
and, after a hasty meeting, granted Nasser's request. The Russians viewed this as a
"decision fraught with grave consequences" that would require restraint on the part of
the Egyptians. Brezhnev's final request was that the deployment be kept a secret to
avoid an adverse US/Israeli reaction.
Nasser successfully pressured the Soviets into providing air defense assistance
for Egypt. The Soviets sent SA-3s, 15-20,000 combat troops and 80 aircraft and pilots
to defend the skies over Egypt. 133 In July Nasser revealed to his people the secret
agreement he had reached with Moscow, "the Soviet leaders declared that they would
throw all their weight behind us to defend our homeland. . . . The Soviet leaders
honored their promise." 134
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision!
133
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The Soviets already regarded Egypt as a location of strategic importance. As
a result of the deployments in 1970 their position in Egypt was significantly enhanced.
In return for the commitment of Soviet personnel, Nasser gave the Soviets exclusive
jurisdiction over six Egyptian airfields and a free hand in the deployment of personnel
and pilots. 13 These air bases provided the Soviets with a military infrastructure in the
Eastern Mediterranean and allowed military strategists to entertain thoughts of linking
the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets by means of a protected Suez Canal. 136 Since the
Soviet deployments did not generate a dangerous American/Israeli response, the
Soviets enhanced their strategic position at a minimal cost.
4. Summation
• The. Soviet party and militarv hierarchv were both intent upon maintainine the
Soviet presence in Egvpt. There was agreement in the need to prop up Nasser's
threatened reeime. "However, this required the direct involvement of Soviet
combat forces'? something the Soviets probablv hoped to avoid. Client pressure
prompted direct Soviet involvement, though a shift towards a more active
policy in support ol Egvpt was clearly evident at least one month earlier.
•
•
There was a strone militarv interest in Soviet-Eevptian affairs, as evidenced in •
the tone and substance ol Krasnava Zvezda articles written at this time. The
militarv wished to retain the privileges it gained in 1967 and those received later
as a result of the agreement to deplov Soviet personnel. Military desires mav
well have been a decisive factor in the'decision to advance Soviet manned SA-3
batteries to the canal and allow Soviet pilots to fly combat missions. The
military's ability to influence Soviet decisionmaking seems clear in this instance.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets attempted to impose a "ceiling
of sophistication.'' In factt given Egvpt's desperate situation in January 197(T
the Soviets authorized the deliverv" of a particularly sophisticated piece of
equipment, the SA-3, to fill Egypt's immediate needs.
• The audacitv of Nasser's demands in Januarv 1970 shows that he recognized
the bargaining strength he possessed. The 'importance of Egvpt to Soviet
securitv^made" the Kremlin more susceptible to Nasser's demands and more
willing'to consider high risk policies, such as intervention.
C. 1971: THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
1. Introduction
Gamal Nasser died 27 September 1970 and was replaced by his Vice President
Anwar Sadat. Sadat had a much different personality from Nasser and had a different
opinion of the Russians. Whereas Nasser was frequently skeptical, but generally
appreciative of Soviet efforts to support Egypt, Sadat made increasing demands and at
times became hostile when his demands were not met. Sadat's reluctant tolerance of
his Soviet sponsors was typified in his remark "I would bring in the devil himself if he




could defend me. Before Soviet-Egyptian relations came under the serious strains
that culminated in the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972, there was one brief
moment of Soviet-Egyptian collaboration, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
2. Internal Inputs
Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations!
The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on
very short notice and was not subject to debate in the Soviet press. The lingering
disparity between party and military interpretations of the objective of Soviet
commitments to the Egyptians was noticable in coverage of the Treaty signing. The
Egyptian leadership made it clear that they had signed the treaty with the
understanding that "The Soviet Union will help us to liberate the land." These
pronouncements were repeated by Krasnaya Zvezda but were completely ignored by
Pravda. The military press also stressed that the treaty was directed against Israel and,
indirectly, the United States, suggesting an effort on the part of the military leadership
to state unequivocal backing for the Egyptians at a time when Soviet-Egyptian
relations were under considerable strain. 138 In contrast, Pravda would go no further
than to quote Soviet President Podgorny that the treaty "reinforces and cements" 139
Soviet-Egyptian relations, indicating that the party viewed the treaty in terms of
codifying and institutionalizing existing relations rather than creating new
commitments.
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
Since the treaty was signed on short notice it is unlikely the military leadership
could have influenced the negotiations. The clauses of the treaty carried no explicit
understanding of any new military commitments. The treaty, which served as a model
for "Friendship and Cooperation" agreements with other Third World nations,
including Syria, was phrased in such a vague manner that it could be used to justify
various forms of future Soviet action. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviet
leadership intended to use the treaty to rationalize expanded Soviet involvement in
Egypt.
137 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 119.
138A discussion on the Treaty appears in Kass, pp. 207-208.
139 Pravda, 29 May 1971; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 29 June 1971.
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3. External Inputs
Was [here a conflict between [he foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state!
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was negotiated during a
particularly troubled time in Soviet-Egyptian relations. On 2 May 1970 Anwar Sadat
had dismissed his Vice President, AH Sabri, for a coup attempt. Sabri was openly pro-
Soviet, and despite Sadat's assurances Moscow could not be convinced that the Sabri
dismissal (and later arrest) was not "anti-Soviet" rather than domestic in nature. In
turn, Sadat was afraid the Sabri coup attempt was Soviet-inspired. Both nations
desired a clarification of their relationship, which had "operated on an ad hoc, but
continuing basis" 140 since 1955. The Soviets undoubtedly sought guarantees of their
status in Egypt in the aftermath of the Sabri scandal; Sadat hoped to lend an air of
legitimacy and security to his new and recently threatened government. Interestingly,
there is some controversy over who initiated the treaty negotiations. Rubinstein and
Glassman believe the treaty was a Soviet idea, prompted by the Sabri controversy. 141
In contrast, Mohamed Heikal insists that the Egyptians approached the Soviets with a
treaty proposal well before the Sabri affair. 142 In any event, both sides were amenable
to the idea of a treaty, and the agreement was signed on 27 May 1970, just two days
after the arrival of the Soviet delegation.
Whether the Treaty expanded Soviet influence over Egyptian foreign and
domestic affairs is open to interpretation. The articles of the treaty seem to imply very
close cooperation between the two countries and an Egyptian acceptance of Soviet
guidance and assistance. However, on closer examination, it is doubtful whether the
treaty would have any impact on Soviet-Egyptian relations. For example:
• Article 2 dealt with Egypt's "aim of reconstructing societv along socialist lines"
and pledged Esvpt and the Soviet Union to "cooperate closely and in all fields
in ensuring conaitions for preserving and furthering the social and economic
gains of their peoples." This required no concrete Egvptian programs, and
certainly no greater reforms than the Egyptians had already adopted."
• Article 4 called on both parties to work towards a "lasting and fair peace in the
Middle East." Again, Sadat was committed to nothing hew. He was actively
seeking a negotiated settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict, if on his own terms.
140 Rubinstein. Red Star on the Nile, p. 146.
141 See Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 149, Glassman, p. 89. Rubinstein is
particularly adamant that Moscow originated the treatv, stating, the treaty obviously
resulted from a Soviet and not an Egyptian initiative." Tie points to the sudden arrival
in Cairo of a large Soviet delegation'in late May, headed By President Podgorny, and
the apparent benefits Moscow derived from the treaty.
142Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 227.
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• Article 7 specified that the two countries would "regularlv consult each other at
different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states"
if there should occur "a daneer to peace or a violation of peace.
-
' In such
situations the two nations would "contact each other without delav. in order to
concert their positions with a view to removing the threat." ' This article
committed Sadat to little more than maintaining frequent contact with Moscow,
something, given Egypt's reliance on Soviet support, he was likely to do
anyway.
• Article 8 discussed Soviet military support to Egypt. The article pledged the
Soviets to "provide specifically for assistance in the training of the C.A.R's
military personnel in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the
C.A.R with the view of strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences
of aggression." The Soviets had made comparable promises to Eevpt since at
least"December 1969 and this article did not implv Soviet intervention on the
Egyptian side in the event of a war.
• Article 9 concluded the treatv bv prohibiting either country from entering into
"an alliance directed against' the other." The Soviets probably included this
stipulation to prevent a possible Egyptian alliance with the 'U.S., a highly
unlikely prospect at the time.
The treaty was an effort by the Soviets to institutionalize the Soviet-Egyptian
relationship, to have something "in writing" that would guarantee their position in
Egypt. The vague wording of the articles might allow a manipulation of their meaning
at a later date, if Moscow found this necessary. For the moment they legitimized and
stabilized Sadat's regime. Both countries had reason to be satisfied with the treaty.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
(specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed?.
Weapons were not a consideration in the negotiation process. Article 8 did,
however, reaffirm the flow of Soviet weapons and advisors to Egypt, a pledge certain
to appeal to Sadat and the Soviet military.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies? Were they successful!
All reporting indicates that both the Soviet Union and Egypt were interested
in reaching an agreement even if for their own reasons. Egypt did not pressure the
Soviets into signing the treaty, which may well have been a Soviet initiative in the first
place.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision!
The continued strategic importance of Egypt to the Soviet Union was evident
in Moscow's interest in institutionalizing Soviet-Egyptian ties. Above all, the Soviets
did not want the Sabri coup attempt to be used as a pretext for a disruption in the
Soviet-Egyptian relationship that would jeopardize Soviet air and naval facilities. The




treaty, however vague in its wording, placed the objectives of the relationship "on
paper" to serve as a guarantee for Soviet military privileges in Egypt.
4. Summation
• The Soviet Treatv of Friendship and Cooperation was drafted in a manner that
allowed the Soviet Union to consolidate and institutionalize its presence in
Egvpt, while making no commitment to intervene on the Eevptian side in the
eve'nt of an Arab- Israeli war. It did not expand Soviet commitments in Egypt.
The militarv had no apparent direct impact on the drafting or negotiating of the
treaty. Still, thev must have been pleased bv the treaty's clauses which seemed
to guarantee So'viet presence in Egvpt and generally solidifv the sometimes
shakv Soviet-Egvptian alliance. The format ofthe treatv suggests that while the
militarv mav not have made direct inputs, military interests were considered in
the treaty's formulation.
The Soviet "ceiling of sophistication" was not considered in the treaty process,
as no specific weapons systems were discussed.
The terms of the treatv placed no further commitments on the Soviet Union,
but thev also did not 'bind Egvpt's President Sadat to anv new policv. The
Soviet decision not to push Sadat into making major concessions may te'stify to
a Soviet recosnition of Esvpt's bargaining strength.
D. 1972: THE SOVIET EXPULSION
1. Introduction
The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provided only
temporary relief from the fundamental stresses afflicting the relationship. The primary
source of friction was Sadat's determination to decide when and how to conduct a war
to liberate the occupied territories. This policy frequently conflicted with Moscow's
efforts to control events by exercising a monopoly over arms supplies as a means to
prevent, postpone, or at least prevent the uncontrolled escalation of any future Arab-
Israeli conflict. Sadat was embarrassed by his inability to fulfill a promise to make
1971 the "year of decision" in the Middle East due in large part to inadequate Soviet
support. 144 As Soviet reluctance to support an Egyptian war effort became
progressively apparent Sadat decided to alter the Soviet-Egyptian relationship by
expelling the majority of the Soviet personnel from Egypt. This move marked a low
point in Soviet-Egyptian affairs, but was apparently not completely unexpected in
Moscow. The initial Soviet response was described as one of "shock, but not
-145
surprise. w




Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations!
Since the expulsion of the Soviet personnel was an Egyptian action, done
without warning, no debate between the party and military elite over Soviet-Egyptian
relations appeared on the pages of the Soviet press. Pravda articles that appeared in
the weeks just prior to the Soviet expulsion carried no hint of the impending
breakdown in relations. Sadat's visit to Moscow in April 1972 was described as
"comradely and cordial." 146 When Soviet Defense Minister Grechko journeyed to Cairo
in mid-May, Pravda noted simply that military cooperation was "developing
successfully." 14 One month later when General Sadek, the Egyptian Minister of War
and War Production, visited Moscow Izvestia quoted him praising Soviet- Egyptian
relations as "extremely important and successful." The article also mentioned that the
Soviet Union would continue to render aid to Egypt. 148
The Soviet press response to the expulsion was exceedingly restrained. On 20
July a Tass communique observed that: "In accordance with the request of the leaders
of the Arab Republic of Egypt" there had been a "temporary stationing of a certain
number of Soviet military personnel in the country ... for a number of years." These
troops had deployed to help the Egyptian armed forces "master the Soviet war
material." These Soviet advisors "have now fulfilled their mission" and would be
returning to Russia. Their departure would "in no way affect the basic principles of
Egyptian-Soviet friendship." 149 Two days later Pravda stressed the "positive" aspects of
the Soviet exodus by reporting "festive sendoffs for Soviet troops" as a way of thanking
them for their "sincere efforts and critically important services." 150
The moderation of the Pravda reporting may have disguised a major debate
raging in the Kremlin over the appropriate response to the expulsion. Mohamed
Heikal speculates that certain elements in the Soviet Union may have argued that "the
policy of dependence on the bourgeoisie had proved a failure," and suggested a
reversion to older policies:
146Pravda, 30 April 1972; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 24 May 1972.
14/ Pravda, 19 May 1972; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 14 June 1972.
^Izvestia, 15 June 1972; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 12 July 1972.
149 Pravda, 20 July 1972; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 16 August 1972.
150 Pravda, 22 July 1972; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 16 August 1972.
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As a. revolutionary power no doubt the wisest course of action would have been
to minimize the significance of the debacle over the experts, to assert that thev
had been stabbed in the back bv ungrateful Arab governments, and to adopt the
easv alternative which presented itself - that is to sav, switching to support of
local Communist parties.
This viewpoint clashed with that held by many others in the leadership,
especially in the military, who were "much less concerned with ideology than with the
Soviet Union's responsibilities as a superpower." It was argued that the Soviet Union
could not abandon its position in the Middle East, given its importance to Soviet
political prestige and its military significance for Soviet national security. The latter
argument prevailed, and the Soviet Union took great pains to preserve what remained
of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. 151
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
Heikal reported that "the military, in particular Marshall Grechko, argued
repeatedly in the Politburo that there was no easy way out, and that the flow of
military aid to the Arabs must be stepped up." 152 Shipments of military hardware were
increased significantly soon after the expulsion, leading Sadat to remark, "they are
drowning me in new arms." 1 - 3 Between December 1972 and June 1973 the Egyptians
received more arms from the Soviets than they had in the previous two years. These
shipments included many of the advanced weapons, such as the SA-6, T-62 tank, and
Scud-B surface-to-surface missile, that the Egyptians would use to great effect in the
1973 war. Since Sadat had expelled only the Soviet air defense contingent, between
1500 and 2000 advisors remained in Egypt. Soviet access to Egyptian naval facilities
was not affected, allowing Moscow to retain its foothold in Egypt despite Sadat's
actions. The military was unwilling to jeopardize what remained of its position by
cutting off arms deliveries. The arguments apparently carried the day and military
shipments were increased substantially soon after the expulsion.
Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 253. It is sometimes difficult to
determine how much of Heikal's account is fact and how much is pure speculation. In
Heikal's defense, he was a consummate journalist who had excellent sources in the
Egvptian government and access to the best political rumors. It also seems reasonable
that certain Soviet ideologues, still uncomfortable with the 1956 reinterpretation of
Marxist- Leninist doctrine as applied to the developing world, would seize this









Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client statel
Sadat's decision to expel the Russians can be traced to a fundamental
difference between the Egyptian and Soviet foreign policies. Quite simply, Sadat
wanted the capability for independent action in the Middle East: to be able to fight a
war with Israel at a time and place of his own choosing, and without reliance on Soviet
guidance or Soviet intervention. This required a special commitment from the
Russians, as Sadat explained to them on his visit to Moscow in February 1972:
What I want this time is a strategic decision that vou will give us the opportunity
to be equal to Israel. We do not want supremacy, but equalitv. This is a
strategic decision. After it has been made, anv request we make or any additions
you give our forces are strictly a matter of detail.
The Soviets had no intention of giving Sadat military parity with Israel. The
joint communique issued after Sadat's visit said only that "the sides again considered
measures to secure the lawful rights and interests of the Arab peoples " and gave no
indication of any change in the Soviet arms supply commitment. 1 " 6 Sadat needed a
modern military machine to confront the Israelis, but the Soviets were refusing to give
any Arab country the ability to confront Israel unilaterally. Barring a major
diplomatic breakthrough, Sadat would either have to find a means of altering the
Soviet-Egyptian relationship or abandon his hopes of regaining the occupied territories.
Sadat knew that he had to take the Sinai back. This was as much a political
imperative for him as it had been for Nasser. He probably believed that he would
never be able to recover Egypt's lost prestige while Soviet troops were in Egypt, and
particularly not while Soviet troops manned the SA-3 batteries along the Suez Canal.
The removal of these troops might ease the transition to active warfare.
A second major concern was the SALT I 'interim agreement' signed by the
United States and the Soviet Union on 29 May 1972. The Basic Principles of
Relations' section of this agreement stated that the two nations would "do everything
in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to
increase international tensions." On a global scale this detente related accord was a
155Quoted in Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 171.
156 Rubinstein, p. 172.
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major success for the Soviet Union, since it placed it on an equal footing with the
United States. For Sadat it was almost a personal affront. Just one month earlier he
had convinced Moscow to release the following statement:
The Arab states had - in addition to their efforts for a peaceful settlement - everv
right to use other means to restore the Arab territories usurped by Israel. All the
peace Iw'ing peoples will accept with full understanding the use of these
means.
The terms of the interim agreement seem to contradict this apparent Soviet sanctioning
of Egyptian war plans. Sadat could not help but wonder whether Egypt would be
abandoned in the interest of Soviet-American detente.
Finally, Sadat found the Soviet presence an economic burden. He disliked the
requirement to pay for the Soviet air defense network with hard currency. 158 Soviet
advisors were often rude and abusive and were not popular with the Egyptian
military. 159 Since the dangerous period of the "War of Attrition" had long since ended
these advisors had little to do and Sadat could do without the expense and
inconvenience of a large Soviet contingent in his country.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
( specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed1.
Sadat's disenchantment with the Russians was not over a Soviet reluctance to
deliver arms in quantity. As Table 1 shows, the Soviets were certainly generous in
supplying weapons. However, there can be little doubt that the Soviets exploited their
position as sole supplier to control the release of certain weapons to the Egyptian
army, either to prevent Sadat from launching a war or to force Sadat to limit his
objectives. Some examples will illustrate the Soviet efforts to delay or restrict arms
deliveries to Egypt.
• The Soviets were verv hesitant to provide the Egyptians with a bomber that
would give them a strategic capability. They never Fulfilled promises to deliver
the TU-22 Blinder supersonic oomber and offered the TU-16 Badger medium
bomber on condition that it be used onlv with Soviet permission. Sadat
rejected this offer in February 1972 as a violation of Eevptian sovereientv. .The
Soviets later relented and provided Egypt with a limited" number of TC~-16s.
157
Sella, pp. 72-73, provides a discussion of this seemingly contradictory Soviet
policy.
158 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 167.
159
Heikal, p. 179.
160 Sadat, p. 220 and Efraim Karsh, Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in
the 1970 's (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 9.
69
TABLE 1
MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS USED BY THE EGYPTIAN ARMED
FORCES
TYPE Quant.ity Increase (%)
Oct. '70 Oct. '73
Tanks 1300 1900 46
APCs and other
Armored Vehicles 900 2000 122
Artillery Pieces 1500 1700 13
Surface -to-Air
Missile Batteries 35 125 260
Combat Aircraft 315 420 33
Helicopters 70 190 170
Source: Efraim Karsh, Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970'
s
(Jerusalem: JafTee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p.8.
• Deliveries of the MiG-23 Floeger were withheld. At one point the Soviets even
attempted, to substitute advanced MiG-21s for an agreed upon delivery of the
newer jet.
• The Soviets made arms deals with no specified delivery date. Sadat believed
that this was because thev wanted to setxhe delivery time bv their own criteria
"and so secure control of the situation.
• The release of less advanced weapons was never a smooth process. Delavs and
obstacles forced frequent postponements and alterations to the Eevptian
operational timetable.
• Moscow prevented nations producing Soviet arms under license from supplving
those arms to Egvpt. For example, Moscow blocked an EevptLari efiort to
purchase military material (mostly spare parts) from India in 1971. °~*
161 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 160.
162Sadat. p. 173.
163 Karsh, p. 9.
164 Karsh, p. 9.
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In Moscow's defense it should be noted that Egypt's constantly changing war
plans resulted in frequent modifications to Egypt's weapons requirements. Even Heikal
admitted that Egyptian demands were "sometimes excessive" and blamed them in part
on "an exaggerated idea of the productive capacity of the superpowers.
"
16:> The
Egyptians assumed that slow Soviet deliveries were due to a Soviet reluctance to
support their cause and not the fact that some weapons simply could not be produced
in the desired quantity (particularly newer weapons like the MiG-23). Still, the Soviets
undoubtedly knew that Egyptian war objectives would ultimately be determined by-
weapons supply. While the Soviets may have trained the Egyptians to fight like the
Soviet army, they never provided the weapons required to follow classical Soviet
warfighting doctrine. 166 If Sadat insisted on a war, it would have to be fought for
limited objectives.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies! Were they successful!
Sadat's expulsion order was an effort to pressure the Soviets into improving
their support to Egypt. It was not an attempt to end Soviet involvement in Egypt.
Most importantly, not all the Soviet "advisors" in Egypt were expelled. All advisors
who had arrived in Egypt prior to 1970 were allowed to stay. Soviet naval facilities
were not affected. The expulsion also exempted instructors under contract with the
Egyptian army. Only the large air defense contingent deployed to Egypt in 1970 was
sent home. This amounted to all but 1,500-2,000 of the 15.000-20,000 Soviets in
Egypt, but still left the Soviets with a secure position in Egypt. Since the air defense
forces had outlived their usefulness with the end of the "War of Attrition," Sadat could
send Moscow a very clear message without jeopardizing Egyptian security.
Sadat sent this message to Moscow to force a change in Soviet-Egyptian
relations. He explained later that he ordered the expulsion because "otherwise things
would continue as they are now for twenty years." 168 Sadat gambled that a dramatic
gesture would break up the logjam in Soviet arms shipments. Subsequent events were
to prove that Sadat was correct in his assumption.





168 Sadat made this statement durina a confidential brief to Cairo editors
immediately following the expulsion. See Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 17j.
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Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision!
The Soviet decision not to contest the expulsion order and the rapid return to
friendly relations, both testify to the continued strategic importance of Egypt to the
Soviet Union. Under strong military pressure to preserve the remaining Soviet military
privileges (the naval facilities) and with Soviet political prestige on the line, the Soviet
government stepped up its efforts to improve Soviet-Egyptian ties. It should be noted,
however, that as a hedge against future difficulties the Soviets sought to improve
relations with Syria. Just before the expulsion order a reported S700 million arms deal
was negotiated with Damascus. Soviet TU-16 reconnaissance aircraft were transferred
to Syrian bases and the Soviets moved to guarantee access to Syrian ports.
4. Summation
• Sadat's expulsion order was viewed as a serious threat to continued Soviet
presence in the Middle East. In order to maintain their presence the Soviets
significantly expanded their militarv assistance to Cairo, therebv increasing the
chances of a new round of Arab-Israeli fighting. In this instance, the Soviet
leadership apparentlv believed that continued presence in Egvpt was worth the
risk of an escalation' in Middle East tensions and the inherent possibilitv of the
need for Soviet intervention.
• The militarv was determined not to lose their militarv privileges in Egvpt and
there is evidence that thev fought hard to continue Sbviet-Esvptian ties in the
face of pressure to cut-off relations after the Eevptian "stab-m-the-back.." The
militarv mav have influenced the final decision lb patch up relations, though it
must also be noted that Brezhnev and other partv leaders were also anxious to
maintain relations for reasons of political prestige.'
• The Soviets clearlv attempted to impose a "ceiline of sophistication'' over
weapons deliveries 'to Egvpt. The Soviets avoided sending Sadat weapons that
would give him a true offensive capabilitv, including bombers, surface-to-surface
missiles, and modern tanks and fighters. They also worked to preserve their
monopolv as arms supplier bv sluming off 'non-Soviet arms sources, and
regulated" arms flows in a way probabiv designed to prevent Egvpt from
seriouslv considering a war with' Israel. These restraints were relaxed' after the
expulsion of the Soviet advisors as Soviet leaders sacrificed control over the
situation for the continued goodwill of Sadat.
• Sadat would not have contemplated expelling the Soviets had he not felt secure
in his bargaining position. Trie obvious strategic importance of Egvpt to the
Soviet Union gave Sadat the confidence he needed to expel "the Soviet
personnel, (while carefullv retaining those vital to Egvptian national securitv)
and imposing a new reality upon Soviet-Egyptian relations.
E. 1973: THE OCTOBER WAR
1. Introduction
By 1973 the Egyptian government was under heavy domestic pressure to go to
war with Israel. The costs of maintaining the country on a constant war footing had
placed an intolerable strain on the Egyptian economy and required tremendous
169Glassman, p. 97.
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sacrifices from the Egyptian people. President Sadat was also confronted by a restless
military anxious to retrieve its lost honor, and sometimes violent public demands for
action. 1 ° Sadat realized that Egypt could no longer tolerate the "no peace, no war"
status that had prevailed since 1967. He also believed the Egyptian military was at
peak proficiency and feared the effects of a continued delay. With no diplomatic
solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict in sight, Sadat began the final planning for his
"war of liberation."
2. Internal Inputs
H as [here evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations!
The 1973 October War presented the ultimate test of Soviet-Egyptian relations
and brought to the forefront many of the simmering controversies over the depth of
Soviet commitment to its Egyptian client. A review of Soviet press reporting during
the war reveals a familiar pattern. The party leadership, as represented on the pages of
Pravda, looked for ways to control the conflict and limit the Soviet role. The military's
mouthpiece, Krasnaya Zvezda, focused its concern upon the maintenance of a strong
Soviet position in the Middle East and hinted at a need for a more active Soviet role in
the fighting. The articles in these two papers suggest that there was a significant
degree of disagreement on what policies the Soviets should follow during the war.
Pravda had three primary themes during the war. The first was the
importance of detente. In her study Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy, Dina
Rome Spechler points out that critics of detente, in the military and elsewhere, seized
upon the conflict as an opportunity to question the Soviet relationship with the United
States. The pages of Pravda devoted considerable space to the defense of detente and
examples of how detente had served Soviet interests by moderating American policy.
The paper was also surprisingly positive in its reporting of American activity. For
example. Pravda avoided reprinting Arab condemnations of the United States, and
made no assertions that Israel was an American puppet. Apparently Brezhnev and the
other party leaders sought to reassure the United States that the USSR had not
discarded detente. As Spechler observes "whatever the other results of the fighting may
be, Pravda wants to make sure that it leaves detente intact." 171
1/0 Heikal provides an account of the Egyptian situation in 1973 in, The Road to
Ramadan, p. 204.
171 Spechler. p. 19. Spechler's discussion on Pravda' s approach to the war
appears on pages 17-25.
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The second major concern voiced in Pravda was for the maintenance of the
Soviet foothold in the Middle East. Another crushing Israeli victory might topple the
"progressive" governments of Egypt and Syria with installation of anti-Soviet. pro-
Western regimes in their place. This would completely undermine Soviet Middle
Eastern strategies. A prolonged war, even one ending in an Arab military victory,
might cause such severe economic dislocations that the friendly Arab regimes in Cairo
and Damascus might collapse. It was imperative to prevent this from happening.
Most importantly, the Party leaders feared the potential broadening of the
conflict and the increasing possibility of a U.S. -Soviet confrontation the longer the
fighting continued. Pravda articles reflected a desire to avoid Soviet intervention and
the potential for a superpower clash. Spechler observed a "very great eagerness to limit
Soviet involvement in the war. Whatever might reduce the need for Soviet
participation this paper enthusiastically endorses." 172 Overall, the articles in Pravda
reflected an interest on the part of Brezhnev and other members of the party hierarchy
to maintain the Soviet presence in the Middle East at the least possible cost. The
eagerness for an early settlement to the war flowed from twin desires to avoid a
superpower confrontation and prevent an Arab defeat. This would require tremendous
flexibility and innovation - not only on the pages of Pravda but also in Soviet Middle
Eastern policy.
Krasnaya Zvezda took positions that contrasted with those found in Pravda.
This paper's handling of the crisis demonstrated a desire to project a strong Soviet
image and preserve Moscow's more tangible benefits in the Middle East. Krasnaya
Zvezda made infrequent references to detente policies. While detente was not openly
criticized, it was also clear that the military writers did not evaluate the Arab- Israeli
conflict in terms of its ability to promote or jeopardize Soviet-American relations.
Instead the paper argues that there are essential preconditions for the success of
detente, notably Soviet military strength and activism.
With this in mind the military daily was "less concerned about the dangers of
escalation than about the possible consequences of Soviet restraint." In some
instances it appears that the paper supported a more direct Soviet role in the fighting
as the Arab attack faltered and Soviet interests were jeopardized. When Israeli air
1
'"Spechler, p. 20.
1/3 Spechler, p. 34. Spechler's discussion of the Krasnaya Zvezda response to the
war appears on pages, 32-41.
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raids caused Soviet casualties Krasnaya Zvezda declared that the "aggressors" had
"gone too far." It suggested that the Israelis heed the Soviet Union's "serious warning"
or risk "serious consequences for Israel itself." 174 It was never made clear, however,
what those consequences might be.
Finally, there were no calls for a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Krasnaya Zvezda showed no interest in diplomatic matters, preferring to give
detailed accounts of Arab military successes, and encourage the Arab war effort. The
paper seemed particularly interested in erasing any remaining doubts about the
capabilities of Soviet weapons. An article that appeared in mid-October announced
that the war "in no way resembles the six-day war," and went on to claim that Israeli
Prime Minister Golda Meir attributed her country's losses to the "high quality of
Soviet weapons." 1 ,:>
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
It is exceptionally difficult to measure the possible military influence on Soviet
policy during the war because in many ways military and party goals were similar.
While the Party leaders may have been more moderate in their viewpoint, and more
concerned about the survival of detente, both Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda reflected a
desire to avoid an Arab defeat and preserve the friendly Arab governments. While the
military airlift and the Soviet "threat" to intervene in the closing stages of the war seem
to indicate a strong military influence, they are also compatible with a more general
desire to preserve the status quo ante bellum. It cannot be proven that the Soviet
military was successful in altering Soviet policy. On the other hand military leaders
probably approved of many of the measures taken.
3. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state!
The volume of Soviet weapons deliveries to Egypt between December 1972
and June 1973 strongly suggests that Moscow supported Sadat's decision to regain the
lost territories by force of arms. Despite the deliveries, the Soviets were skeptical of
the Arabs' ability to defeat Israel and looked to retain some influence over the course
of the upcoming conflict, assuming they could not prevent it. Soviet actions
174 Spechler, p. 34.
l,5 Krasnava Zvezda, 20 October 1973; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press 14
November 1973. Krasnaya Zvezda seemed most proud of the fact that the war had
destroyed the "myth" of Israeli invincibility.
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immediately before and during the October War demonstrates a Soviet desire to
restrain the Egyptians and prevent the escalation of the war, even as they supplied the
Egyptian war effort.
The Soviets knew that Sadat planned an offensive, but did not now exactly
when it would occur. Sadat had informed the Soviets in very vague terms because he
was uncertain of the depth of detente and feared that a Soviet warning to the U.S. or
Israel might force a postponement of the Egyptian assault. 176 Unable or unwilling to
prevent the Egyptian attack, the Soviets agreed to back the Egyptian plan but
requested that they be allowed to evacuate Soviet civilian personnel from Cairo. This
evacuation, carried out just days before the Egyptian attack, may have been a subtle
attempt to warn the Israelis and the Americans that hostilities were imminent without
openly betraying Soviet-Egyptian friendship. 177
Next the Soviets called for a ceasefire just six hours after the opening of
hostilities. This action shocked the Egyptians, who were having substantial success
along the Suez Canal. Moscow insisted this plea was made at Syria's request, but the
Syrians denied this. A quick end to the hostilities had obvious benefits for Moscow. It
would preserve the initial Arab gains, save Russia the expense of underwriting a long,
expensive war, avoid the possible destabilization of pro-Soviet Arab governments if the
Arabs began to lose, and eliminate the risks of a Soviet-American confrontation. The
belligerents refused to accept the ceasefire and the fighting continued. 178
As the fighting dragged on, Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Cairo on 15
October to again advocate a ceasefire backed by promises that the Soviets would
ensure Israeli compliance. Kosygin warned that the tide of battle was turning (an
Israeli armored column had counterattacked across the Canal) and suggested that the
Egyptians would be wise to accept a standstill ceasefire before the situation
deteriorated further. While assuring Sadat that Egypt had full Soviet backing, he also
noted that the USSR had "an obligation to world peace" and a commitment to "search
for a just and durable solution to the Middle East problem." This served to remind
Sadat that the USSR had interests beyond Egypt.
l76The "Interim Agreement" siened bv the U.S. and the Soviet Union in May
1972 would have obligedlhe Soviets to warn' Washington.
1;7
Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, gives an account of Egyptian pre-war activities
on pp. 24-27.
l78William Quandt, Soviet Policv in the 1973 lVar K Rand Report R-1864-ISA,
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1976). Also Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 263.
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Soviet efforts to lesson the international impact of the Arab- Israeli
confrontation did not prevent them from beginning a massive air and sea resupply
effort to Egypt and Syria soon after the war started (8 October). This apparent
contradiction with the Soviet pleas for a ceasefire was, in fact, consistent with broader
Soviet policies. The Soviets could not allow the defeat of their primary Arab client,
nor were they prepared to jeopardize future Soviet-Egyptian relations by appearing to
withhold arms during the conflict. In addition, the deliveries gave them the leverage
needed to pressure Sadat to accept a ceasefire.
Soviet behavior immediately before and during the 1973 October War was
consistent with Soviet, but not Egyptian interests. It is very likely the Soviets
attempted to indirectly spoil Sadat's offensive by evacuating their civilian personnel
from Cairo. Moscow next called for a ceasefire in the midst of impressive early Arab
successes and actively promoted a ceasefire thoughout the conflict. At the same time,
Moscow was generous in its support of the Egyptian war effort. Soviet diplomacy
displayed a keen grasp of Middle Eastern realities and impressive crisis management
skills, allowing Moscow to exercise some control over the situation without alienating
the Egyptians.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
{specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed!
The flood of Soviet arms to Egypt in the months preceding the October War
did not contain all the weapons the Egyptians desired. The MiG-23 fighter and the
TU-22 supersonic bomber were not delivered. Advanced weapons that did arrive were
primarily for air defense (SA-6, SA-7) and the ground forces (T-62, large numbers of
Sagger anti-tank missiles). 180 It may well be that Soviet deliveries represented overdue
deliveries finally reaching the Egyptians, combined with some new weapons. Given
Sadat's near total dependence on Soviet armaments, the Russians were still in a
position to control the arms flow without risking Soviet-Egyptian ties. The Soviets did
not give Egypt the ability to attack Israel alone. All Egyptian operational plans were
closely coordinated with Syria to ensure that Israel would be faced with a two-front
war.
1 ~9 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 245 and Quandt, pp. 28-30.
180Glassman, p. 105.
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One notable exception to the Soviet restriction on long-range offensive
weapons was the Scud-B, a guided missile with a range of 150 miles. This weapon, and
the threat of its use, played a significant role in the war. On 16 October, after a series
of Arab setbacks, Sadat warned that if Israel attacked Egypt in depth he had the
means to retaliate against Tel Aviv. 181 Several Scuds were launched against Israeli
troops on 22 October as a demonstration of Egyptian capabilities. The firing of the
Scud-Bs signified that Egypt possessed a deterrent that could prevent Israeli deep
penetration strikes. The Scuds were apparently under Egyptian control but at least
partially Soviet-manned. This implies a certain level of Soviet cooperation in the
launch of the missiles, marking the first time Soviet personnel were involved in an
offensive attack against Israel. 182
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies! Were they successful!
Publicly, Sadat was pleased with Soviet support for his war effort, particularly
the resupply effort. Soon after the ceasefire went into effect the semi-official Egyptian
newspaper Al Ahram reported that "the USSR has done everything necessary to ensure
the success of the Arab countries struggle." 183 This is not to say that Sadat was
completely pleased with Soviet behavior; he had been alarmed by the Soviet request to
evacuate their citizens 184 and disturbed by the Soviet pleas for an early ceasefire. 185 He
may also have noted that Soviet deliveries required hard currency, in particular a S200
million dollar donation from Algerian President Boumedienne. 186 On balance, however,
it must be remembered that Sadat could not afford to offend his Soviet sponsor and
was in no position to be anything but cooperative.





183/Quoted in Pravda, 31 October 1973; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 28
November 1973.
184
Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 34.
185 Rubinstein. Red Star on the Nile, p. 263.
186Sadat. p. 264. Sadat would write later in his autobiographv that Boumedienne
onvinced the Soviets were "a hundred times more eager" to see' an Egyptian defeatwas c
than the Americans or the Israelis
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Egypt was still the focal point for Soviet interests in the Middle East at the
time of the Yom Kippur War. The size of the Soviet resupply effort, and Kosygin's
guarantee that the Soviet Union would ensure Israeli adherence to a ceasefire were
signs of how seriously the Soviets took their position in Egypt. There was even an
implied Soviet threat to intervene in the fighting when Brezhnev wrote to President
Nixon on 24 October that if the United States refused to join the USSR in a joint
intervention to force Israeli adherence to the ceasefire "we should be forced to consider
the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps
unilaterally." 187 Although this threat was vaguely worded and issued after the peak of
the crisis had passed, it does symbolize the risk Moscow was willing to take to ensure
the survival of a pro-Soviet government in Egypt.
4. Summation
• The Soviets took great pains to ensure their continued presence in the Middle
East. The Soviets'provided full support to the Eevptian war effort and even an
implied threat of militarv intervention. Moscow's* frequent pleas for a ceasefire
were the result of a desire to prevent an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict
and preserve initial Arab gains. Above all, the Soviet leadership hoped to avoid
a superpower confrontation.
• The militarv had a distinct interest in the outcome of the 1973 War, but the
moderation' of Soviet policies indicates that the militarv made limited inputs to
the Soviet decisionmaking process. Still, the Soviet militarv elite was probablv
not entirelv displeased bv~Soviet policv during the war. It is also to be expected
that in a crisis of such rhagmtude and immediacy the partv would maintain the
final authority.
• Despite Soviet reservations over the Egvptian war plan, thev did provide Sadat
with sufficient weapons to launch his cross-canal offensive. The flow of arms to
Egvpt in earlv 1973 did not give Sadat the abilitv to attack Israel unilaterallv
(thev required joint Svrian operations) or escalate the regional conflict without
Soviet backing. Also*, with the notable exception of the Scud-B, the Soviets
managed to restrict the delivery of offensive weapons to Egypt.
• Sadat would not have launched his attack had he not been certain of Soviet
support. The Soviet willingness to back Egvpt up to the point of possible
militarv intervention, indicates that Sadat still retained significant bargaining
strength derived from Egypt's strategic location.
F. 1976: THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
1. Introduction
In spite of the extensive Soviet military and political support of the Egyptian
war effort in 1973, Soviet-Egyptian relations began to deteriorate soon after the
fighting ended. This gradual collapse culminated on 14 March 1976 with Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat's unilateral decision to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of
18/ Fukoyama, Soviet Threats to Intervene in the Middle East: 1956-1973, p. 15.
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Friendship and Cooperation. Sadat cited several reasons for his decision, including the
apparent Soviet opposition to the "trend toward peace" in the Middle East, the
improvement of Egyptian-American relations, Moscow's refusal to place a moratorium
on Egyptian repayment of Soviet military and developmental loans, and difficulties
over military shipments and spare parts. 188 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Sadat's
action was a response to specific Soviet acts, but rather part of a fundamental shift in
Egyptian foreign and domestic policy.
2. Internal Inputs
Was there a disagreement between the party and the military regarding the
proper conduct of relations']
Several articles that appeared in Pravda during the months preceding the
termination of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty indicated that the Soviet leadership was
aware of the deterioration in relations. The Pravda items emphasized the positive
aspects of the Soviets-Egyptian relationship and reminded the Egyptians of their
indebtedness to Soviet assistance. An article printed on 25 July 1975 criticized
Egyptian policymaking and noted that "it was the Soviet anti-aircraft installations that
protected the cities of the Nile Valley in the spring of 1970. 189 A second Pravda article,
published three months later, listed the accomplishments of Soviet-Egyptian
cooperation and added that President Nasser had once observed, "if it were not for the
support of the Soviet Union, Egypt would have been unable to accomplish a single
complicated task; either economic or political." 1
While the Soviet leadership apparently recognized, and was disturbed by, the
disintegration of Soviet-Egyptian relations, there is no evidence of any internal debate
over the conduct of Soviet-Egyptian relations. Soviet policies were never blamed for
the frictions between Moscow and Cairo. When the treaty was abrogated, Soviet
reaction to the Egyptian decision was a terse four paragraph statement that described
the act as the latest "manifestation of a policy unfriendly to the Soviet Union," and
declared that "all responsibility . . . rests with the Egyptian side." 1 l Finally, the Soviets
had no prior notification of the impending Egyptian action. A lack of internal debate
188 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 325.
lS9 Pravda 25 July 1975; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press 6 August 1975.
190 Pravda, 25 October 1975; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 19 November
1975.
191 Toss statement appearing in Pravda, 16 March 1976; in: Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, 7 April 1976.
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between the political and military elites is therefore not surprising.
Was [he military successful in changing [he pa[[ern of [he relationship)
There are no indications that the military attempted to influence the conduct
of Soviet-Egyptian relations during the months preceding the abrogation of the treaty.
This relative silence may be attributed to the suddenness of the Egyptian move, the
improvement in Soviet relations with Syria and the shift of naval assets to that country
that began in 1972. and possibly a leadership vacuum in the Defense Ministry
(Marshall Gretchko died in April 1976). In any event, the Soviet military leadership
obviously elected not to make an issue out of the end of Soviet military presence in
Egypt.
3. External Inputs
IVas [here a conflia between [he foreign policy objec[ives of [he Sovie[ Union and
[he cliem s[a[e?
The period following the end of the 1973 October War was marked by a
pronounced change in Egyptian foreign policy. Cairo's relative success in its
persecution of the war effectively changed the prevailing Middle Eastern "status quo"
and allowed Anwar Sadat to pursue a wider range of policy options. Egypt no longer
needed to prove itself on the battlefield, its efforts in 1973 had expunged the memory
of the 1967 fiasco and allowed Sadat to consider peaceful methods of regaining Egypt's
lost territories.
The Egyptian President also had to address pressing internal concerns.
Egypt's internal economic crisis had been exacerbated by excessive military spending.
Soon after the war ended, military expenditures, which had been rising steadily since
1967, began to drop. The shift in Egyptian spending appears even more pronounced
when viewed in terms of arms imports as a percentage of total imports. For example,
in 1970 and 1973, 82% of Egypt's total arms imports were arms related. In 1974 that
percentage decreased to 7%, in 1976 to 4%.
The reduction of military requirements lessened Egyptian dependence on the
Soviet Union and gave Sadat greater flexibility in his pursuit of economic assistance.
Sadat was as aware of the leverage provided by Egypt's strategic position as was his
predecessor, Gamal Nasser, and had proven adept at using these advantages to force
concessions from the Soviet Union. However, after the war, Sadat was less inclined to
192 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agencv, World Military Expenditures




EGYPTIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES (CONSTANT 1975 DOLLARS)
Arms as % of
Year Military Expendi tures Arms Impc rts Tota 1 Imports
1967 462 323 26%
68 609 176 17
69 718 162 18
70 1020 888 82
71 1060 458 39
72 1290 691 63
73 1360 883 82
74 1360 170 07
75 1060 357 10
76 1050 131 04
Source:U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers: 1967-1976 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978),
p. 42. 179.
consider Moscow as a source of aid for two major reasons. First, Sadat had a strong
personal dislike for the Soviets. Ever since the AH Sabri affair in 1972, Sadat had been
suspicious of Soviet motives in Egypt. He was particularly annoyed by Soviet efforts
to hinder any improvement in Egyptian relations with the United States. Sadat
complained frequently of the inconsistency of a Soviet policy that promoted detente
between the superpowers, but rejected the notion of improved relations between
Washington and Cairo.
Second, Sadat saw many practical advantages to dealing with the United
States. The first was economic. Mohammed Heikal reported that the Egyptian
President had for many years believed "that what Egypt really needed was its own
193 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 321.
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Marshall Plan, the sort of program of economic recovery- which only America could
finance and organize." 194 Rebuilding Egypt's economy required Western assistance, as
well as funds from conservative states such as Saudi Arabia. To get these funds Sadat
would be required to reduce the Soviet presence in his country. 19 - From a diplomatic
standpoint. Sadat recognized that it was the Americans and not the Soviets who could
pressure the Israelis into accepting a peace settlement and returning the Sinai. Henry
Kissinger impressed this point on Sadat soon after the war; "the USSR can give you
arms, but the U.S. can give you back your territories." 196
The Soviets were understandably disappointed by the post-war shift in
Egyptian foreign policy and made clear that they opposed improved Egyptian-
American relations. Moscow had no diplomatic relations with Israel, a fact which
severely limited its potential role as a negotiator in the Middle East peace process.
Any enhancement of the U.S. role in achieving a peace settlement threatened to
consign the Soviets to the sidelines, despite years of active and expensive involvement
in Middle Eastern affairs. The conflicts between Egypt and Russia were further
intensified by a general change in the Soviet approach to economic assistance to the
Third World. After losing enormous sums providing economic aid to unstable clients
during the 1960s, Moscow had reassessed the political utility of economic assistance
and was more concerned with the "profitability" of its economic aid. 19 '' Soviet aid
disbursements to the developing world decreased steadily throughout the 1970s, and
what aid was given was carefully targeted to achieve maximum gain for the Soviet
Union. This reappraisal of Soviet economic assistance policy in the Third World helps
explain Moscow's reluctance to grant Egypt a debt moratorium or reschedule Cairo's
outstanding loans. Moscow's policy inevitably conflicted with Sadat's efforts to
improve Egypt's domestic situation through massive economic programs.
In sum, Soviet-Egyptian relations had always been based on convergent
interests. Once free from the overriding need for Soviet arms, Sadat explored new
means of improving Egypt's international and domestic standing. The Soviets, who
19 Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Furv (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983). p. 43. It
is also interestine to observe that a Pravda article that appeared on 10 March 1976
commented on US Treasury Secretary William Simon's otter of a "Marshall Plan' to
Egypt. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 7 April 1976.
19
- Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 289.
196Rubinstein, p. 289.
197The modification of Soviet aid policy is addressed in Alexiev, pp. 33-37.
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had proved a willing and trustworthy supplier of arms to Egypt's military, proved
unable, or unwilling to address Egypt's more pressing economic concerns. The Soviet
reputation as an arms dealer, and little else, left Moscow with little influence over
Cairo after 1973. In March 1976 Sadat abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, effectively ending the client-superpower relationship which had existed
since 1955.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
(specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed!
The conflict between Egypt and the Soviet Union also extended to arms
transfers. Following the war the Soviet Union continued to supply Egypt's military
requirements at a more than adequate level. As Table 3 shows, the Soviets quickly
replaced all Egyptian war losses. By 1974 the arms in the Egyptian inventory were
quantitatively equal, and qualitatively superior, to pre-war levels. Once this loss
compensation was completed, however, a one year freeze on arms shipments went into
effect. A final arms deal was reached in 1974, that included a limited number of the
coveted MiG-23, SU-20s and "several hundred" armored vehicles. Following the
delivery of this equipment in 1975 there were no further Soviet shipments of major
weapons systems to Egypt. 198
The slowdown in Soviet arms deliveries did not jeopardize Egyptian military
capabilities, and significant shortages appeared only in the numbers of frontline combat
aircraft. Nevertheless, Sadat was quick to reproach the Soviets for their failure to
provide Egypt with sufficient weapons. On several occasions he openly questioned
Soviet support for Egypt. On 14 August 1974 he remarked that "I have not had any
(arms) in nine months, and there are no signs that they will send me anything." Later,
in January 1975 he complained, "they refused to replace the material that we lost
during the October war, or to deliver to us the sophisticated late model arms that they
have furnished without difficulty to Svria.
"
199
198 Karsh, p. 9.
1
"Quoted in Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 300. Sadat's view was not
shared bv all in the Egvptian government and his constant criticism of the Soviet
Union was a source of serious dissension among Egvpt's leadership. There were many
in Cairo who agreed with one high official who said, "the United States gave Israe'l
more than the "USSR gave Eevpt. but the LSSR nonetheless gave Eevpt enough
weapons to, do what had to beMone. President Sadat's criticisms of the Soviet Lnion
are unjustified," p. 291.
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TABLE 3
EGYPTIAN MILITARY STRENGTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE
OCTOBER WAR
Weapons Systems Pre-War Losses Early 1974
Tanks 1900 900 2000
APCs and other
Armored Vehicles 2000 900 2000
Artillery Pieces 1700 Unknown 1700
Surface- to-Air
Missile Batteries 125 20-30 130
Combat Aircraft 390 180-200 400
Source: Efraim Karsh. Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970' s,
(Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 10.
This final point was one Sadat found particularly disturbing. Syria had been
quickly reequipped after the war, with no haggling over the repayment terms. In
contrast, Egyptian requests were frequently postponed as "under study." When Sadat
requested a ten year debt moratorium from the Soviets he was refused, but a similar
request was granted to the Syrian's in the spring of 1974. Sadat was especially enraged
by Soviet demands for payments on debts incurred during the 1973 war. He was quick
to point out that the Russians had made only one installment on their lend lease debt
following WW II, and could not understand why the Soviets would not extend him the
same consideration.
When the Soviets refused to overhaul Egyptian aircraft and further forbade
India, which manufactured MiG-21 engines under license, from doing so, Sadat had
had enough. Sadat would say later that "the question with India . . . was really the
main cause for ending the treaty."201 He accused the Soviets of failing to uphold
Article 8 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, (to build up and strengthen
200 Rubinstein, p. 322.
201 Rubinstein, p. 325.
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Egypt's military- potential) and elected to abrogate the 1971 agreement in March 1976.
A Soviet reluctance to supply Egypt with the arms it wanted can thus be pointed to as
a major cause for the breakdown in Soviet-Egyptian relations. But given Sadat's new
Western orientation, Soviet hesitancy is certainly understandable. As Alvin Rubinstein
points out:
Vloscow had kept the Arabs supplied during the war. However, given Sadat's
changed policv orientation afterune fighting stopped, it did not feef obligated to
give the Egyptians any bonuses.'
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies1. Were they successful!
Sadat's outward hostility towards the Soviet Union was designed to alter, not
end, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. His refusal to remain silent over the issue of
arms was undoubtedly an attempt to force the Soviets to increase their military and
economic aid. By publicly embarrassing the Soviet Union and questioning its support
for the Egyptian and Arab cause he hoped to improve his bargaining position. Sadat's
first effort at pressuring the Soviets, the 1972 expulsion of the Soviet advisors, had
been a resounding success and led to expanded Soviet arms shipments. Sadat probably
believed that, given Moscow's enormous investment in Egypt, the Soviets would take
whatever steps were necessary' to preserve their position. If so he guessed wrong, and
the Kremlin leadership refused to alter its policies to conform with the desires of its
client.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision!
The Soviet refusal to alter its arms transfer and economic policies towards
Egypt, thereby jeopardizing its position in that country, indicates that by 1976 Egypt
did not have its former strategic importance for Soviet planners. The Soviet decision
to grant a debt moratorium to Syria and not Egypt is convincing proof that the
Kremlin leadership viewed Damascus as a more reliable longterm ally than Cairo.
While the naval facilities available to the Soviets in Syria could not compare with those
lost in Egypt, changes in Soviet and American force structures allowed the Soviet
military to view Syria as a viable alternative to Egypt. The long-range Backfire
bomber, an aircraft well-suited for maritime strike missions entered service in 1974. In
:02 Rubinstein, p. 297.
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1976 the Soviet launched their first Kiev class VTOL carrier. 203 Additionally,
improvements in the range of U.S. submarine launched missiles made it possible for
American SSBN's to leave the vulnerable Eastern Mediterranean and patrol in the
safer waters of the western Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. 204 All these factors
combined to make the Soviets less dependent on Egyptian facilities and allowed the
Kremlin leaders to take a harder line towards Egypt's demands.
Further, Moscow was becoming increasingly aware of Israel's nuclear
capability and the subsequent potential for nuclear confrontation in the Middle East.
A Soviet government statement on the Middle East released on 28 April 1976
expressed alarm at reports that "Israel is creating or has already created its own
nuclear weapons. It is not difficult to see what a potential danger to peace is posed by
this.
"
205 A nuclear exchange in a Middle East conflict would create strong pressures for
the intervention of the superpowers, with unpredictable results. Under these
circumstances the Kremlin leadership may well have decided that it would be wise to
place some distance between themselves and any potential combatants in a Middle
Eastern confrontation.
4. Summation
• Sadat's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian Treatv of Friendship and
Cooperation, and his later (4 April 1976) cancellation of Soviet naval facilities,
effectivelv ended the Soviet presence in Egvpt. Moscow's failure to take
measures' to improve Soviet-Egvptian relations." such as a debt moratorium of a
tvpe alreadv granted to Svna.'sueeests a reappraisal of Cairo's reliabilitv as an
aliv
t
and a' reassessment' of importance of the Eevptian facilities to 'overall
Soviet national security. Given Sadat's rapprochement with the West and
growing hostility towards Moscow, the changing Soviet and American force
structures in the' Eastern Mediterranean, the availability of adequate alternative
facilities in Syria, and the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East
scenario, it is not surprising that the Kremlin leadership found its desire for a
continued presence in Egypt outweighed bv the risk of an unwanted Soviet
intervention into a Middle'Eastern crisis.
• The Soviet military, though undoubtedly dismayed bv the loss of the Egyptian
facilities, apparently had "little impact on the 'Soviet decisionmaking process.
There was no evidence of disagreement between the Soviet military" arid political
elites. The introduction of the Backfire bomber and Kiev-class VTOL carrier.
coupled with the increased Soviet presence in Syria, substantially decreased the
The 37 000 ton Kiev VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) carrier has a
complement of 12 Forger fighter-bombers. ( an aircraft capable of performing both air-
air and air-surface missions) and 16 Hormone or Helix ASW helicopters.lt is officially
described by the Soviets as a "tactical aircraft-carrving cruiser. Jane's Fighting
ShipsJ986-F987 (London, Jane's Publishing Co., 1986) p'. 556.
204Bv 1976 31 Polaris submarines had been upgraded to carrv the Poseiden C-3
missile (10 M I RVS missile, 3000 mile range). The 10 remaining LS SSBXs had been
upgraded to the Polaris A-3. Also, by 1976 the United States Aavy was building its
first Trident submarines. The Tridenf missile had a 4000 mile range. Jane's Fighting,
Ships. 1975-1976 (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1976), p. 783.
205Quoted in Sella, p. 157.
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need for the Egyptian facilities and would have lessoned the military's interest
in, and ability to" alter, Soviet handling of Egyptian relations.
After replacing most Egyptian war losses, the Soviets again began to restrict
arms shipments to Egypt. A long lull in Soviet arms shipments during 1974.
persistent shortages in 'spare parts, and the Soviet blocking of an Indian offer to
service Egyptiarfaircraft, points to a continued Soviet effort to limit Egyptian
war-making capabilities and restrict Egyptian policies. The Soviets did raise the
"ceiling of "sophistication" in 1975 when thev delivered a limited number of new
MiG-23s. This delivery, however, did not mark a Soviet commitment to
Egypt's military parity "with Israel, and with the reorientation of Egyptian
pnbrities was too late fo salvage Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Sadat's unreliability and the shift in Western force deployments had lessened
Egypt's strategic importance to the Soviet Lnion. As 'Moscow and Cairo
shifted their policy priorities, the relationship was no longer of primary
importance to their national security. Without this common need, the
relationship was doomed.
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V. THE SYRIAN CASE: 1980-1985
A. BACKGROUND: 1967-1980
This chapter begins its detailed examination of Soviet-Syrian relations with the
signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation by the two nations in October 1980.
This was not, however, the opening of close relations between Moscow and Damascus.
While Egypt had been the focus of Soviet Middle Eastern relations, Moscow never lost
sight of the advantages of close ties with Syria. The 'progressive' government in Syria
had much to offer the Soviet Union. The Syrians promoted radical, secular political
aims, professed a bitter opposition to Israel, maintained close ties with Egypt, and had
an active pro-Moscow Communist Party. Further, Syria was located in a strategically
important position in the Eastern Mediterranean and therefore presented a promising
alternative to Egypt if Soviet-Egyptian relations foundered. A brief review of Soviet-
Syrian relations prior to 1980 is needed to understand subsequent events.
Syria negotiated her first arms agreement with the Soviet Union in 1956. By the
time of the June War Syria was almost totally dependent on Soviet arms. Syria was
not defeated as thoroughly as the Egyptians in 1967, but still suffered crushing
equipment losses, including 60 aircraft (almost two-thirds of the active air force
inventory')- A major Soviet resupply effort over the course of the next year equipped
the Syrians with 120 modern aircraft and 400 tanks; the deliveries were reportedly
valued at S300 million. Along with the equipment over 1000 advisors were dispatched
to Syria to tram forces, modernize tactics and assist in the operation of the new
hardware. By the middle of 1970 there would be 2-3000 advisors in Syria. 206
Major Soviet weapons deliveries to Syria continued during the period preceding
the 1973 October War. Between 1968 and 1970 the Soviets provided late model
MiG-21s, tanks, SA-2s and naval vessels. The expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt
in 1972 intensified Soviet interest in Syria. The delivery of several major items to Syria
took place at this time including additional aircraft, T-62 tanks, and SA-3 air defense
missiles. In all, Soviet equipment deliveries totaled S150 million in 1972 and SI 85
million in the first six months of 1973.
20bRoeer F. Pajak, "Soviet Military Aid to Iraq and Syria," Strategic Review 4
(Winter 1976): 55.
207 Pajak, pp. 55-56.
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Despite these Soviet deliveries, Syria suffered a catastrophic defeat in the October
War. Losses reportedly included 222 aircraft (65% of the Syrian inventory), 1100
tanks (50%) and 17-20 SAM batteries (50%). Once again the Soviets launched a
major resupply effort and by 1974 all Syrian losses had been replaced with more
modern weapons. New equipment delivered during this time included the MiG-23
(export variant), SA-7, and the SCUD surface-to-surface missile. 208
In March 1976, President Sadat of Egypt unilaterally abrogated his country's
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, thereby terminating the
Soviet presence in Egypt. To offset this blow to regional prestige, the USSR increased
arms shipments to Syria and sought to strengthen ties with the Damascus government.
In all. Soviet arms deliveries during the 1970s (exclusive of war loss compensation)
amounted to nearly 3000 tanks, 1000 armored personnel carriers, 800 artillery pieces,
and 100 aircraft. 209 Syria became the focus of Soviet efforts to secure a position in the
Middle East and establish its role as the indispensible ally of those Arab states that
rejected the Camp David peace process.
Soviet generosity in supplying arms and other forms of military assistance to
Syria was not enough to prevent several disagreements that strained relations between
the two nations. These difficulties, while never leading to a break in relations, served
to show the circumstances under which Soviet and Syrian relations diverged before
19S0 and form a backdrop for more recent disputes. Three of these disagreements
deserve special attention, given their impact on later relations. First, in the years
following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria refused to join the Soviet Union and work
towards a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead the Syrians pushed
for a military solution and espoused the total defeat of Israel. Moscow reportedly
responded to this act of defiance by threatening to withhold arms shipments. Syria, in
turn, opened arms negotiations with the French in 1968 and the Chinese in 1969.
Although no agreements were reached with either country, the Syrian ploy succeeded
in forcing the Soviets to offer new arms contracts. 210 A second disagreement arose in
1972 when the Soviets offered Syria the opportunity to follow the Egyptian and Iraqi
examples and sign a friendship treaty. The Syrians rejected this and several subsequent
Soviet offers to conclude a treaty, preferring to preserve the appearance of non-
208 Pajak. pp. 56-57.




alignment despite the highly visible Soviet presence in their country. Finally relations,
were shaken in 1976 when the Syrians intervened in Lebanon in support of Christian
forces and against the Soviet supported PLO and the Lebanese left. The Soviets
suspended arms shipments as a sign of dissatisfaction, but following a visit by Syria's
President Assad to Moscow in early 1977 deliveries were resumed. 211
Policy differences will continue as long as Moscow must deal with Syrian
President Hafez Assad and his conception of Syrian national interests. Assad became a
key member of the Syrian government in February 1966 and took full control of the
country in November 1970. He has dominated Syrian affairs ever since and his
leadership has provided Syria with stability as well as economic and social progress. In
his foreign policy, Assad's "tenacious dream of a Greater Syria" 212 had led to an
aggressive pursuit of Syrian interests in neighboring states. Of special note are Syria's
substantial economic interests in Lebanon, which were a prime motivation for Syria's
intervention in that country in 1976 and later.213 Such Syrian adventurism has been a
major source of conflict with the USSR. Additionally, Assad's deserved reputation for
pragmatism and independence has hampered Soviet-Syrian relations. He has been
largely responsible for Syrian efforts to diversify arms suppliers and has occasionally
hinted that he might accept a resolution of the Syrian- Israeli conflict that is not co-
sponsored by Moscow. 214
Arms deliveries to Syria have resulted in some tangible benefits for the Soviet
Union. In return for their assistance after the 1967 war, the Soviets were allowed to
use Syrian airfields for long-range TU-16 reconnaissance missions and begin
construction of naval facilities at the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. These
arrangements were comparable to, though not as favorable as, arrangements reached
with Egypt at about the same time. After the Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972,
Moscow negotiated an agreement to expand the facilities at Tartus and Latakia as a
potential alternative to its Egyptian bases. 215
211 Alvin Z. Rubinstein. "The Soviet Presence in the Arab World," Current
History SO (October 1981): 3l4.
212John F. Devlin, "Svria: Consistencv at Home and Abroad," Current History
85 (Februarv 1986): 70. Quote from James H. Scheuer, "How to Stop Svria," The New
Times, 15 March 1984.
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With only limited usage rights at Syrian ports and airbases, the Soviets had
arguably received a poor return on their investment of billions of rubles in the Syrian
military and economy. However, the most important Soviet gains were not easily
quantified. Soviet aid to Syria maintained Russia's entree into the Arab-Israeli dispute
after 1976 and, despite periodic Syrian recalcitrance, assured a more or less permanent
Soviet foothold in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. In 1980, this Soviet
foothold was institutionalized through the Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation.
B. 1980: THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
1. Introduction
The Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in Moscow
on October 8, 1980, marked a major change in the relations between the two countries.
The treaty was an important victory for Soviet policy in the Middle East and the
success of the treaty negotiations came at an especially critical time for Soviet regional
relations. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had seriously damaged the Soviet
position in the Arab world, and Moscow was also anxious to counter recent American
successes in the region such as the Camp David peace process. For the Syrians, the
treaty was an opportunity to lend legitimacy to a regime shaken by domestic violence
and isolated by Egypt's abandonment of the Arab-Israeli struggle.
2. Internal Inputs
Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations!
Unlike the Soviet-Egyptian treaty the Soviet-Syrian accord was the
culmination of several years of effort. Still there is no evidence of disagreement
between the party and the military over the objectives and purposes of the treaty either
before or after the signing. Krasnaya Zvezda reporting on the topic was
straightforward and unremarkable. Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, in a speech
following the signing of the treaty, made it very clear that the treaty entailed only
limited commitments for the Soviet Union. Brezhnev praised the agreement as a
"graphic example of such cooperation between socialism and the forces of national
liberation" that "raises (relations) to a new, higher level," but carefully added that the
treaty was "not directed against any third country ... it is a treaty for peace, not war."
It seems apparent that the Soviet leadership was intent on highlighting the fact that the
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treaty was designed solely to improve Soviet-Syrian relations, and not to imply a direct
Soviet linkage to ongoing Middle Eastern disputes. This reporting of the treaty
provides an interesting counterpoint to articles that appeared following the signing of
the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in 1971. In that case the military press stressed that the
treaty was directed against a third party, Israel, and indirectly against the United
States, while the party press organ, Pravda, made no mention of this. 216
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship 1.
The negotiation of the Soviet-Syrian friendship treaty appears to have been a
wholly political process. The treaty carried no explicit discussion of military relations
beyond a pledge "to steadily develop friendship and cooperation between the two states
in the . . . military . . . field."217 There has been some speculation that Article 10 of
the treaty, which states that the countries "will continue to develop cooperation in the
military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them in the
interest of expanding their defense capacity," was an indication of secret security
appendices attached to the treaty that spelled out a true "defensive alliance."218 The
Soviets have categorically denied the existance of such appendices and insisted that
such speculation "could not be further from reality."219 More importantly, no Soviet
actions since the signing of the treaty have given any indication that such appendices
exist.
Additionally, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation resulted in no increase
in the size, or change in the character, of the Soviet military presence in Syria. While
many in the West feared that the treaty was designed to allow the Soviet Union to
intervene in the Middle East in emergency situations, no identifiable improvements
were made to enhance the Soviet intervention capability. There was no increase in the
number of military advisors in the country, no airfields, ports, or other facilities turned
over to the Soviets for their use and there were no joint exercises of any
A commentary on the treatv and Brezhnev's remarks appeared in Izvestia on
October 1980. See Izvestia, 15 October 1980; in: Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS). (USSR) 16 October 1980. It seems evident the partv leadership wanted no
such controversy over the meaning and objectives of the Soviet-'Syrian treaty.
2[1 Pravda, 9 October 1980; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 12 November
1980.
Amiram Nir, The Soviet-Syrian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: Unfulfilled
Expectations (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983)^ p. 12. Nir s paper
proved an invaluable source of information on trie impact of the Friendship Treaty on
Soviet-Syrian relations.
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consequence. 220 There was no noticeable alteration in the pattern of Soviet arms
shipments. 2" 1 In all, the Soviet-Syrian military relationship appeared unaffected by the
signing of the treaty, and it is doubtful that the military attempted to influence the
pattern of the overall Soviet-Syrian relationship.
3. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client statel
Both the Soviet Union and Syria viewed the agreement as a means of
furthering its own national interests. The disparity in these interests resulted in
conflicting interpretations of the commitments implicit in the treaty. This is
understandable given the different needs and intentions of the two governments. As
the decade progressed, the varied interpretations of the treaty would become
increasingly evident.
As late as 1979 President Assad of Syria had rejected Soviet offers of a
Friendship treaty. There were several reasons for his reluctance. Assad undoubtedly
feared that any treaty arrangement with the Soviet Union would damage Syrian
standing in the Arab world, interrupt the flow of funds to Syria from conservative Arab
oil countries, and possibly generate unrest among religious fundamentalist and
nationalist groups within Syria. Two sets of factors apparently caused Assad to reverse
his earlier decision and seek closer ties with Moscow.
First, Assad's change of heart was probably connected to a spell of serious
domestic violence that shook Syria throughout 1980. The failure of the Syrian armed
forces to control the situation may have caused Assad to fear that the Soviets might
shift support to some stronger candidate. Assad would have seen the treaty as a means
of formally tying the Soviet Union to his regime to ensure its continued existence. In
using the treaty to legitimize his rule, Assad's actions seem remarkably similar to
Sadat's in 1971. 222
A joint Soviet-Svrian amphibious exercise was held on 6 Julv 1981 during
which the Soviets 'landed' 300-401) troops on a Svrian beach. This operation was
supported bv about half of the 53 ship Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Both U.S. and
Israeli analysts concluded that the maneuvers were intended for political, rather than
military purposes and were designed to highlight Soviet intervention capabilities to the
Arab states. The exercise was not of a scale" that would have allowed the Soviets to
resolve the phvsical and logistical problems inherent in any major landing operation.
See Nir, pp. 26-28.




Assad also had foreign policy considerations when he signed his agreement
with the Russians. Of immediate concern was a need to prevent the Israelis from
taking advantage of Syrian internal unrest to seize the military initiative. Second,
Assad probably planned to use the new agreement as a deterrent cover for Syrian
initiatives in Lebanon. New Syrian interventions in Lebanon would certainly meet
with strong Israeli opposition and it would have been prudent of Assad to seek some
assurance of Soviet support for his actions. Finally, the treaty offered a means of
ending Syria's regional isolation. When Egypt withdrew from the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Syria was left virtually alone to face a growing Israeli threat. Backing from other Arab
states was limited at best: Saudi Arabia was expanding its ties with the United States,
Libya was pursuing an adventurous policy in Africa, Iran and Iraq were planning to go
to war against each other, and Jordan was supporting opposition groups within Syria.
For Syria to redress the regional strategic balance, she would have to ally herself
closely with one of the superpowers. Assad was apparently unconcerned by possi' :
restrictions the treaty would place on his freedom of action; Arab criticisms could be
parried with the argument that the treaty was a necessary means of preventing Israeli
regional military superiority and opposing the Camp David Accords. 22
Above all, Assad wanted a strong treaty that would explicitly commit the
Soviet Union to support Syrian policy initiatives. The Syrians viewed the agreement in
terms of a "defense treaty" or "strategic alliance." Two days after the treaty was
signed, the Syrian press described it as a "strategic alliance" and observed that "the
Soviet commitment to the Arab struggle . . . was confirmed under all conditions that
have faced and are facing the Arab struggle. Circumstances soon demonstrated that
a blanket support for Syrian policies was not the Soviets' intention.
The Soviets had their own reasons for seeking a friendship treaty with the
Syrian government. In general, the Soviets have always placed great value on the
traditional benefits of written relationships with other nations, particularly nations in
the Third World. As one analyst observed, "Moscow perceives such agreements as
providing it with prestigious achievements in regions where political prestige has a
cumulative significance."225 In 1980 there were several additional reasons for the
— J
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Soviets to seek, the prestige of a written agreement with the leading Arab confrontation
state.
On the state-state level, the Soviets were anxious to maintain the status quo in
Syria. Moscow harbored great reservations towards the potential alternative to Assad,
the Muslim Brotherhood, which was an anti-Soviet, Islamic extremist group. A
takeover by such a group would certainly jeopardize Russia's sizeable Syrian
investment. Assuming the Syrian domestic crisis was resolved and Assad survived, the
treaty would serve as a signal to Assad that the Soviet Union could be counted on as a
reliable ally, thereby forestalling any possible Syrian shift to the West.
Regionally, the treaty offered the Soviets an opportunity to recover a measure
of the Arab support they lost due to their invasion of Afghanistan. Close cooperation
with Syria placed a pro-Soviet voice in inter-Arab forums and might nullify some of the
negative effects of the Afghan invasion. Finally, at the superpower level, the Soviet
leadership recognized that the American position in the Middle East, both militarily
and politically, had improved significantly in the late 1970's. The treaty was an
effective response to US activities in that it promised a Soviet input to Middle Eastern
peace talks and also provided a possible justification for a future Soviet intervention in
Syria if this was ever deemed necessary. 2"6
The treaty also entailed certain risks for the Soviet Union. By closely
identifying themselves with the Assad regime, the Soviets endangered their position in
Syria in the event Assad was overthrown. Further, it was possible the treaty would
compel the Soviet Union to support Assad in regional initiatives that were not
necessarily in the best interests of the Soviet Union. Moscow's willingness to offer the
treaty to Assad despite these possible reservations indicates that the Kremlin leadership
believed the Soviet investment in Syria had passed the 'point of no return' and that
they were confident the treaty contained only a limited obligation to support the
Syrians.
As written, the treaty supported the Soviet perception of limited commitments.
There were no articles that explicitly bound the Soviets to support Syrian policy
initiatives, nor did the treaty guarantee maximum Soviet backing in any situation. The
vague and ambiguous wording of the agreement offered several advantages to Soviet
foreign policymakers; allowing them to 'institutionalize' the Soviet-Syrian relationship,
recoup a measure of their regional prestige, and establish a potential justification for
226Nir, pp. 7-8.
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intervention in the region, either to defend Syria from an Israeli attack, or to prop up
the Assad government. These benefits were gained at minimal cost. By avoiding a true
"defense treaty," the Soviets retained control over the circumstances of their possible
intervention in the Middle East. Additionally, the less definitive terms of a "friendship
treaty" avoided the potential impact that a "defense treaty" might have had on other
regional relationships, such as a strengthening of US ties with Israel and the
conservative Arab states.*"'
The text of the treaty bore several similarities to earlier treaties signed between
the Soviet Union and other third world nations, including Egypt, suggesting that
Moscow had a standardized format for friendship treaties. Selected articles from the
treaty will demonstrate the general nature of the treaty and the fact that it imposed no
new commitments on either Moscow or Damascus:
Article 1 pledged the "hieh contracting parties" to "declare their determination
to steadilv develop and strengthen friendship and cooperation between the two
states and peoples in the "political, economic, mihtarv, scientific-technical,
cultural ana other fields". This article can be seen as a guarantee of a
continued Soviet presence in Svria. At the same time it commits both nations
to "noninterference in each others internal affairs, " a restriction which mav
applv more to the Soviet Union than Svria.
•
•
Article 4 states that "the Lnion of Soviet Socialist Republics will respect the
non-alignment pursued bv the Svrian Arab Republic." a pledge which
demonstrates a certain Soviet acceptance of an independent Svrian foreign
policy. It also calls into question any speculation about "defensive'alhances."
Article 6 states that whenever "a situation arises that threatens the peace or
security of one of the parties . . . the high contracting parties will immediatelv
contact each other with a view to coordinating their positions and cooperating
in eliminating the threat that has arisen and restoring the peace." The use oT
the term "secuntv" is unique to the Soviet-Svrian Treatv and mav broaden the
bounds of coordination bevond an external 'threat to Svria to include internal
threats. Also of interest in this article of the treatv is the use of the term
"cooperating." This term is also unique to third world treaties and mav have
been a partial concession to a Svrian desire for a stronger securitv arrangement.
In any event, given Assad's reliance on Soviet support, he was certain to
maintain close contacts with Moscow.
• Article 1 1 prohibited either countrv from entering into "an alliance or taking
part in anv grouping of states or in actions or measures directed against the
other high' contracting partv." As in the Egvptian case, the Soviets~probablv
added this stipulation to 'prevent a future' US-Syrian agreement, however
unlikely.
The treaty was also remarkable for certain items not included. Syria was not
pledged to develop a Socialist state, though Article 7 did note that the countries would
"ensure conditions for the preservation and development of the social and economic




Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, there was no explicit pledge of Soviet military support to
Syria comparable to that found in Article 8 of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty. 228
Most importantly, there was no practical change in Soviet-Syrian relations
following the consummation of the agreement. Each partner interpreted its obligations
under the terms of the treaty in a way designed to fulfill its national interests. While it
is admittedly impossible to track every potential incidence of Soviet-Syrian
coordination after the treaty was signed (including telephone conversations, telegrams,
and other informal means of communication), based on an assessment of Soviet
reactions to Syrian foreign policy activity it seems clear that there was little or no
coordination been Moscow and Damascus on Syrian policy initiatives despite the
provisions of Article 6 of the treaty. Three crises which occurred soon after the treaty
was negotiated demonstrate the limited impact of the agreement on Soviet-Syrian
relations.
Less than two months after the treaty was signed, a crisis erupted on the
Syrian-Jordanian border. Syria moved troops to the border area and for a time it
appeared that an open conflict was imminent. There were no indications that the
Syrians consulted with the Soviets before moving their troops and it is doubtful that
Moscow would have approved of an action which threatened to involve them in an
inter-Arab dispute. It also came at a time of increasing difficulties in Afghanistan and
high tensions in Poland. The Kremlin leadership ignored the situation publicly and the
crisis received no mention in the Soviet press. On the diplomatic front, Moscow
dispatched Vice President Kuznetsov to Damascus to neutralize tensions. About a
week later Syrian forces withdrew from the border. The crisis demonstrated that,
despite the friendship treaty, Moscow could not be certain that it would be consulted
before Syrian foreign policy initiatives. The Syrians learned not to assume automatic
Soviet support for their decisions. 229
The second crisis was the Syrian decision to deploy SA-6 surface-to-air
missiles in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on 29-30 April 1981, after Israeli fighters downed
two Syrian helicopters operating over central Lebanon. Once again, there is no
evidence of Soviet-Syrian coordination prior to the Syrian action. The Soviets,
somewhat belatedly, voiced support for the Syrian move. A commentary in Pravda on
"The text of the treatv appeared in Pravda on 9 October 1981. See Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, 12 November 1980. For critical analysis of the treaty's




17 May was typical. It described the movement of the missiles as a "strictly defensive
measure'' and observed that the missiles could "only be used for defensive purposes."
The article then criticized the United States for its inability to control "Israeli
aggressiveness.
Despite Moscow's verbal support, the Soviets made it clear that although they
recognized Syria's right to move into Lebanon they had no intention of becoming
involved themselves. As one analyst reported:
W hile Damascus was declaring that Soviet militarv aid to Svria would be
forthcoming in the event of a conflagration, the 'Soviet media maintained
absolute silence on the matter. Indeed a report carried bv Israeli radio to the
effect that the Soviet ambassador in Beirut had called the (Bekaa) a Svrian
secuntv zone, and that the USSR would back Svria militarily if Israel were to
attack 'Svrian, forces there - was swiftlv and vehementlv denied in Soviet radio
commentary.
The Soviets also probably moved to prevent the escalation of the crisis. Deputy
Foreign Minister Korniyenko was dispatched to Damascus on 6 May for what were
later described as "useful" talks with Assad. 232 The handling of the Lebanese crisis
demonstrated once again that despite the pledges made in the friendship treaty there
was no guarantee that the Soviets would have a say in Syrian foreign policies or that
the Syrians could rely on the Soviets to support their initiatives.
The final crisis was caused by the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in
December 1981. The annexation occurred against a backdrop of increasing Syrian
pressure for an expansion of the pact into a true "strategic alliance" comparable to the
memorandum on strategic cooperation reached earlier by the United States and Israel.
The Soviets balked at the idea of changing the agreement and linking themselves more
closely with the Assad government and, while the Soviets condemned the Israeli
annexation as an "illegal act" and linked the move directly to the US-Israeli
agreement,233 they refused to use US- Israeli "strategic cooperation" as an excuse for
developing a similar relationship with Syria and continued their refusal even in the face
of the provocative Golan Heights annexation.
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The ambiguous wording of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation allowed
liberal interpretations of the treaty's objectives by both Moscow and Damascus. The
Syrians did not feel compelled to discuss potentially dangerous foreign policy measures
with the Soviets, despite the provision of Article 6. The Syrian actions in Lebanon and
on the Jordanian border indicate that they would procede with foreign policy initiatives
with or without Soviet approval. For their part, the Soviets showed no signs that they
planned to support or endorse Syrian actions; no units were placed on alert, there were
no threats of possible intervention, and weapons deliveries to Syria were not increased.
In fact, Moscow seemed most concerned with defusing the crises by restraining the
Syrians. It was obvious that the treaty in practice was designed solely to institutionalize
the Soviet-Syrian relationship. Neither of the partners wanted a pact that restricted
their foreign policy options or entangled them in commitments they would not or could
not fulfill.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
{specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed1.
The treaty did not deal with any specific weapons and there is no indication
that weapons deliveries were a factor in the negotiation process. Article 10 pledged
continued cooperation in military matters based on "appropriate agreements" designed
to enhance their "defense capability." If this is in reference to a Soviet intention to
maintain their military support of the Assad regime, it is certainly very vague.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies1. Were they successful1
Both the Soviets and the Syrians desired a friendship treaty, though admittedly
for different reasons. The Syrians certainly did not need to pressure the Soviets into
signing an agreement that Moscow had wanted for several years. As was mentioned
earlier, the Syrians may have forced the Soviets into certain concessions in the wording
of the document, but subsequent actions demonstrated that the Soviets kept their
commitments limited.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision1
The importance of Syria to the Soviet Union was greatly enhanced when
Egypt abrogated its friendship treaty with the USSR in 1976. When the Soviets were
evicted from the Egyptian ports in April 1976 they were allowed to shift some of their
naval support operations to the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. Although these
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ports could not provide the conveniences once provided by Egypt, being small and
overcrowded, they were critical to the support of Soviet diesel-powered submarines in
the Mediterranean. In 1981 four Soviet TU-16 Badger reconnaissance aircraft and four
IL-38 May ASW aircraft arrived in Syria to take part in a joint Soviet-Syrian naval
evercise. This was the first deployment of Soviet aircraft to a country on the
Mediterranean since the Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972. In terms of national
security and superpower prestige the maintenance of good relations with Syria was
crucial to Soviet national interests. The longstanding Soviet quest for a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation with Syria testifies to the Soviet recognition of the
importance of Syria as a cornerstone of their Middle Eastern policies.
4. Summation
• The Soviet-Svrian Treatv of Friendship and Cooperation was designed to
institutionalize and formalize relations between the two nations, and guarantee
continued Soviet presence in Svria. It did not commit the Soviet Union to
intervene on Svria s behalf in Middle East crises, nor did it place restraints on
Syria's foreign 'policy.
• There is no evidence of militarv influence during the negotiation of the treatv.
The militarv aspects of the So'viet-Svrian relationship were unaffected by the
treatv; there, was no increase in the' number of Soviet advisors in Svria, no
alteration of arms deliverv schedules, and no additional naval or air facilities
were turned over to Soviet use. Still, the desire to preserve the Soviet military
presence in Svria undoubtedlv plaved a part in Moscow's desire to formalize its
relations with' Damascus.
• As in the case of the Soviet-Eevptian treaty, there was no discussion of specific
weapons svstems during the treatv negotiation process. There is no evidence of
a Soviet effort to impose a ceiling' of sophistication.
• The apparent Soviet acceptance of certain textual alterations attests to the
Soviet recognition of Assad's bargaining strength. Good relations with Svria
were essential for continued Soviet presence in the Middle East. While 'the
Soviets proved adept at limiting the depth of their commitment to Svria. Soviet
national interests and superpower prestige in the Middle Ea'st became
dependent on the preservation of the Assad government.
C. THE 1982 WAR IN LEBANON
1. Introduction
The Soviet response or, more accurately, lack of response to the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, has been cause for much comment. Soviet foreign
affairs specialist Karen Dawisha observed:
Soviet inaction in the Lebanon crisis cast serious doubt on the capability of the
USSR to influence events in Lebanon and in the Middle East as a whole. The
USSR was reduced to a series of near-emptv and peripheral efforts during the
crisis - including the exchange of letters with' President Reagan, support for the
Arabs in a United Nations "paralvzed bv the conflict, and a telegram to Yasir
234Turnbull. pp. 72-74.
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Arafat in besieged Beirut assuring the Palestinian Liberation Organization -(P-LO)
Chief that Moscow was behind htm the proverbial "one thousand percent."'
The inability or unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respond to the situation in
Lebanon with active measures greatly upset the Syrians, who anticipated substantial
assistance under the terms of Article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
and had benefited from the Soviet air and sea lift of military supplies during the 1973
war. In 1982 Soviet activity was limited to symbolic gestures, such as placing certain
units in Southern Russia under alert, moving elements of the Mediterranean Squadron
to positions off the Lebanese Coast, and initiating a very limited airlift after 10 days of
fighting. 236
2. Internal Inputs
Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations?
The Israeli intervention in Lebanon could not have come as a complete
surprise to the Soviet leadership. The Soviet press had warned of an impending crisis
at least six months prior to the outbreak, of hostilities. Yet there was no effort made
by the Soviet military elite to pursue a more aggressive stance in support of Syria, nor
was there any attempt to strengthen Soviet-Syrian military ties. Instead the military
seemed content to follow the lead of the political leadership and adopt a low-key
attitude towards the Israeli-Syrian conflict.
During the actual fighting, both Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda were very
restrained in their reporting. In Pravda there were the obligatory attacks on Israeli
aggression, coupled with accusations of American complicity and encouragement, but
there was never any mention of the Soviet-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation and possible Soviet obligations under that agreement. Instead Pravda
commentaries drew attention to the inactivity of the other Arab states and implied that
it was unreasonable to expect Soviet involvement in the crisis if the Arabs themselves
remained silent. 23 Krasnaya Zvezda, if anything, seemed even less intent on promoting
more active Soviet involvement in the conflict. The Soviet militarv dailv virtuallv
235Karen Dawisha, "The USSR in the Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse?"
Foreign Affairs 61 (Winter, 1982,83): 438.
236Dawisha, p. 439.
237 For example, see Pravda, 18 July 1982; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
18 August 1982.
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ignored the fighting between the Syrians and the Israelis, focusing instead on the Israeli
attacks upon the Palestinians and Lebanese. In all. a review of the press revealed no
apparent disagreement between the political and military leadership over the proper
handling of the Syrian- Israeli conflict.
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
There is no evidence that the Soviet military made any effort to alter the
Soviet-Syrian relationship either before or during the outbreak of hostilities in June
1982. The 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had not resulted in an increase
in the Soviet military presence in Syria. During the fighting the highest ranking Soviet
military official to visit Syria was the deputy commander of Soviet air defense forces,
whose primary mission was apparently to determine the reasons behind the failure of
the SA-6's in the Bekaa Valley.238 Practical considerations also mitigated against
Soviet military involvement in Lebanon. The insertion of a token force might result in
a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Israelis, while a major effort threatened a
superpower confrontation. Since the military privileges the Soviet military had been
granted in Syria were limited, and certainly not equal to those previously held in Egypt,
it is understandable that the Soviet military was less willing to accept the inherent risks
of an aggressive policy in the Syrian case.
3. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state!
Both the Syrians and the Soviets were aware of the rising tensions in Lebanon
and the potential for an open conflict between Israel and Syria. Yet, in the weeks that
preceded the fighting there were apparently no discussions between high-level Soviet
and Syrian officials on military or political issues, nor were emergency consultations
initiated once the fighting began. As a result Soviet and Syrian policies were
uncoordinated and unable to pursue a common goal.
The Syrians viewed the Israeli attack as a pretext for raising the friendship
treaty to the level of a "strategic alliance."239 In contrast, Soviet actions both before
and during the 1982 conflict demonstrated a pronounced desire to prevent the
expansion of the conflict and to limit Soviet involvement. There were several possible
reasons for Soviet hesitancy to become entangled in the Lebanon dispute and as many
238
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explanations for Moscow's inactivity. Some of the more important include:
• The Soviets were unwilling to become involved in hostilities outside of Svrian
borders, a policv established bv their response to the Lebanese missile crisis in
May 1981. The Soviets had ho legitimate pretext for military intervention in
Lebanon; thev had no agreements with the Lebanese government and could not
easily justify intervention on behalf of the Syrians or tne Palestinians.
• The Soviets were under no obligation to aid the PLO and offered them virtually
no assistance, causing one Palestinian leader 1 9,lament that "Soviet pressure to
prevent the carnage has had limited influence." u
• Domestic considerations and other foreign policy concerns ruled against Soviet
military action. Afghanistan and Poland had not vet been resolved, arms talks
with the US were being -reinitiated and there was ah impending succession crisis
in the Soviet leadership."
• Above all, the Soviets wanted to prevent a general Israeli-Syrian war with its
inherent potential for a superpower confrontation. This 'was reflected bv
Moscow's downplaying of the war in the press and the general lack o'f
encouragement given to Damascus during the fighting. Moscow's first prioritv
throughout the crisis was to prevent its escalation and avoid involvement in a
Middle East conflict at a time and place not of their own choosing. This policv
served Soviet interests, but also may have damaged Moscow's credibility in the
Arab world.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
{specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed!
There was no apparent change in the size or content of weapons deliveries to
the Syrians in the months preceding the 1982 conflict. It must be remembered that
unlike the Egyptians, the Syrians were not planning an offensive to regain lost territory
and were probably less specific in their demands for equipment. There is no evidence
of Syrian disappointment over Soviet refusal to provide certain weapons and the Syrian
military was well equipped when the hostilities began (late model T-72 tanks, fighters
and fighter-bombers, sophisticated air defense missiles).242 The Syrians lacked long-
range bombers or surface-to-surface missiles of the type frequently requested by Egypt
before the 1973 war, but there is no evidence that the Syrians ever requested weapons
of this variety.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies? What method was used1. Were they successful!
240DFLP leader Nayif Hawatimah made this remark in an interview to the
French newspaper Le Mann, on 15 Julv 1982. See FBIS (MEAJ. 16 Julv 1982. The
Soviet Union has never been forthcoming with significant aid for the PLO. offering
them no assistance in their conflict with Jordan in P970 or Svria in 1976.
241
Nir, p. 44.
242 See The Military Balance. (London, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1982) p. 57 for Syrian military holdings.
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Although the Syrians were disappointed by the Soviet inactivity during their
fight with Israel, they made no effort to pressure the Soviets into taking a more active
role. Like Sadat in 1973, Assad took care not to offend his Soviet sponsor and
jeopardize future Soviet assistance. Syrian press articles and public statements during
this penod generally praised relations with the Soviet Union and if anything called for
stronger ties with Moscow, preferably a "strategic alliance."243 There was no criticism
of Soviet equipment in the Syrian press.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision?
Syria was the last remaining bastion of Soviet presence in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The maintenance of a pro-Soviet government in Syria is undoubtedly
vital to Russian national security interests. Whatever Soviet commitment to Syria
existed, however, it obviously did not extend beyond Syrian borders. Moscow's slow
response to Syria's plight clearly demonstrated that the Kremlin had no intention of
risking a major war over Syrian interests in Lebanon. The war was perceived as a
Lebanese crisis and the Soviet Union had no reason or excuse for intervention in that
country. Still, if the Soviets were reluctant to become actively involved in the Lebanese
hostilities, the perceived importance of maintaining Soviet presence in strategically
important Syria would become evident in the size of the Soviet effort to resupply the
Syrian armed forces.
4. Summation
• The Soviet response to the 1982 conflict in Lebanon was consistent with their
desire to maintain their presence in Svria while avoiding their own military
intervention. The first priontv was to prevent the uncontrolled escalation of the
conflict. While Moscow offered verbal support to the Svrians there was no
evidence, in words or gestures, that the Soviets were prepared to consider
militarv intervention, particularly in reaction to a crisis that did not directlv
threaten the Syrian government.
The militarv's approach to the conflict was exceptionally restrained. There were
no appeals Tor a more aggressive policy, in fact the fighting between Svria and
Israel was virtuallv ignored bv the military newspaper. Krasnaya Zvezaa. This
is understandable given the ra'ther limited nature of Soviet militarv privileges in
Svria and the serious difficulties inherent in anv tvpe of militarv' intervention.
The low-kev Soviet policv therefore would have 'appealed to the Soviet militarv
elite.
There was no apparent Soviet effort to place a "ceiling of sophistication" on
arms deliveries to Svria before the 1982 conflict. There" was a notable lack of
long-range delivery s'vstems in the Svrian inventory (bombers, surface-to-surface




"A statement to this effect bv Svrian Information Minister Ahmad was
reported in the Damascus Domestic Ser'vice'on 20 June 1982. See, FBIS, (MEA), 21
June 1982.
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been denied. Further, unlike the Egyptians in 1972 3 the Svrians were not
developing an offensive war plan and"may well have been more conservative in
their weapons requests.
• Svria's importance to the Soviet Union as an entree into the Arab-Israeli
conflict, coupled with the militarv privileges the Soviets retained in Syria, save
Svrian President Assad a certain degree of bargaining strength when dealing
with the Russians. While Moscow was unwilling" to risk a superpower
confrontation to back the Svrian position in Lebanon, the Russians would
undertake a massive postwar military resupplv effort to ensure continued good
relations with their foremost Middle East client.
D. 1982/83: THE SOVIET RESUPPLY EFFORT
1. Introduction
The Syrian armed forces did not perform well in the 1982 fighting in Lebanon.
This was particularly true of the Syrian air and air defense forces. Israeli pilots downed
over 80 Syrian jets in air-to-air combat while incurring no losses, and completely
destroyed the Syrian surface-to-air missile installations in the Bekaa Valley, again with
no losses.
244 There is no doubt that the failure of Soviet weaponry to perform
adequately was a serious blow to Russian regional prestige and credibility as a supplier
of quality military equipment. As a result the Soviet effort to resupplv the Syrian
military after the 1982 conflict featured the delivery of highly sophisticated equipment,
some of which had never before been seen outside the USSR. The Soviet decision to
give such advanced weaponry to a Middle Eastern client was seen by many Western
analysts as a significant departure from past Soviet arms transfer policy.
2. Internal Inputs
Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military
regarding the proper conduct of relations!
Commentary on the Syrian- Israeli conflict that appeared in Pravda and
Krasnaya Zvezda after the Lebanese fighting revealed no evidence of a debate between
military and party leaders over the proper conduct of relations with Syria. Once the
fighting ended both the political and the military leadership seemed most concerned
with restoring Soviet prestige as a superpower sponsor and denying charges of the
inferiority of Soviet weapons systems. Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda questioned Israeli
claims of success, published Syrian "testimonials'' on the quality of Russian equipment,
and sought to shift blame for the disaster to the inadequacies of the Syrian military
svstem.
'An excellent discussion of the Israeli success in Lebanon can be found in
Cvnthia A. Roberts. "Soviet Arms Transfer Policv and the Decision to Lpgrade Svrian
Air Defenses," Survival 25 (July-August 1983): 154-164.
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Most of the articles in Pravda that dealt with the Lebanese situation
condemned the Israeli presence in that country and charged active collusion between
American and Israeli imperialist intentions. Others presented a uniquely Soviet
interpretation of the results of the June confrontation. In an article published one
month after the fighting ended, the Soviets contended that the combat success claimed
by the Israelis was an elaborate hoax and that the invaders had actually suffered very
serious losses including 67 aircraft, many of which were F-15s and F-16s. 245 A later
Pravda report asserted that the Syrians had destroyed 400 Israeli tanks and armored
personnel carriers (APCs). 246
Krasnaya Zvezda seemed intent on clearing Soviet equipment of any
responsibility for the Syrian downfall. "Testimonials" were published, in which Syrian
authorities attested to the quality of Soviet weapons. For example, Syrian President
Assad reportedly told one military correspondent after the war, "I can say that the
Soviet T-72 is the best tank in the world."247 A Syrian officer related a story of how
after a battle "the soldiers climbed out of their tanks and . . . hugged their tanks in an
outburst of gratitude."248 The military writers also blamed the Syrian military system
for the outcome in Lebanon. In January 1983 an article appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda
entitled "Meetings on Syrian Soil." In this look at Syrian army life the Soviet author
questioned the education level of the average Syrian soldier:
Despite the perceptible increase in literacv in the country, the Armv still receives
people who nave not aone to school. The vouna servicemen must be, taught to
read and write before they can beein to master weapons and hardware.'
This statement implies that Syrian losses resulted from a Syrian inability to properly
employ advanced weapons, not from the weapons' inferior quality. A message was
also undoubtedly intended for the Soviet soldiers who read Krasnaya Zvezda: Do not
be alarmed by the Syrian failure, Soviet arms when properly used are second to none.
24SPravda, 16 July 1982; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 11 August 1982.
2A6Pravda, 21 July 1982; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18 August 1982.




Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 August 1982; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 6
1982.
Krasnaya Zvezda 29 January 1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 4 February 1983.
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Both the military and the party leaders, as reflected in the pages of Pravda and
Krasnaya Zvezda, adopted a restrained approach to the post-war situation. The
newspapers contained typical condemnations of American and Israeli aggression and
some imaginative explanations and rationalizations for Syria's military defeat. There
were, however, no calls for an aggressive policy in support of Syria. There was no
debate over the proper Soviet role in backing the Syrian government comparable to
those that arose between the party and the military over the appropriate level of
support for Egypt in the months following the 1967 June War.
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
It does not appear that the military made any effort to alter the pattern of the
Soviet-Syrian relationship in the wake of the 1982 conflict. Articles that appeared in
Krasnaya Zvezda indicated that the military's primary concern was the recovery of
Soviet military prestige. The military did not engage in a campaign through the press
to promote a more active role in support of Syria (as they seemed to have done in the
Egyptian case in 1967) with an eye towards preserving their military privileges in that
country. The Soviet military leaders seemed content to follow the restrained policy of
the party leaders.
The military may, however, have had an input into the decision to send the
SA-5 missile to Syria. The SA-5, with its long slant range and high altitude capability
would be an extremely effective weapon against the type of threat the Soviet military
saw originating from the Israeli Air Force. A Soviet study of the air conflict over
Lebanon highlighted the role of airborne surveillance systems, such as the E-2C, in the
Israeli success. According to a later Rand report, the Soviet study concluded:
that without E-2C support, the IAF would have been unable to achieve its air
combat results. This mav sav something about the rationale for subsequentlv
providing Svria with the 'SA-5, whose extended range will allow it to engage
tarsets t^ke'the E-2C and 707 even in overwater orbits or deep in Israeli
airspace.
The military may well have suggested that the SA-5 could provide the air defense
deterrent required by Syria and in that way influenced the Soviet decision to send that
missile system, and other advanced weapons, to their Middle Eastern client. This is
250 Beniamin S. Lambeth, Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War,
Rand Report R-3000, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1984), p. 20. The studv cited by
Lambeth was written bv Colonel Dubrov, one ol the Soviet Air Force s leading
authorities on combat tactics.
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not to suggest that there was no political rationale for the deployment of the SA-5.
which as fixed-site, defensive weapon was compatible with both Soviet and Syrian
interests.
3. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state?
In the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon conflict, Syrian President Assad showed
few outward signs of disagreement with Soviet policy decisions. Assad's compliance
was based on two factors. First. Assad was in a position similar to the one Egyptian
President Nasser found himself in after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. He faced an
immediate threat and lacked an alternative to his Soviet arms source. Assad surely
realized that only the Soviet Union could rebuild his shattered air force and provide air
defense equipment that would meet Syria's pressing needs. While Assad was
disappointed by Moscow's inactivity during the war, he could not afford to offend his
Soviet sponsors at a time when he faced a serious Israeli threat.
More importantly, the policies adopted by the Soviet Union after the war
served Syrian interests. Soviet policymakers had two primary objectives after the war.
The first was to regain their regional and international credibility as a supplier of
quality weapons systems to their clients. To this end the Soviets supplied the Syrians
with some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the Soviet arsenal, including the
SA-5, Flogger B G, and SS-21 surface-to-surface missile. The delivery of this advanced
equipment also furthered Moscow's second objective; to provide Damascus with a
credible deterrent capable of preventing an Israeli attack on Syria itself. In providing
the Syrians with a modern, integrated air defense system that was initially operated by
Russian crews, the Soviets would force the Israelis to think twice before attacking
Syria. The deterrent effect of this missile system was of great importance to the
Soviets, who realized that the next Syrian- Israeli battle would probably be fought on
Syrian soil and might leave the Soviets with no option but to intervene.
At the same time the air defense missiles were being deployed, a variety of
Soviet sources were sending clear signals that if Israel attacked Syria the Soviet Union
would honor its commitments and render military assistance. Soviet warnings that
they would intervene were seen in the following instances:
• In February 1983. the leader of a Soviet delegation to Beirut (Karen Brutents,
Head of the External Affairs Desk of the Central Committee of the CPSU)
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stated that the USSR would honor its commitment to Damascus "Ln-,a most
serious manner." He added, "what this entails will become clear later. *
• In earlv March a Soviet radio broadcast to the Arab world announced that
Svria was "not alone" and that the LSSFLwas loval to its commitments under
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
• In mid-March a Lebanese radio station reported that the Soviet Ambassador to
Lebanon had informed Lebanese President Gemayal that the Soviets would
intervene ^directly in a war between Syria and Israel/ The intervention would be
sizeable.
• A Soviet broadcast to the Arab world in late April warned Israel that the
Svrians "are not alone." .^This was in reference to what the Soviets saw as an
impending Israeli attack.
These statements were all made against a backdrop of high tension along the
Israeli-Syrian border and amidst fears that the Israelis might launch a pre-emptive
strike against the Syrian air defense system and trigger a Syrian-Israeli war. The Soviet
commitment to defend Syria, with troops if necessary, gave Assad many of the
practical benefits of a "strategic alliance" with the Soviet Union despite the Soviet
reluctance to sign a true defense treaty. It can further be argued that Soviet weapons,
backed by a Soviet treaty, allowed Assad to continue his pursuit of a forward policy in
Lebanon secure in the knowledge that Moscow would protect him from Israeli
retaliation if that retaliation extended to attacks on Syrian territory. Assad's
adventurism in Lebanon, which was not condoned by the Kremlin, can be seen as an
unintentional byproduct of Soviet generosity in meeting Syrian defensive needs.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
{specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed!
There is no information available regarding the exact nature of Syrian weapon
requests following the 1982 conflict, so it cannot be determined whether Damascus
requested offensive weapons such as medium bombers or fighter-bombers. The
equipment delivered to Syria was designed for air defense, and the quantity and quality
of the weapons apparently met with Syrian approval. Soviet deliveries of the advanced
weapons began within 6 months of the fighting, suggesting that there was no attempt
to delay or postpone deliveries.
251
"Beirut Monday Morning," 7-13 February 1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 17
February 1983.
252Moscow Radio for Peace and Progress in Arabic to the Arabic World, 2
March 1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 4 March 198 J.
253 Marj Uyon Voice of Hope, 17 March 1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 17 March 1983.
254Moscow Radio for Peace and Progress in Arabic for the Arab World, 28 April
1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 25 April 1983.
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Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies! Were they successful!
There is no conclusive evidence that the Syrians threatened to alter the Soviet-
Syrian relationship if they did not receive the weapons they desired. However,
diplomatic sources have speculated that President Assad paid a secret visit to Moscow
in early July 1982.255 If so, the context of this visit would have been remarkably similar
to the emergency trip to Moscow made by Egyptian President Nasser in January 1970
when Egypt was losing the "War of Attrition." In that instance Nasser warned the
Soviet leadership that if he did not receive adequate support from Russia he would
"hand over to a pro-American President."256 Not surprisingly the Soviets elected to
provide Nasser with the air defense support he demanded, including the deployment of
Soviet air defense troops to Egypt, rather than jeopardize their strongest link to the
Arab world.
A similar visit by Assad may have had similar results, but as noted earlier
there were several reasons why the Soviets would have upgraded Syrian air defense
capabilities, regardless of Syrian demands. If the Soviet decision was the result of
Syrian demands, it was certainly a low-risk means to reassure their client. The SA-5
was a fixed-site air defense weapon and its introduction could easily be justified by the
Soviets and the Syrians as a strictly defensive measure. As one Pravda article asked,
"Is it not the right of a sovereign country to take care to defend against air attacks on
its own country?" 25. The deployment of the missiles was also defended in the context
of Syria's "legitimate right to self-defense."258 Israeli protests over the missiles were
dismissed as "provocative ballyhoo"259 designed to provide an excuse for new
aggression against Syria.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision!
25 Dawisha, Foreign Affairs, p. 440.
256
Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 84-90.
251 Pravda, 1 February 1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 2 February 1983.
25S
Tass, 25 March 1983; in: FBIS (USSR). 25 March 1983.
2 * 9 Svrian Information Minister Ahmad, quoted in hvestia, 8 March 1983; in:
FBIS, (USSR) 10 March 1983.
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The size of the Soviet resupply effort and the Soviet threats to intervene in
defense of Syrian sovereignty testified to the continued strategic importance of Syria to
the Soviet Union. This importance extended beyond the somewhat limited Soviet
military presence in Syria. Only by aiding Syria could Moscow retain its position as
the foremost ally of the Arab confrontation states. The importance of maintaining a
political presence in the Middle East, if only for the purpose of denying Western
domination of the region, had not diminished in importance since the initial Soviet
involvement in the region in 1955.
4. Summation
• The Soviet resupplv effort following the 1982 Lebanese conflict clearlv reflected
the Soviet desire 'to maintain their presence in the reeion while' avoiding
intervention. The advanced equipment sent to Svria enhanced the Soviet image
as a supplier of qualitv militarv assistance and also provided Svria with a
credible deterrent to future Israeli attacks. The combination of weapons
deliveries and warnings indicates that the Soviets hoped to avoid a situation in
which their militarv intervention would become necessarv to avoid the collapse
of the pro-Soviet "Svrian government and the end of Soviet presence in that
country.
• There was little in the wav of militarv privileges in Svria that the military would
have felt compelled to defend. For 'this reason it is' doubtful that the 'militarv
would have sought to influence decisions regarding the resupplv effort, except
perhaps to offer"suggestions regarding the proper weapons to meet Svrian needs
and Soviet interests.
The Soviets were extremelv generous in the quantitv and qualitv of weapons
delivered to Svria. The "ceiling of sophistication" ap'pears to have been raised
with regard to air defense weapons (surface-to-air missiles and intercepters).
Still, the Svrians received onlv limited numbers of long-range delivery svstems.
such as fighter-bombers and surface-to-surface missiles."suggesting tha't Moscow
seeks to limit the Syrian ability to initiate hostilities with Isfael.
The quantitv and qualitv of the Soviet resupply effort attests to Syria's
continued bargaining strength as a major plaver in the Arab-Israeli equation.
As a shrewd politician, Assad certainly understood the importance of Svria as
Moscow's entree into the Middle East and Moscows desire to preserve his
government. Svria's later adventurism in Lebanon attests to Assad's confidence
m the continuance of Soviet support.
E. CURRENT SOVIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS
1. Introduction
Moscow soon discovered that generous arms shipments could not be
translated into Syrian subservience to Soviet foreign policy interests. President Assad
has pursued his own foreign agenda in recent years, and in so doing has frequently
clashed with his Soviet suppliers. Despite several quarrels in recent years, primarily
over Syrian activity in Lebanon, the Soviet-Syrian "marriage of convenience" continues






Was there evidence of a disagreement between the party and the military-
regarding the proper conduct of relations1.
There has been no evidence of disagreement between the military and political
elites over the conduct of Syrian-Soviet relations in recent years. Articles in both
Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda have generally supported Syrian policies and criticized
real or perceived American or Israeli initiatives in the area. This indicates that there is
agreement within the Kremlin on the conduct of Soviet-Syrian affairs. At this time the
advantages of ties between Moscow and Damascus seem primarily political in nature;
the guarantee of a Soviet voice in the Middle East peace process and the prevention of
Western domination of the region. The continuation of this situation would satisfy the
goals of both the military and the political leadership.
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship?
There is no evidence that the Soviet military establishment has attempted to
alter the conduct of the Soviet-Syrian relations. It is possible, particularly in light of
the Egyptian example, that the military has promoted the continued supply of
sophisticated weaponry to the Syrians as a means of solidifying ties between the two
countries.
3. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state 1.
Several disagreements between Moscow and Damascus have developed in
recent years, in most cases as a result of Syrian adventurism in Lebanon. The most
serious of these occurred in September 1983 when Syria backed efforts to overthrow
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. In fighting around Tripoli, Lebanon, Soviet-armed
Syrian troops battled Soviet-armed PLO forces, causing Moscow considerable
discomfort and further destabilizing the Lebanese situation. The Soviets were also
alarmed by Syria's confrontations with the United States over Lebanon in late 1983,
and reportedly counselled restraint for fear that Syrian activity in Lebanon might
escalate into a superpower confrontation. 260
260 Larrv L Fabian, "The Middle East: War Daneers and Receding Peace
Prospects," Foreign Affairs 62 (America and the World 1983/T635.
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There were also signs of disagreement between Moscow and Damascus during
Assad's visits to the Soviet capital in 1984 and 1985. In October 1984 Assad traveled
to Moscow for what was termed a "friendly working visit." The joint communique
issued at the meeting's close stated that there was "a broad coincidence in the two side
positions."261 However, other sources reported that Assad had expressed extreme
displeasure over Soviet discussions with two of Syria's enemies, Jordan and Iraq.262
While there is less information available concerning President Assad's June
1985 visit to the Soviet capital, the terminology used in the joint communique points to
substantial disagreement between Moscow and Damascus. Apparently the talks
centered on the Palestinian question, a persistent cause of conflict between the Soviets
and Syrians. The Soviets placed special emphasis on the preservation of PLO unity,
perhaps in reference to Syrian efforts to oust Arafat. The communique issued by the
Soviet press announced that the talks were held in "an atmosphere of mutual trust and
frankness" (emphasis added) a term of diplomatic doubletalk usually reserved for
instances where serious differences in opinion occur. The Syrian press later found it
necessary to refute rumors of a disagreement between Moscow and Damascus, calling
such reports an example of psychological warfare "perpetrated by the Israelis and the
Americans."264
The future of Soviet-Syrian relations is open to speculation. Assad could elect
to follow Sadat's lead and seek a separate peace with Israel. There can be no question
that the upkeep of Syria's military is placing an enormous burden on that country's
limited financial resources. Approximately 50% of Syrian's 1985 budget was
earmarked for defense and the 400,000 men assigned to the armed forces represent one
sixth of the Syrian work force. 265 In recent years arms have accounted for over 40% of
all Syrian imports. (See Table 4). 266 Domestic unrest rising from a Syrian economic
" 61 Pravda, 19 October 1984; in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 14 November
1984.
262Radio Monte Carlo, 19 October 1984; in: FBIS (MEA), 22 October 1984.
263The full text of theJoint communique appeared in Pravda, 20 June 1985; in:
Current Digest of the Soviet F^ress, 17 July 1985.
264Damascus Domestic News Service, 24 June 1985; in: FBIS (MEA), 27 June
1985.
~6
- Devlin, "Syria: Consistency at Home and Abroad," p. 69.
266U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agencv, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers, (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19S5), p.
125.
114
crisis could conceivably pressure Assad into reaching an accommodation with the
Israelis that would allow him to address his most pressing internal problems. Several
factors rule against such a change in Assad's policies. An agreement with Israel would
almost certainly require a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the subsequent loss of
substantial revenues generated by Syrian interests in that country. 267 Additionally,
Syria's abandonment of its role as the primary confrontation state in the Arab-Israeli
conflict would jeopardize the flow of financial assistance from the rich, oil producing
Arab states that is crucial for Syria's economic well-being. Finally Assad must
carefully weigh the potential domestic repercussions, since much of Syria's internal
cohesion can be attributed to a persistent external threat.
It is also possible that Assad will go to the opposite extreme and initiate a war
with Israel. 268 Such a move is frequently dismissed on the grounds that Syria would
certainly lose such a war. However, as The Economist points out "most people did not
expect an Egyptian attack in 1973 because they thought Mr. Sadat's army would take
a beating."269 While Sadat could not defeat Israel in 1973, the inital success of the
Egyptian assault across the Suez Canal altered the political status quo in the Middle
East and dramatically increased his policy options. Assad may feel he could also gain
by renewing hostilities with the Israelis. Since Moscow would almost certainly
disapprove of the reopening of Syrian- Israeli hostilities, it is ironic that the recent
shipments of sophisticated Soviets arms to Syria make such a war a possibility.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
{specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed?.
Since there is no information available on precisely what weapons systems the
Syrians requested from the Soviets, or the quantities desired, it is impossible to
accurately determine Syrian satisfaction with the pace of Soviet deliveries. A look at
the Syrian inventory, however, reveals that Syria has not been provided with the
weapons necessary to launch a successful unilateral assault on Israel, because the large
quantities of military equipment sent to Syria since 1982 have not appreciably
improved Syrian offensive capabilities. Instead Soviet deliveries have enhanced Syrian
267 For a discussion on Svrian economic interests in Lebanon see Olson, pp.
26-28.
268This possibilitv has been discussed recently in the press. For example see "The
Wispv Clouds of War over the Golan Heights,"The Economist, 12 April 19S6, and
"Israel and Syria Believed to Face Risk of Conflict," Sew York Times, 19 May 1986.
269 The Economist, 12 April 1986, p. 37.
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TABLE 4
SYRIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES (CONSTANT 198.I DOLLARS)
Arms as % of
Year Military Expenditures Arms Imports Total Import:;
1973 927 2549 212. 0%
74 988 1488 67. 2
75 1544 628 22. 5
76 1537 978 26. 2
77 1472 960 24. 3
78 1626 1238 36. 5
79 1855 2664 63.
80 2163 3144 65. 4
81 2203 2237 41. 6
82 2371 1900 47. 3
83 2051 1630 43. 7
Source:U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers: 1985 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1985), P.
83, 125.
defensive and deterrent forces. For example:
• In general, aircraft delivered to Syria since 1982 have been optimized for air
defense. The large numbers of MiG-21's and even the late model MiG-23's are
optimized for air defense and possess a limited ground attack capability. 270
• The SS-21, a highly accurate, short range surface-to-surface missile delivered to
the Syrians in 1983, reportedly can be used only for self-defense under terms of
a Soviet-Syrian agreement. Even then it requires prior Soviet approval 271
2/0
Figures for major Svrian militarv holdings are taken from The Military Balance
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967,68 through 1985,86).
271 Al Majallah (London: 29 October-4 November 1983); in: TBIS (MEA). 31
October 1983. Scud-B missiles launched bv the Egvptians during the 1973 October
War were apparentlv Eevptian controlled but partiallv Soviet-manned. In that
instance it is believed" that' some level of Soviet cooperatfon was necessary to launch
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• The Soviets have not sold the Syrians a weapon with a true deep-strike
capability. The Syrians have no bombers of any type and ground attack
aircraft (FITTER A and J, FLOGGER F) have been provided in very limited
quantities when compared with air defense aircraft. All surface-to-surface
missiles in the Syrian inventor.' are of limited range and accuracy or Soviet
controlled.
In sum. the Syrians possess a defensive capability sufficient to deter an Israeli
attack, but at the same time they lack the offensive weapons needed to attack Israel.
This carefully contrived balance serves Soviet interests in the Middle East. As long as
Syria remains dependent on the USSR for defensive armaments. Moscow will exercise
a degree of influence in Damascus. By restricting the flow of offensive weapons.
Moscow can minimize the risk of the outbreak of a Middle Eastern war that might
necessitate intervention.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet decisionmakers to
alter or modify arms policies! Were they successful!
There is no evidence available to suggest that Syria has pressured the Soviet
leadership to alter their arms delivery policies. Syria probably has reached the
absorptive capacity of its manpower and technological resources. There are no
indications that the Syrians have seriously attempted to diversify their sources of arms
in recent months. Finally, with Soviet prestige and credibility in the Middle East
becoming increasingly reliant upon the performance of the Syrian armed forces, it is in
Moscow's interest to provide Damascus with the weapons it needs.
Was the client state of strategic importance to the Soviet Union at the time of
the decision!
Syria is the linchpin of Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Soviet
determination to prevent the Western domination of the region remains unchanged.
While the Soviet Union has taken steps to prevent the creation of a situation in which
Soviet intervention in a Syrian- Israeli conflict would become necessary. Soviet public
statements continued to warn that an attack on Syria would provoke a Soviet military
intervention and indicated that certain preparations had been made.
• In September 1983. an Israeli official in Moscow to discuss the resumption of
diplomatic relations was informed that if Israel attacked Svria. the LSSR would
intervene with^2,000 troops in twelve hours to "teach Israel a lesson that it will
never forget.
"iir
the missiles. Glassman, pp. 136-138.
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• In April 1984, Karen Brutents warned Israel that "an adventure would not be
easv and without cost" and that Svria could secure help from "friends and
allies.
• In an interview with a Spanish newspaper in May 1984, Svrian Defense
Minister Talas reported that plans had been drawn 'up to allow two Soviet
divisions to be transported to Damascus in twelve hours. He also stated that
Svria had no ne,ed for Soviet forces unless the Lnited States aligned with Israel
to attack Syria.
Moscow's apparent preparations to intervene militarily, if necessary, to
preserve a pro-Soviet government in Syria is a clear demonstration of the importance
the Kremlin attaches to the maintenance of a Soviet foothold in the Middle East. The
collapse of the Assad government, and its replacement by a ruling body hostile to the
Soviet Union would seriously jeopardize the security of Russia's southern borders, a






The Soviets are determined to maintain a presence in the Middle East, as a
means of insuring a Soviet voice in Middle Eastern affairs and to secure the
southern borders of the USSR. If Soviet statements are to be believed the
Soviets are prepared to intervene militanlv to assist the pro-Soviet government
in Damascus if the existence of that government is threatened. This does not
mean, however, that the Soviets are anxious to enter a Mideast conflict. The
Soviets have combined open political signals and defensive hardware in an
effort to make an attack on Svria a very unattractive proposition. At the same
time, thev have not provided Svria with'the offensive weapons needed to launch
an attack on Israel. Moscow is seeking to maintain a delicate balance in which
its presence is required, but its commitments are never fully tested.
The Soviets have not appreciablv enhanced their military presence in Svria in
recent vears. Consequentlv, the' Soviet militarv establishment would hot be
expected to have a significant impact on Soviet-Syrian relations. With no
substantial militarv* facilities in Syria, the Soviet military will focus its attention
on the strategic' benefits of 'maintaining the Soviet-Svrian relationship,
specilicallv the "security of Russia's southern border. Overall, the current state
oT Soviet-Syrian relations seems more than adequate to fulfill these goals.
The Soviets have apparently decided to raise the "ceiling of sophistication" in
defensive weapons and are willing to supply Damascus with their latest
hardware. Deliveries of offensive, particularly deep-strike, weapons remains
virtually non-existant or rigidly controlled.
Soviet willingness to supply Syria with late model weaponrv, and Moscow's
apparent consideration of military intervention in Svria, attests to the strategic
importance of Svria to the Soviet Union. Syria's President Assad has felt free
to pursue adventurist policies in LebanonI and to disregard Soviet desires
concerning the PLO, secure in the knowledge that it will" continue to be in
Moscow s"best interest to preserve his government.
272 Kuwait Al-Anba, 20 September 1983; in: FBIS (USSR), 22 September 1983.
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This study was designed to develop a framework for the detailed investigation of
Soviet Middle Eastern policy from the end of the Six Day War in 1967 to the present.
The volatility of the current Mideast situation, and the active involvement of the
superpowers in the region, lends a sense of urgency to the task of interpreting Soviet
interests, objectives and commitments in the Middle East. The objective of this paper
was to examine carefully past Soviet policy behavior in the Middle East as a means of
constructing a methodological tool for the understanding of current and future Soviet
policies.
The primary goal of this paper was to explain the outputs of Soviet Middle
Eastern policy, actions which frequently seem contradictory and self-defeating, by
measuring the impact of critical inputs to the decisionmaking process. The inputs
examined were classified as either internal or external. The investigation of internal
inputs sought to measure the level o[ policy concurrence within the Kremlin, more
specifically the level of agreement between the party (CPSU) and the military. External
inputs refers specifically to the pressure that a state can exert on Soviet policy makers.
The Soviet willingness to adapt and adjust policies to accommodate client demands is a
poorly understood, but extremely important, determinant in Soviet behavior in the
Middle East.
A case study methodology was chosen as the best means of determining the
consistency of Soviet policy during the period of time in question. A focused
comparison approach was used, in which a series of events, chosen for their importance
to the conduct of Soviet politico-military relations with their Arab clients, were
analyzed through the examination of a common set of variables. In each instance a
standardized set of questions was asked, thereby enforcing a discipline within the study
and enhancing the legitimacy of the paper's conclusions.
The field of study was limited to two countries, Egypt and Syria, which have
played leading roles in the formulation of Soviet Middle Eastern policy. Egypt was
chosen because of its former importance as Moscow's most important Arab and Third
World client, the wealth of information available on Soviet-Egyptian relations, and the
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opportunity it presented to follow a Soviet-client relationship from its inception (1955)
to its collapse (1976). Syria was chosen due to its current status as the "linchpin" of
Soviet relations with the Arab world, its leadership of the "rejectionist" states, and its
constant confrontation with the United States and the West. The study was based on
a premise that a framework of analysis which explained Soviet policy towards Egypt
would be a useful tool in interpreting current and future Soviet policy towards Syria.
Four hypotheses were introduced at the beginning of this paper. They were:
• The Soviet objective in the Middle East is to maintain a presence in the region
while avoiding military intervention.
• The military's interest in, and ability to, influence the course of relations with any
Soviet client will vary in direct proportion with the tangible benefits (bases,
presence, etc.) the military derives from the relationship.
• The Soviet Union will impose a "ceiling of sophistication" on arms exports to Arab
client states that will exclude offensive weapons that might allow a client to initiate
or escalate a regional conflict unilaterally.
• The greater the perceived strategic importance of a client, the greater its
bargaining strength.
This conclusion will be in three parts. The first will be a review of the standardized
questions asked in Chapters IV and V. Each individual question will be examined
again, but this time across the full series of events, both Egyptian and Syrian. In this
manner consistence in Soviet behavior will become evident and deviations from
established patterns will be highlighted. Next the hypotheses will be reintroduced to
determine whether they have been proven correct. Finally, some general statements on
future Soviet Middle Eastern policy will be made, based on the results of this study.
B. CASE STUDY REVIEW
1. Internal Inputs
Was there evidence of a conflict between the party and the military regarding the
proper conduct of relations!
A survey of the Soviet press, focusing on Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda,
indicated that a limited degree of discussion and debate sometimes occurs between the
party and military elites over the proper conduct of Soviet-client relations. While it is
important not to exaggerate the severity of these apparent disagreements, they do shed
light on the different perceptions of client relationships and Soviet national security
requirements that arise within the supposedly monolithic Kremlin decisionmaking
process. Importantly, these debates were observed only in the Egyptian and not the
Syrian case. This allows some contrasts to be observed between the objectives and
interests of the party and the military over different timeframes and circumstances.
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Both party and military objectives in the Middle East are guided by a concern
for Soviet national security. This gives them a common goal when formulating
regional policy; to prevent the Western domination of the Middle East because of the
threat that would pose to Russia's southern boundaries. The Soviet penetration of the
Middle East in the 1950s was prompted by a need to counter the Baghdad Pact and
prevent the formation of anti-Soviet alliances. A constant goal of Soviet policy
towards the Middle East, from 1955 to the present, has been the maintenance of a
presence and influence in selected client states in the Arab world to ensure a Soviet
voice in Middle Eastern affairs. This "denial" objective is the critical element in Soviet
Middle Eastern policy formulation.
The disagreements between the party and the military over client relations
arose when a new factor was introduced to the national security equation. This was
the need for overseas bases to counter a very specific military threat, the U.S. ballistic
missile submarine fleet stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean. The military, which
had played a limited role in the initial stage of Soviet-Egyptian policy, became
increasingly interested in gaining access to Egyptian naval and air facilities. Once
access was granted, the military proved extremely sensitive to policy decisions that
might jeopardize their overseas presence. Commentaries in Krasnaya Zvezda were
notably pro-Egyptian as part oC an apparent effort to secure the Soviet position in
Egypt. The military was first to consider extraordinary measures to prop up the
Egyptian government, including indirect suggestions of Soviet involvement in that
country's air defense. In contrast. Praxda commentaries at the same time indicate that
party leaders believed a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict best served Soviet
interests, by avoiding a renewal of hostilities with their unforeseeable consequences.
This explanation of the party-military debate is supported by the drop in
military interest in Egyptian facilities when the perceived Western threat from the
Eastern Mediterranean diminished in the mid-1970's. There was no protest in
Krasnaya Zvezda over the loss of Soviet naval access in Egypt in 1976, due in part to
the decreased threat and also to the availability of adequate alternative facilities in
Syria. There has been no evidence of disagreement over the conduct of Soviet-Syrian
relations, probably because the relationship has not centered on Soviet access to Syrian
facilities. Rather, the Soviet-Syrian relationship has been more political in nature. By
backing the foremost Arab confrontation state, Moscow ensures a Soviet voice in
Middle Eastern affairs. This fulfills the denial objective of Soviet policy, the common
goal of the party and the military.
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A final possible explanation for party-military disagreement was detente.
Party-military disagreements intensified with the improvement in Soviet-American
relations, which were based on differing opinions of the relative importance of detente
to overall Soviet policy. The Soviet military was skeptical of detente and perhaps
feared that Soviet overseas initiatives and privileges would be sacrificed to improve
relations with the United States. As a result, the military leadership probably found it
necessary to take a more active role in the policy developments process to protect
special military interests. As Soviet-American relations worsened in the mid-1970's
there was a clear decrease in the incidence of party-military debate.
Was the military successful in altering the pattern of the relationship!
In those instances when military members chose to question the party's
pursuit of foreign policy, they undoubtedly did so with the intention of forcing a
change in that policy. It is often difficult to determine exactly how successful the
military has been at influencing a policy decision. However, two events stand out in
which the military played a major role in the formulation of an important policy
decision.
The first was the decision to have Soviet troops take an active role in
Egyptian air defense. A debate between the party and the military apparently arose in
March 1970 when the first troops arrived in Egypt. These discussions centered on
whether these troops should be stationed in active combat zones and whether Soviet
pilots should fly combat missions. The military strongly believed in an active Soviet
role, ostensibly to fulfill Russia's "internationalist duty," but also to preserve the Soviet
presence in Egypt and counter the American threat from the Eastern Mediterranean.
The party was far less anxious to risk Soviet involvement in a Middle Eastern conflict,
and consistently downplayed the Soviet military role in the area. The eventual use of
Soviet pilots in operational missions, and the deployment of Soviet manned SA-3
batteries to the Suez Canal, suggests that the military successfully promoted a more
active Soviet involvement in Egyptian air defense.
The second instance occurred after the expulsion of the Soviet technicians
from Egypt in July 1973. The Egyptian action reportedly ignited a major debate in the
Kremlin between those who saw the expulsion as an excuse to sever ties with Egypt,
and those determined to preserve Soviet-Egyptian ties at any cost. The military,
foremost proponents of the latter course, argued for an increased flow of arms to Egypt
to prove Soviet support for the Arab cause. Military shipments to Egypt were
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increased substantially soon after the expulsion, a clear indication that the military had
successfully argued its case.
It must also be observed that no major decision on Soviet Middle Eastern
policy can be made without consulting the military. Since Soviet relations with their
clients rely so heavily on arms deliveries, the Soviet military will necessarily play an
important role as the source of the arms, training and support vitally necessary to the
conduct of Soviet relations. While the military does not always determine the course
of Soviet policy, military objectives, desires, and advice must be carefully weighed
before making policy decisions. The fact that the military has infrequently played a
major role in shaping policy decisions is due primarily to the fundamental commonality
of party and military objectives with regard to Soviet national security requirements.
The military carefully limits its opposition to policy initiatives and argues only to
preserve hard won overseas privileges they perceived as crucial to Soviet security.
2. External Inputs
Was there a conflict between the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union and
the client state!
In each event examined there was evidence of some level of conflict between
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and that of the client state; in no instance was
there evidence of full agreement or coordination. These conflicts were at varied levels
of intensity, ranging from Nasser's determination to pursue a low-grade war with Israel
(War of Attrition) despite Soviet calls for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict, to Sadat's rapprochement with the West after the October War, to Assad's
continued presence in Lebanon and the ongoing confrontations between Syria and the
Soviet-backed PLO. Moscow endured recurrent problems with its often recalcitrant
clients in Cairo and Damascus, despite frequent high-level consultations and carefully
negotiated Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation. The persistent differences of
opinion were the result of two frequently underestimated aspects of Soviet foreign
policy.
First, clients invariably have their own foreign policy agendas which are not
always compatible with Soviet interests. Every state has a unique perception of its
own national interests and security requirements. The Soviet Union found that the
cooperativeness of a client state often varied with the immediacy of the threat and the
availability of alternative sources of military and economic aid. Neither Egypt nor
Syria was hesitant to pursue policy objectives over Soviet objections. More often than
not. they ignored Soviet counsel and jealously guarded their independence.
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Second, it would be a mistake to overestimate the Soviet Union's ability to
manipulate or influence the policies of a client state, and it would also be wrong to
assume automatic Soviet backing for every client initiative. This study has shown a
remarkable lack of coordination between the Soviet Union and its Egyptian and Syrian
clients on even the most fundamental foreign policy decisions. In the majority of the
events studied the Soviet Union found itself responding to unexpected client initiatives
and attempting after the fact to regain some control over the situation.
Did the client receive the weapons requested or was the delivery of certain items
{specifically offensive weapons) delayed or postponed!
A frequent source of friction between the Soviet Union and its clients was the
pace of Soviet weapons deliveries. The Soviet leadership, aware of its inability to
dictate client policies, seeks instead to limit a client's policy options by carefully
regulating the number and type of weapons delivered. In the Egyptian and Syrian
cases some clearly identifiable patterns developed in Soviet deliveries.
• The Soviets will alwavs provide their clients with a certain minimum level of
military hardware. After every Arab-Israeli War (1967, 1973. 1983) the Soviet
swiftly resupplied their Egyptian and Syrian clients, replenishing their
inventories to slightly above, "pre-war levels.
• The Soviets are hesitant to supplv their clients beyond this established level and
further requests are carefullv considered and frequently put off or ignored.
Moscow has no intention of giving anv Arab client the capability to attack
Israel unilaterally and under no circumstances will the Soviets give a client
weapons parity with Israel because that would invite a reopening of Arab-
Israeli hostilities, with its unavoidable risk of a superpower confrontation.
• In general, the Soviet Union is generous with defensive weapons, such as
surface-to-air missiles and interceptors, but very hesitant to supply anv tvpe of
weapon capable of striking deep inside Israel 'such as bombers or surface-to-
surface missiles. VIoscow evidently fears the possible Israeli response (to
include nuclear retaliation) and the subsequent danger of the conflict escalating
to the superpower level.
It has been Soviet policy to restrict arms deliveries within these general
guidelines. By providing its clients with an adequate level of self-defense, but limited
offensive capabilities, the Soviets have been generally successful in using their arms
transaction policy to prevent a situation in which they might be forced to intervene in
a Middle Eastern crisis. The Soviet Union has adhered to this policy despite the
friction it creates in client relations, and is likely to continue with it in the future.
Did the client attempt to bring pressure to bear on Soviet decisionmakers to alter
or modify arms policies! Were they successful!
The study found that Soviet policymakers are at times extremely susceptible to
pressures applied by client states. Threats by Egypt to terminate or change its
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relationship with the Soviet Union were generally successful in altering Soviet policy to
a course more compatible with Egyptian interests. The Soviet Union is particularly
susceptible to such pressure when good relations with a given client are viewed as
essential to Soviet national security interests. Two examples from the Egyptian case
stand out:
• In Januarv 1970 Eevptian President Nasser traveled to Moscow to request the
immediate' deliverv" of SAO air defense missiles to counter Israeli deep
penetration raids. 'He warned that he would feel obliged to turn Egvpt over to
a pro-American president'' if the Soviets could not meet his demand's. Nasser's
threats achieved the desired result. Within two months Moscow began the
deplovment of 15-20.000 air defense troops and SO combat aircraft to Egvpt. It
is unlikelv that the Kremlin would have adopted such a riskv policv'in the
absence o'f Egyptian pressure.
• In Januarv 1972 President Sadat expelled the bulk of the Soviet advisors from
Egvpt to express his displeasure with what he saw as unwarranted delavs in
Soviet weapon deliveries. The expulsion order applied only to the sizeable!! and
bv 1972 larselv unnecessary air defense contingent and not to those advisors
needed to train the Eevptian militarv. By sharply reducing the Soviet presence
u sent a clear ' message to Mo<
postponements' in weapons deliveries could end the Soviet-Egyptian
relationship. Sadat's gamble proved a success and the loejam in "Soviet
shipments to Egvpt was broken. The new weapons were Instrumental in
Sadat's plannineTor the 1973 October War. This consent to supplv Sadat's war
plan represented a major change in Soviet policy.
In each of these instances the Soviets altered their policies to satisfy client
demands. In this timeframe, however, the Soviets were determined to maintain their
presence in Egypt and consequently were far more susceptible to client demands. By
1976. when Sadat again attempted to pressure the Soviets into increasing their
economic and military aid to his country, the situation had changed dramatically.
Annoyed with Sadat's constant maligning of Soviet support for the Arab cause and
disturbed by his expanded ties with the West, the Soviets took no action to rescue the
faltering relationship. Moscow could refuse to meet Egyptian demands because its
national security requirements had changed by 1976. The withdrawal of the U.S.
submarine force from the Eastern Mediterranean, the introduction of VTOL carriers
and the Backfire bomber to the Soviet inventory, and the availability of adequate
alternative facilities in Syria combined to make the Soviet presence in Egypt far less
integral to Soviet national security.
Finally, this study uncovered little evidence of Syrian attempts to pressure
Soviet policymaking. As Moscow's foremost Arab client, Syria could be expected to
have substantial leverage in any negotiations, and Soviet arms deliveries to Syria have
certainly been generous. Still, it is impossible to say whether Soviet policy is generated
by Syrian threats, Soviet interests, or possibly lessons learned from the Egyptian
experience.
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Was the Soviet decision determined by the perceived strategic importance of the
client!
All Soviet Middle Eastern policy decisions are ultimately determined by Soviet
national security requirements. The client can serve Soviet security needs in one of two
ways; either by allowing the Soviet Union to simply deny that country (or region) to
the potentially hostile West, or by granting the Soviets access to military facilities
needed to counter a specific threat. The strategic importance of a country is defined by
its ability to fill these two roles.
The first Soviet contacts with the Arab world were prompted by the denial
objective. Egypt, as a leader of the Arab nations, was particularly important in this
regard. Later, after the U.S. deployment of Polaris submarines to the Eastern
Mediterranean added a military dimension to Soviet Middle Eastern policy, access to
Egyptian naval and air facilities greatly enhanced that country's strategic importance to
the USSR. The preservation of good relations with Egypt became the driving force in
Soviet policy for several years.
In time, with the withdrawal of the American submarines, the Soviet
requirement for Egyptian bases was greatly reduced. Additionally, Sadat's growing
involvement with the West undermined Egypt's ability to play a "denial" role in the
Middle East. Egypt, in effect, had lost its strategic importance for the Soviet Union
and Moscow felt free to transfer its attentions to the more reliable Syrians. At this
time Syria, as the leader of the Arab confrontation states, best fulfills a "denial" role for
the Soviet Union. Coupled with Soviet access to Syrian naval and air facilities, this
ensured that Syria will remain of strategic importance to Moscow for the foreseeable
future, and will make Moscow very anxious to retain good relations with Damascus.
The tables below are a graphic presentation of the results of this study. Listed
horizontally are the years in which important decisions were reached in either Soviet-
Syrian or Soviet-Egyptian relations. The categories listed vertically refer to the
standardized questions investigated in Chapters IV and V. All questions were designed




1967 1970 1971 1972 1973 1976
Int. Debate Y Y Y Y Y N
Mil. Influence Y Y N Y N N
Foreign Policy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Deliveries Y Y N/A N Y N
Pressure N Y N Y N Y
Strat. Imp. Y Y Y Y Y Y
TABLE 6
SOVIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS
1980 1982 1983 1984
Internal Debate N N N N
Military Influence N N N N
Foreign Policy Y Y Y Y
Deliveries N N N N
Pressure N N N N
Strategic Importance Y Y Y Y
C. HYPOTHESES
Having reviewed the results of the case studies, it is now possible to determine
whether the hypotheses introduced at the beginning of the paper were proven correct.
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The Soviet objective in the Middle East is to maintain a presence in the region while
avoiding military intervention.
This hypothesis was proven correct. Since 1955 the Soviet Union has sought to
ensure its presence in the Middle East, either by influencing selected states and thereby
denying control of the region to the West, or by maintaining an actual physical
presence at overseas facilities. The need to preserve a Soviet voice in Middle Eastern
affairs is seen as crucial to Soviet national security, and Moscow has been willing to
pay a high price in terms of military and economic aid to maintain its position of
influence in the Middle East.
Yet, as the Egyptian and Syrian cases both demonstrate, the Soviets do not want
Soviet troops to become directly involved in a Middle East conflict and Soviet policies
have been designed to prevent this from happening. Weapons deliveries to Egypt and
Syria were carefully regulated to maximize defensive, but minimize offensive,
capabilities. They have refused to sign a "strategic alliance" with Syria. Soviet threats
to intervene in support of their clients have either been as warnings to forestall a
potential crisis, or have been issued well after the crisis has peaked and the opportunity
for intervention has passed. The lone exception to this policy of non-intervention, the
deployment of air defense forces to Egypt in 1970, was not a Soviet initiative and was
only carried out due to Egyptian pressure. Overall the Soviets have successfully
maintained their presence in the Middle East while avoiding commitments that might
force them into a conflict at a time and place not of their own choosing.
The military's interest in, and ability to influence the course of, relations will vary in
direct proportion with the tangible benefits (bases, presence, etc.,) the military derives
from the relationship.
The military's interest in client relations, determined by a review of Krasnaya
Zvezda, does vary according to the military privileges, such as strategic access, that the
Soviet Union retains in the client states. The military was most involved in policy
formulation when the Soviets had naval and air facilities in Egypt, particularly when
access to those facilities was seen as vital to Soviet national security. When the
possession of military privileges loses its importance, in Egypt after 1975 or in Syria
today, the military is less apt to promote its special interests or challenge party policy
makers. This is not to imply that the military ever loses interest or influence over
Middle Eastern policy. Since that policy has a direct impact on Soviet national
security the military will always be consulted and their advice will be carefully weighed.
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However, in the absence of tangible benefits, the military seems far more content to
follow the policy chosen by party leadership.
The Soviet Union will impose a "ceiling of sophistication" on arms imports to client
states that will exclude weapons that might allow a client to initiate or escalate a regional
conflict unilaterally.
The Soviets were apparently less concerned with the sophistication of the
weapons transferred to Egypt and Syria than they were with the capabilities of those
weapons. The Soviets delivered large quantities of late-model defensive weapons to
Cairo and Damascus, such as surface-to-air missiles and intercepters. A "ceiling" was
imposed on offensive weapons, particularly those with an ability to strike deep into
Israel, such as bombers and surface-to-surface missiles. Even older weapons with these
capabilities rarely found their way into Arab inventories. This policy is clearly
designed to ensure the Soviet objective of avoiding the intervention of Soviet troops in
the Middle East. By providing their clients with a strong self-defense capability, the
Soviets minimize the chance of a client calling on them for military assistance. By
limiting a client's offensive capability Moscow minimizes the chance of a client starting
a war it cannot finish without Soviet intervention. Under no circumstances will the
Soviet Union allow a client to attain military' parity with Israel, to do so would
seriously undermine the Soviet ability to control events in the Middle East.
The greater the perceived strategic importance of a client, the greater its bargaining
strength.
Soviet foreign policy decisions are driven by concerns for Soviet national security.
When good relations with a client state becomes a strategic imperative for the Soviet
Union, that country can exercise enormous leverage in its dealings with VIoscow. For
several years Egypt demonstrated substantial bargaining strengths, as evidenced by the
Soviet decision to send combat troops to man Egyptian air defense in 1970 and the
increase in arms delivers after the Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972. It is possible
that Syria, as Moscow's foremost Middle Eastern client, now has a comparable level of
bargaining strength. The Egyptian case also showed that a client's bargaining strength
is derived almost exclusively from its strategic importance. Changing circumstances
can dramatically alter a client's relative worth to the Soviet Union, and end its ability
to alter Soviet policies successfully.
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
This study has identified the general pattern of past and present Soviet policies in
the Middle East, and has defined the prevalent Soviet goals and objectives in the
conduct of relations with its clients in that region. Having outlined past trends in
Soviet policy, using Egypt and Syria as examples, it is also possible to make some
general predictions regarding future Soviet behavior in the Middle East.
First, the preservation of Soviet-Syrian ties will be a high priority objective for
Soviet policymakers. Ties with Syria give Moscow an entree into Middle Eastern
affairs, ensures a Soviet voice in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and are instrumental in
allowing the Soviets to "deny" the region to the West. Additionally, access to Syrian
naval and air facilities is important to Soviet Mediterranean strategy. At this time the
Soviets lack an alternative to Syria as the cornerstone for their Middle East policy, so
they must be prepared to pay a high price for Syrian loyalty. If a break in Soviet-
Syrian relations does occur, it almost certainly will not be Soviet initiated.
Second, the Soviet military will continue to play a minor role in Soviet-Syrian
relations, and will not be inclined to question policies designed by the party. It would
not be surprising, however to see a noticable military interest in acquiring access to
overseas facilities closer to the current perceived American threat, possibly in India and
South Yemen (Indian Ocean) or Libya (Western Mediterranean).
Third, the Soviets will continue the transfer of highly sophisticated, defensive
weapons to its favored clients. A Soviet delivery of the MiG-29 Fulcrum, the Soviet
Union's latest fighter, but one optimized for air defense, would be consistent with this
policy. Deliveries of late-model surface-to-air missiles (SA-ll, SA-14) can also be
expected. In contrast, the Soviets will continue to withhold most offensive weapons.
The delivery of such a weapon system, for example the Fencer medium bomber, would
mark a significant change in Soviet arms transfer policy.
Finally, the Soviets will be very cautious in its approach to Middle Eastern
affairs. A renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities would be detrimental to Soviet interests
and could force the Soviets into a military intervention to rescue a faltering client. To
prevent such an occurrence the Soviets will be slow to support adventurist policies and
will counsel restraint in dealings with Israel and the West, as they have already done in
the Syrian case. This will not, however, prevent Moscow from seizing every
opportunity to undermine the American position in the Middle East.
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These predictions assume that Soviet policymakers will adhere to the general
guidelines observable in past Soviet policy behavior. This study has also shown that
very little in the Middle East is predictable, and that the Soviet Union, despite its size
and power cannot always dictate its own policy, but instead must respond to
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